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ABSTRACT 
 
Kurt Zemlicka: Public Argument and the "Human": 
Rhetoric, Values, and Difference in the Biotechnology Debate 
(Under the direction of Christian Lundberg) 
 
 
The past 50 years have seen rapid advancements in the fields of genetics, robotics, 
and nanotechnology  so called GRN technologies. In the realm of biomedicine, proposed 
applications include the capacity to manipulate patients at the genomic level. These 
manipulations will also alter any genes the patient passes on, permanently changing the 
genetic makeup of any of the recipient's offspring, their offspring's offspring, and so on. 
Once these technologies give us the possibility to start tinkering with our own genome, 
we will be able to, quite literally, reshape the building blocks of humanity, and thus 
compel us to question and define the essential qualities of the "human." 
The task of this dissertation is to provide both an examination of how debates 
over biotechnology in the United States have become enmeshed in positions that stagnate 
the debate and stifle the possibility for increased public deliberation  a goal all sides agree 
is necessary given the potential impacts of the technology. By looking at five specific 
cases ranging from debates over human cloning and reproductive technologies to the sex-
verification of Olympic athletes, I analyze the dominant tropes used by both sides to 
argue for either the total ban or continued development of a given biotechnology. In 
looking at the governing tropes in each debate, I aim to understand why each side has 
developed incommensurable positions in an attempt to reformulate how we can deliberate 
over these technologies in a more pragmatic way.  
 iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction:	  Arguing	  About	  Values	  and	  Our	  Future	  ................................................................	  1	  Framing	  the	  Biotechnology	  Debate	  ..............................................................................................................	  4	  Signifying	  the	  "Human"	  Beyond	  Language	  ................................................................................................	  7	  Arguing	  About	  Values:	  Why	  Rhetoric	  Matters	  ......................................................................................	  15	  Arguing	  About	  Our	  Future:	  Rhetoric	  and	  Psychoanalysis	  ...............................................................	  20	  Laying	  Out	  the	  Argument	  ...............................................................................................................................	  29	  PART	  I:	  READING	  MORAL	  ARGUMENTS	  PUBLICLY	  .................................................................	  36	  Chapter	  1:	  What	  Makes	  Us	  Special:	  Definitionality	  and	  the	  Debate	  	  Over	  the	  Concept	  of	  "Dignity"	  in	  Contemporary	  American	  Bioethics	  ..............................	  37	  Foundations	  of	  Dignity	  ....................................................................................................................................	  41	  Rhetoric,	  Definitionality,	  and	  Public	  Moral	  Argument	  ......................................................................	  48	  Definitionality	  and	  Stasis	  ................................................................................................................................	  65	  Conclusion:	  Fostering	  Public	  Moral	  Argument	  ......................................................................................	  79	  Chapter	  2:	  Should	  We	  Enhance	  the	  Human?	  Affect,	  Rhetoric,	  	  and	  the	  Trope	  of	  the	  "Human"	  in	  Contemporary	  American	  Bioethics	  .............................	  86	  Affect	  and	  Signification	  ...................................................................................................................................	  88	  The	  Biotechnology	  Debate	  ...........................................................................................................................	  116	  Conclusion:	  Incompossibity	  and	  Polysemy	  ..........................................................................................	  132	  PART	  II:	  ARGUMENT	  AND	  DIFFERENCE	  ...................................................................................	  137	  Chapter	  3:	  The	  Female	  Athlete	  Does	  Not	  Exist:	  Tropological	  Regress	  	  and	  the	  Sex-­‐Verification	  of	  Female	  Olympians	  ........................................................................	  138	  Olympic	  Sex-­‐Verification	  ..............................................................................................................................	  142	  
 iv 
Signifying	  the	  Woman	  ...................................................................................................................................	  158	  Tropological	  Regress	  .....................................................................................................................................	  168	  Chapter	  4:	  On	  Affirmation,	  Negation,	  and	  Modality:	  	  Debates	  over	  Human	  Cloning	  and	  the	  Rhetorical	  Engagement	  with	  Novelty	  ............	  178	  The	  Event:	  Human	  Cloning	  ..........................................................................................................................	  181	  The	  Dual	  Aporias	  of	  Rhetoric	  and	  Differentiation	  .............................................................................	  189	  Rhetorical	  Modalities:	  Schematizing	  Affirmation	  and	  Negation	  .................................................	  210	  Modality	  and	  Engaging	  with	  the	  Event	  ..................................................................................................	  216	  Conclusion:	  Affirming	  Pragmatism	  ..........................................................................................................	  229	  Conclusion:	  How	  to	  Argue	  About	  Values:	  Empty	  and	  Full	  Deliberation	  	  in	  the	  Biotechnology	  Debate	  ............................................................................................................	  235	  
Reproduction	  and	  Responsibility	  and	  New	  Directions:	  Rational	  Public	  Debate?	  ...................	  240	  Two	  Types	  of	  Deliberation	  ..........................................................................................................................	  258	  Full	  Deliberation	  and	  the	  Biotechnology	  Debate	  ...............................................................................	  267	  WORKS	  CITED	  ........................................................................................................................................	  275	  
 
 
  
 v 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AIS Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome 
 
ART Artificial Reproductive Technologies 
 
DSDs Disorders of Sexual Development 
 
DYZ1 Fraction of repetitive DNA found on the Y chromosome 
 
EVF Ex Vivo Fertilization 
 
IAAF International Amateur Athletic Federation 
 
IOC International Olympic Committee 
 
IVF In Vitro Fertilization 
 
NOC National Olympic Committee 
 
PCB The President's Council on Bioethics 
 
PCSBI Presidential Commission on the Study of Bioethical Issues 
 
SCNT Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer 
 
SRY Sex-determining region of the Y chromosome  
 
  
 vi 
LIST OF SYMBOLS 
 
( | ) The "bar" that separates the signifier from both its referent and other  
 signifiers 
 
a The Ego; the subject's imagining of itself 
 
a' Lacan's "other," the imaginary object the subject negates to have a positive  
 sense of self 
 
Es(S) A combination of Freud's Es, the "is" or the physical assemblage of the 
  self, independent of the Ego, and Lacan's conception of the signifier,  
 united as a physical entity caught in language independent of any  
 imaginary or symbolic coordinates 
 
S The signifier 
 
$ The "barred" or "split" signifier or subject 
 
The The impossible existence of a universal concept that follows it, for 
example, The Woman 
 
1  
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction: Arguing About Values and Our Future 
 
The past 50 years have seen rapid advancements in so-called GRN technologies – 
genetics, robotics, and nanotechnology. Yet while our current-day implementations of those 
technologies are already providing substantial benefits for existing biomedicine, most proponents 
and detractors of GRN developments are exceedingly interested in their potential future 
applications. While we do not yet possess the capacity to substantially augment, manipulate, or 
clone human embryos and adults, or engineer the genetic makeup of the unborn and living, many 
surmise that GRN development will inevitably give us the ability to do so. Thus, if left alone, 
research in these areas will inevitably give us the power to alter our biology in ways that have 
heretofore been unfathomable. With that power comes the fear that scientific advancement is 
currently occurring at an exponential rate, meaning that new uses for biotechnology may develop 
faster than our capacity to understand the moral implications that come with them. As such, 
bioethicists focusing on biotechnology have a peculiar task: to imagine the capacities of yet-to-
be-developed biotechnologies and to determine how they may challenge our current 
understandings of the purpose and morality of scientific research in the field. 
Two possible moral concerns over future biotechnological developments thus follow: 
First, advancements in GRIN technologies compel us to question and define the essential 
qualities of the "human." Since proposed GRIN applications include the capacity to manipulate 
patients at the genomic level, they offer the ability to substantially alter the basic parameters of 
human physiological and psychological capacities. Not only will these manipulations alter the 
genetic makeup of the recipient, they will also alter any future genes the recipient passes on, 
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permanently changing the genetic makeup of any of the recipient's offspring, their offspring's 
offspring, and so on. That means that once GRIN technologies give us the possibility to start 
tinkering with our own genome, we will be able to, quite literally, reshape the building blocks of 
humanity. Therefore debates over the desirability of these proposed technologies demand that we 
understand what components of our genome we want to change, what components we want to 
leave untouched, and perhaps most importantly, how do we draw a line between the two. If we 
may someday possess the capacity to permanently alter the genetic makeup of every future 
human being, we must investigate in whether those changes are desirable. In determining what 
genes we tinker with and how we create new human life, we are forced to ask questions about 
human self-understanding: what are the core components that make us human? Can we change 
some aspects of our genome and our reproductive practices without losing who we are? Even, 
should we be concerned with maintaining our humanity in the first place? Ultimately, in order to 
begin to answer the difficult questions concerning what human genes we ought to manipulate we 
are required to first answer the even more difficult question: what makes us human in the first 
place? 
Second, these advancements are increasingly challenging us to confront whether we 
should regulate the process of scientific advancement in biotechnology. Since that question falls 
under the realm of public policy, the desire for more sustained public deliberation over the issue 
is something that nearly all bioethicists agree is paramount to understanding their potential 
impact. However, the current state of the arguments about the morality of these biotechnologies 
render it difficult to facilitate the type of deliberative practices everyone seems to agree is 
necessary. With stakeholders arguing for or against biotechnological development by starting 
from radically incommensurable assumptions about the nature of the "human" and 
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biotechnological advancement more broadly, the general landscape of the debate seems devoid 
of the sustained argumentative interaction that is necessary for comparing one side to the other. 
As such, the capacity for collective judgment and meaningful debate, both essential components 
for the deliberative process, are stifled. As it stands, if more public deliberation were to take 
place within the current parameters of much of the biotechnology debate, the ability for the 
public to decide the merits of competing claims, much less advocate for certain policy proposals, 
is almost impossible given the difficulty in weighing one side against the other. 
The current state of bioethical debates in the United States, and the call for increased 
public deliberation that follows, chalenges the entire discipline of bioethics as it grapples with 
questions about future biotechnologies. Angus Dawson characterizes the discipline as "[having] 
no future: at least not in its present form … We need to face up to the fact that as a discipline it is 
has become stale and tedious. It is time to ask some fundamental questions about what bioethics 
is and where it is going."1 Part of the problem, according to M. Cathleen Kaveny, stems from the 
fact that "Most people … treat ethical claims (their own and others’) as an expression of a deeply 
held irrational feeling about a particular act or practice, rather than as an intellectually defensible 
moral judgment about the matter under discussion."2 Thus Kaveny laments, "I would not be 
surprised if many students come out of [undergraduate courses on bioethics] further convinced of 
the improbability of sustained, reasoned discussion about the most neuralgic questions of 
morality and public policy."3 Therefore, I aim to provide both an examination of how these 
                                                
1 Angus Dawson, “The Future of Bioethics: Three Dogmas and a Cup of Hemlock,” 
Bioethics 24, no. 5 (2010), 218. 
2 M. Cathleen Kaveny, “Rhetoric, Public Reason and Bioethics: The President’s Council 
on Bioethics and Human Cloning,” Journal of Law and Politics 20(2004), 497. 
3 Ibid. 
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discourses have become enmeshed in positions that stagnate the debate and stifle the possibility 
for public deliberation and to provide a possible way out. However, before I lay out the argument 
in more detail, it is worth exploring the parameters of the debate. 
Framing the Biotechnology Debate 
Leon Kass, the former president of the President’s Council on Bioethics (PCB), points 
out that biotechnological progress highlights: 
[The] weightiest questions of bioethics, touching on the ends and goals of the 
biomedical enterprise, the nature and meaning of human flourishing, and the 
intrinsic threat of dehumanization (or the promise of super-humanization). It 
compels attention to what it means to be a human being and to be active as a 
human being. And it gets us beyond our narrow preoccupation with the "life 
issues" … to deal with what is genuinely novel and worrisome in the biotechnical 
revolution: not the old crude power to kill the creature made in God’s image, but 
the science-based sophisticated power to remake him after our own fantasies.4 
As a result proposed biotechnological applications have become the nexus of an increasingly 
stratified debate between two ideological camps. The dominant position of most institutional 
bioethicists, Kass included, define themselves as "conservative bioethicists" or 
"bioconservatives." They argue that we are now at a point in history where our technological 
advancement threatens to outpace our ethical understanding of how to develop and utilize 
biotechnology. As Kass points out, "Many people are increasingly worried about where 
biotechnology may be taking us. We are concerned about … what we might do to ourselves. We 
are concerned that our society might be harmed and that we ourselves might be diminished … in 
                                                
4 Leon Kass, “Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Human Improvement,”  
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ways that could undermine the highest and richest possibilities of human life."5 Armed with 
these concerns, the movement has mobilized itself to inject traditionally conservative values into 
policy-making recommendations aimed at limiting the development and implementation of 
biotechnology. According to Yuval Levin, a leading scholar in the movement, "Bioethics, at the 
juncture of politics and science, is where the struggle for the character of the new 
biotechnological age will be waged. And conservatives are right to enter the fray as they have."6 
He outlines the conservative project as a "mission to prevent our transformation into a culture 
without awe filled with people without souls… And its achievement is, properly, a key priority 
of the American right."7 
 Eric Cohen outlines the five main themes of conservative bioethics: "(1) an 
understanding of human beings as ethical animals; (2) an understanding of human equality from 
conception to natural death; (3) a sensibility about the meaning of mortality; (4) an account of 
the nature of marriage, family, and procreation; and (5) an understanding of the character of 
human experience and human flourishing."8 Influencing all of these themes are the fundamental 
questions of what it means to have "a biological life" and what it means to have "a distinctly 
human biological life."9 The "distinctly human," from a conservative standpoint, refers to a life 
that begins at conception and ends at a death that has not been delayed by enhancement. 
Furthermore, human attributes must be worked toward in order to facilitate an appreciation for 
                                                
5 Kass, “Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Human Improvement.” 
6 Yuval Levin, “The Paradox of Conservative Bioethics,” New Atlantis 1(2003), 63. 
7 Ibid., 65. 
8 Eric Cohen, “Conservative Bioethics and the Search for Wisdom,” The Hastings Center 
Report 36, no. 1 (2006), 47. 
9 Ibid. 
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how they are attained. As Cohen explains, "cultivated bodies and cultivated minds must remain 
enough ‘our doing’ if they are to be worthy of genuine admiration."10 This logic applies to both 
physical and mental enhancements. Both the overcoming of physical limitations and the 
experience of psychic trauma are considered to be a prerequisite to "human flourishing" and thus 
need to be maintained in order for human beings to have a properly human life. Ultimately, the 
fundamental conservative argument against human enhancement is that technologies "aiming to 
improve one set of human attributes [risk] undermining the human whole that makes us function 
well in the first place."11 In other words, human enhancement technologies threaten to 
irrevocably disrupt our ontological status as human beings, and that ontological status ought to 
be preserved. 
 Opposed to the bioconservatives, there is a steadily growing number of bioethicists who 
believe that biotechnology represents a step toward what has become called posthumanity. Nick 
Bostrom argueds that if we follow the possibilities of enhancement technologies to their logical 
endpoint, we will enter a world radically different from our own. Bestowed with 
"superintelligence," posthuman inhabitants would possess the ability to fundamentally alter both 
themselves and their environment: "The superintelligent inhabitants of this world are autopotent, 
meaning that they have complete power over and operational understanding of themselves… An 
autopotent being could … transform itself into the shape of a woman, a man, or a tree. Such a 
being could also easily enter any subjective state it wants to be in."12 Biotechnologies, according 
                                                
10 Ibid., 51. 
11 Ibid., 50. 
12 Nick Bostrom, “Dignity and Enhancement,” in Human Dignity and Bioethics, ed. The 
President’s Council on Bioethics (Washington D.C.: The President’s Council on Bioethics, 
2008). 
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to this viewpoint, represent the tools that will facilitate the next step in human evolution and 
therefore their development is seen as a universal good. 
While both sides found their stances on a conceptual definition of the essential qualities 
of the "human," they provide vastly different understandings of its ontological grounding. For 
the bioconservatives, the most essential quality of the human is its "givenness" or "natural" state 
of being whereas the transhumanists argue that human beings are no different than any other 
evolutionary organism  our essential quality is to strive to better ourselves and our chances for 
continued survival and reduced suffering. For both sides, all arguments in favor of or against 
biotechnological advancement necessarily stem from their initial definition of humanity. Thus, at 
stake in the debate is not just the desirability of future biotechnologies, but also understanding 
how we define ourselves and how we signify that definition to others in a persuasive way. In 
other words, the side that controls the definition of the "human" controls the debate. 
Signifying the "Human" Beyond Language 
The inherent paradox in attempting to define the essential qualities of the "human," 
especially in ethical and legal discourses that rely on precise linguistic definitions, is that it must 
articulate something that supposedly rests in an "objective" reality outside of linguistic 
signification. As such, signifying the "objective" requires a specific act of linguistic labor: an 
artificial linkage must be created that attaches a signifier (the "human") to a concept (essential 
qualities of humanness). This is even more difficult given the fact that the concept of "essential 
humanness" is not a quantifiable object; additional signifiers must be linked to additional 
concepts and then solidified around a cogent, conceptual understanding of essence, which then 
must be linked back to the "human." Thus the field of discourse in bioethical debates is 
predicated solely on the artificial linking of the trope of the "human" to other tropes that 
themselves artificially coalesce to form a concept of essence. This assumption is not followed by 
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either side of the biotechnology debate. Instead, bioconservatives and transhumanists both claim 
that their definitions of the "human" are natural, not naturalized. One need look no further than 
their claims about the epistemological foundations of their definitions. Kass sums up the 
bioconservative epistemology through his characterization of the concept of biology, stating, 
"[There] are indeed profound and permanent incapacities and restrictions of biology. Moreover, 
these incapacities follow directly from biology's defects precisely in the matter of limits or 
boundaries … at any time, it faces the insuperable limitations posed both by the deficiencies of 
human reason and by the mysteries of its subject, life itself."13 The inability for humans to fully 
grasp complete knowledge of themselves establishes the epistemological framework from which 
bioconservatives naturalize their definitions of the "human"  the inherent unknowability of 
ourselves means that our biology is based on inalienable limitations that logically follow our 
incomplete grasp of ourselves. Conversely, transhumanist epistemology, as explained by Simon 
Young, is defined as, "the acquisition of knowledge viewed as a process of information retrieval 
by the evolved, self-recognizing, self-programming, embodies, organic information processor 
that is the human mind, in its own interests of ever-increasing survivability and well-being."14 
This is best achieved, according to Young, through science that aims to, "[enhance] human well-
being through the technological refinement of nature."15 By characterizing the "human" as an 
essentially knowable being, and one that seeks to preserve and enhance itself, the argument that 
biotechnological enhancement is both desirable and natural necessarily follows. How can two 
                                                
13 Leon Kass, Life, Liberty, and the Defense of Dignity (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 
2002), 278-9. 
14 Simon Young, Designer Evolution: A Transhumanist Manifesto (Amherst: Prometheus 
Books, 2006), 94. 
15 Ibid., 96. 
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radically opposed epistemological positions come from definitions of the same term? In order to 
explore that question, we will turn to each position in turn. 
The Rhetoric of the Bioconservatism: The Naturally Human 
I will begin by analyzing the conservative position as laid out in Leon Kass’s 
foundational text on the relationship between enhancement technology and humanity, "Beyond 
Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Human Improvement." Since the crux of the 
conservative position rests on the idea that some biotechnologies threaten to impinge on what it 
is that makes us human, Kass expends a considerable amount of time and effort defining the 
nature of the human species. He begins his argument with a series of questions that set up his 
objection. He first asks, "What is disquieting about our attempts to improve upon human nature, 
or even our own particular instance of it?"16 He answers his question: "If there is a case to be 
made against [biotechnology] we sense that it may have something to do with what is natural, or 
what is humanly dignified, or what is the attitude that is properly respectful of what is naturally 
and dignifiedly human."17 It is here that a shift from defining the "human" to defining its 
components begins to take place. To clarify what he means by "natural" and "humanly 
dignified," Kass indicates that these concepts revolve around three "human goods": "modesty 
and humility, about what we know and can do to ourselves," "the meaning of aging and the 
human lifecycle," and "the nature of human activity and human flourishing, and the importance 
of exercising the first and seeking the second through fitting means."18 Kass subsequently 
outlines his objective: to prove that these three "human goods" possess an intrinsic value that 
would be diminished with the implementation of enhancement technologies: 
                                                
16 Kass, “Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Human Improvement.” 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
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[Only] if there is something inherently good or dignified about the ways in which 
we engage the world as … seekers of our own special excellence and flourishing 
in whatever arena to which we are called—only then can we begin to see why 
those aspects of our nature need to defended… We must move from the hubris- 
tic attitude of the powerful designer to look [at] the proposed improvements as 
they impinge upon the nature of the one being improved.19 
Kass proceeds to unpack the three "human goods," attempting to explain both how each is good 
in and of itself and how enhancement technology threatens to disrupt their functioning in human 
essence. Kass’s attempt to isolate the ontological status of the human is constantly deferred; 
"natural" becomes "humanly dignified," which becomes "human goods" (consisting of three 
parts), which becomes "something inherently good or dignified about the ways in which we 
engage the world," which becomes "excellence and flourishing," which once again returns to 
"nature." Here we can see a continuous progression of deferral, which is the most basic and 
perhaps most important rhetorical form I will explore here since it permeates nearly all 
discourses on future biotechnologies. For the bioconservative position, this deferral hinges upon 
a very specific definition of “nature” or the “natural.” Recall Kass’s earlier comments on 
biology: the permanent inability of the human subject to fully understand itself through 
contemplation indicates a structural component of limitedness in nature that is so inherent it 
cannot be overcome or fully mastered. In this sense, there is always a remainder left at the end of 
any project of natural mastery  a forced limitedness that remains interwoven, yet independent 
from any attempts to fully master nature, human or otherwise. Working forward from this 
conception of the natural, we can see the deferral outlined above maintains a thread of “limits” in 
                                                
19 Ibid. 
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all of Kass’s characterizations of the “human”: “excellence and flourishing” along with the 
“inherent good or dignified” manner in which we engage with the world must stem from our 
inability to fully comprehend ourselves. With that inability comes the intrinsic limitedness 
inherent in the essence of the “human,” and thus strategically negates the desirability of 
biotechnological enhancement from the start. The form itself is strategic in that it continually 
effaces the fundamental disconnect between the signifier of the "human" and its supposed 
referent. While this means that the discourse must conceal this split in order to ground and 
authorize its authority to speak about the world outside of the sign, the appeal to the natural 
masks this split by appealing to the world independent of language. Hence, Kass’s definition 
becomes naturalized. 
The Rhetoric of Transhumanism: The Right to Evolve 
Whereas the conservative position seeks to formulate a definition of the "human" that 
stems from a set of continually deferred natural essences, the transhumanist position relies on a 
much simpler, yet no less deferred assumption: the "human" is a living organism that, like all 
other living organisms, has been "actively involved in enhancement." We have been "passive or 
at least unwitting participants in an evolutionary process" and thus seek to evolve new and better 
physical and mental capacities.20 In his book, Enhancing Evolution: The Ethical Case for 
Making Better People, John Harris lays out this position: 
This "progress of evolution" is unlikely now to be achieved accidentally or by 
letting nature take its course. If illness and poverty are indeed to become rare 
misfortunes, this is unlikely to occur by chance, even with the thousands of 
centuries … evolution requires. It may be that a nudge or two is needed: nudges 
                                                
20 John Harris, Enhancing Evolution: The Ethical Case for Making Better People 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 15. 
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that will start the process … of replacing natural selection with deliberate 
selection, Darwinian evolution with "enhancement evolution."21 
The posthumanist position grants no special status to the "human" vis-à-vis other species and 
does not attempt to identify a natural essence of humanity that would differentiate humans from 
other species. The overarching goal of humans as a species, as with the members of other 
species, is to enhance themselves collectively, the only difference between the human species 
and other species being, according to Harris, that we have "both the wisdom and the necessity of 
intervening in what has been called the natural lottery of life, to improve things by taking control 
of evolution and our future development to the point, and indeed beyond the point, where we 
humans will have changed, perhaps into a new and certainly into a better species altogether."22 
As part of his justification for our ethical responsibility to enhance ourselves, Harris 
frames the development of enhancement technologies as an inevitable part of evolutionary 
progression: "If we wish humankind to achieve its potential (which has so far almost universally 
been assumed to be an inevitable part of evolutionary progress)," he writes, "this might require 
some deliberate changes."23 Here the concept of the "human" is broken down into "achieving 
potential" and embracing the "inevitable part of evolutionary progress" that demands change. 
Thus a linkage is made between the achievement of human potential and acceptance of the 
inevitability of progress. Just as with the conservative position, the ontological grounding of 
humanity in the transhumanist account is theorized through deferred concepts that serve as the 
basis of ethical obligations. Since nature is presented here as any number of systems that seek to 
                                                
21 Ibid., 11. 
22 Ibid., 4–5. 
23 Ibid., 11–12. 
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integrate information and continually better themselves to ensure both their perpetual and more 
efficient existence. Thus, unlike the bioconservative position, limitedness is simply a starting 
point of the natural, one that is not insurmountable. The logic of the transhumanist conception of 
nature dictates that since the goal of any system is to continually overcome its own limitations, 
and since the distinction between the organic and the technological is only an arbitrary separation 
of two different systems, there is no reason the two cannot be integrated in the quest to abolish 
the limitations of human biology. While the concept of nature differs from the conservative 
position, it operates within the same basic rhetorical form. The claim that the essence of the 
“human” is to improve itself is effectively naturalized by attempting to draw on a world 
independent of language to authorize the split between nature and signification. Since both 
positions draw upon (competiting understandings of) the way the world “is” independent of our 
ability to describe it, they differ in content but not form. 
Furthermore, Harris links the notion of inevitable progress to a notion of choice. He 
argues that since humans are a product of evolutionary progress, it is indefensible to think our 
"particular sort of being is not only worth preserving in perpetuity … but to make sure that 
neither natural selection nor deliberate choice permit the development of any better sort of 
being."24 The concepts of progress and choice are thus disarticulated from the metaphor of the 
"human" in much the same way the good is disarticulated from the "human" in the conservative 
position and then elevated to their own metaphoric status as sites of significant rhetorical 
investment. Just as with Kass’s conception of human nature and human goods, progress and 
choice are imbued with a series of artificial linkages. For posthumanists, progress is portrayed as 
both inevitable and as an a priori good, and choice is framed as the inalienable right of us human 
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to alter and enhance our world in order to "make us better at doing some of the things we want to 
do," make us "stronger, more competent, more of everything we want to be." In addition, 
"enhancements will also make us less: less the slaves to illness, pain, disability, and premature 
death."25 The end result is that we "could build, or rather cultivate, [our world] into something 
that has greater value than a daydream."26 Here the process of naturalization through continual 
deferral is enacted through the idea of the human transcending itself – yet like the conservatives, 
transhumanist discourse constantly effaces its inability to clearly link together the signifier of 
"human" with a stable referent. In each case, Kass, Harris, and Bostrom choose quantity over 
quality in how they signify the "human," opting to ground their definitions in still other concepts, 
each pointing to something that exists outside of the chain of signifiers utilized by their 
arguments. This sort of signifier shell game thus presents both positions with an aura of stability 
and begins to account not only for their allure, but also their inability to engage with each other. 
The debate between conservative and posthumanist bioethicists is therefore enmeshed in 
an antinomy in which the concepts of human nature, human goods and flourishing vie with 
progress, evolution, a different human nature, and choice. This is problematic because the 
starting epistemic positions, which authorize the definitions that follow, are so entrenched that 
meaningful debate is precluded due to the structural inability for each side to clash with the 
other. Since the desirability of human enhancement necessarily follows from each side’s 
definition of the “human,” which in turn follows from their understanding of nature, the 
conclusion of each position is given in advance of any actual arguments for or against the 
biotechnology that enables it. What is needed is a reconceptualization of the bioethical project, 
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one that provides a more robust understanding of the artificial processes inherent in the 
competing discourses that define the state of much of the field. By doing so, we can move past a 
debate in which judgment is rendered in advance of the actual arguments for or against 
biotechnological enhancement and hopefully find a way past the stalemate of the current debate.  
My argument here is that turning to classical and poststructuralist rhetorical theory and criticism 
will provide one such possible reconceptualization. 
Arguing About Values: Why Rhetoric Matters 
When we argue about values, specifically when those values derive from particular 
ontological definitions of concepts (in this case the "human") we can examine the discourse as 
taking on a particular rhetorical valence. Instead of looking at the biotechnology debate as a 
series of parallel deferrals, we can then turn to rhetorical analysis to unpack the signifying 
processes that not only lead to those initial, incompatible deferrals, but also understand why 
those deferrals seem initially persuasive and logically complete. 
 Concerned with the ways in which meaning is both created and interpreted by subjects in 
a particular discourse, the study of rhetoric from Aristotle onward provides a logical starting 
point in analyzing how discourses that make particular normative moral claims affect a public. 
Concurrently, scholars of rhetoric are interested not just in the effectivity of discourse, but also 
the ways in which those discourses are formally structured – hence the dual emphasis in 
rhetorical theory and criticism on both the study of persuasion and trope. The concept of rhetoric 
that I forward in this dissertation seeks to be attentive to both "poles" of rhetoric by exploring the 
ways in which they interact with each other. In other words, I seek to examine the ways in which 
the formal elements of discourse, specifically in debates about biotechnology, exert effects on 
the subjects who participate in those discourses. To accomplish this, a careful examination of 
what I mean when I deploy the concept of "rhetoric" is required. 
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I’ll begin with the (seemingly) banal stipulation about the effectiveness of persuasion 
forwarded by Aristotle: audiences are most likely to be persuaded when they are not aware that 
they are being persuaded. In other words, if the rhetor makes his or her strategy apparent to the 
audience, the audience in turn is more likely to be suspect of the rhetor’s motives. Thus the basic 
parameter for crafting "effective" speech relies on the effacement of the artifice used to create a 
persuasive speech. Now, since rhetorical scholars have since moved away from the 
"intentionalist" reading of rhetoric, it is tempting to concurrently make the move that the 
intention of the rhetor is no longer important. Given the influx of poststructuralist influence on 
the field of rhetorical criticism, along with its dissolution of the subject and the subject’s 
intentions, this seems like a logical step. However, it is my contention that we can take into 
account the insights of the critique of intentionalism while still paying attention to the effacement 
of artifice as a key component in the effectivity of discourse. Foucault’s conception of the “Will 
to Truth” is insightful here, demonstrating that the critique of intentionalism and the deliberate 
effacement of artifice are not wholly incompatible with each other. In his “Discourse on 
Language,” Foucault lays out the basic parameters of what makes “true discourse” so alluring: 
“True Discourse, liberated by the nature of its form from desire and power, inescapable of 
recognizing the will to truth which pervades it; and the will to truth, having imposed itself upon 
us for so long, is such that the truth it seeks to reveal cannot fail to mask it.”27 Here I will draw 
on one of the methodological demands of Foucault’s project in that piece. He states, “We must 
conceive discourse as a violence that we do to things, or, at all events, as a practice we impose 
upon them; it is in this practice that the events of discourse find the principle of their 
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regularity.”28 For our purposes, this reworking of our understanding of artifice is in necessary. 
Specifically, following Foucault, I will conceptualize artifice not as a specific strategy deployed 
by a rhetor to persuade an audience, but rather the necessary condition for deliberations about 
values when those arguments draw their validity by speaking about the “natural” world outside 
of language. 
To theorize this precondition, I will turn to the work of Jacques Lacan, as well as several 
scholars who have been labeled "deconstructionist" in the United States, namely Jacques Derrida 
and Paul de Man. While each author’s vocabulary differs, they each make one fundamental 
presupposition: signifiers do not automatically relate in a one-to-one correspondence with 
signifieds. This cornerstone of poststructuralist thought plays out most thoroughly in Lacan’s 
work in terms of how signifiers exert effects on the subject. As such, I will take Lacan as my 
starting point. Understanding the intersection between Lacan and the study of rhetoric has gained 
momentum in recent years. Forays into the usefulness of Lacan’s theories seem to take two 
general trajectories: One the one hand, scholars like Thomas Rickert and Joshua Gunn utilize the 
work of Slavoj Žižek to explore the relationship between language’s effects on the subject 
through Lacan’s register of the Imaginary. In Gunn’s characterization of the register, "the 
imaginary [is] a social field of deceptions, principally … any conception that connotes 
completion, perfection, or symmetry."29 Gunn’s differentiates the psychoanalytic conception of 
fantasy from the method of fantasy theme analysis advocated by Ernst Bormann and others, 
"whereas fantasy in [fantasy theme analysis] is confined to fanciful invention about events not in 
the here and now, fantasy for Freudians is a reality structure that is always, in a sense, in the here 
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and now insofar as it is part of the construction of reality, the meaning of our social existence."30 
According to Rickert, "Fantasy is the framework through which desire operates or is given its 
orientation."31 But desire for what? Gunn offers potential examples ranging from John Edwards’ 
supposed ability to speak to the dead, to a talk show host "counselling others to be sexy."32 In 
each instance the fantasy "glosses over" particular traumas experienced by the subject in order to 
establish a cogent wholeness (I can talk with my dead relative, or I can be beautiful and 
overcome my flaws etc…). This is a potentially productive twinning of Lacan and the study of 
rhetoric because it provides an account of the way language can be effective in sustaining the 
fantasy of the subject. 
However, there is a second path that rhetoricians have forged in linking Lacan and 
rhetoric – namely understanding Lacan’s register of the Symbolic as the basic determinant of 
fantasy. According to Lundberg, "Gunn’s reading of the emergence of the subject and desire 
would benefit from a fuller account of the way that the entry into the Symbolic order is the 
primary (though suppressed) referent of [desire]. This reading of Lacan would have the benefit 
of eliminating the naive psychologism of solely intersubjectively mediated accounts of subject 
formation. This interpretation also has the benefit of accounting for jouissance or enjoyment as a 
constitutive factor in the formation and persistence of the ‘fundamental fantasy.’"33 This 
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invocation of the concept of the "fundamental fantasy" is important for my purposes here 
because it describes Lacan’s conception of the inherent dissonance between signifiers and 
signifieds. By focusing on the formal properties of symbol use in a given discourse (i.e. in the 
Symbolic register), we can explore the ways this dissonance allows for discourse to exert effects 
– namely through the deployment and effacement of artifice. Lundberg angles in this direction 
which his definition of rhetoric as both "signifying in a condition of failed unicity and a way of 
feigning unicity in the context of failed unicity. Failed unicity means … despite the subject’s 
presumption of an essential complementarity between language and the world, there is no 
automatic correspondence between signifiers, representations, and the objects to which they refer 
or between signifiers and that which they attempt to capture."34 He continues, "Feigned unicity 
between signs, representations, and their referents purchases the subject an ability to act as if 
words and representations effortlessly stand in for their referents … Rhetorical artifice … 
underwrites these practices, feigning unicity in the context of its failure."35 Thus the connection 
between Lundberg’s two conditions of unicity and artifice: Failed and Feigned unicity require 
that subjects utilize artifice in order to link together signifiers and signifieds. Added to that 
formulation then, is the condition that the artifice deployed by the subject is in turn effaced; 
subjects act as if they do not need to undergo the labor of instituting those linkages – speech is 
imagined as effortlessly communicable. 
One way of reading public deliberations about values, then, is examining what is effaced 
in the ways the arguments are forwarded. We can locate those points by exploring the rhetorical 
forms of deferral in public argument; try as they might, bioethicists cannot fully cement 
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signifiers to the notion of the "human" that exists outside of discourse. Locating places where 
they appear to "circle around" the concept, then, is a starting point into exploring the rhetorical 
elements of the discourse. Another element of this reading practice is the study what arguments 
are made and how they are effective. Here, then, is the twofold move I wish to make – an 
exploration of public moral argument from both the level of the argument and the level of its 
symbolic interaction with that which it tries to articulate. This, I believe, constitutes the 
rhetorical valence of arguments about values that can best account for both its effectivity and (in 
the case of the biotechnology debate) its stagnation.36 Using the biotechnology as an exemplar, I 
believe that bringing the conceptual tools of rhetorical criticism to bear on the study of public 
moral argument can provide insights not only into the ways the debate has reached an impasse, 
but also provide a tentative method for fostering public deliberations about values that do not 
stagnate in antinomy. 
Arguing About Our Future: Figuring Deliberation 
Arguments about future technologies fall under the purview of the Aristotelian species of 
deliberative rhetoric. Established in Book I of the Rhetoric, Aristotle argues for the future-
oriented nature of the deliberative genre. Utilized in instances of what should be done in matters 
of state, debates over normative claims rely on the power of a sort of imaginary fiat, or the ability 
to conceive of how the status quo would be altered by the implementation of a given policy or 
course of action. This temporal gesture is fundamentally different from the other rhetorical 
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genres, distinguishing deliberation from speech-acts aimed at persuading a judge or influencing 
an audience as to an orator's character. The forward-looking nature of the genre of deliberative 
rhetoric is highlighted in the cases of near- and far-future technologies, such as the proposed 
biotechnologies outlined in this dissertation.  
Since the technologies do not exist, or exist in a state of stunted development compared 
to their potential, the deliberations taking place over their proposed uses rely on a complicated 
deployment of temporality that imagines a world in which the technologies have been fully 
developed and then looks back at the conditions of possibility that enabled those developments. 
It is this act of looking back at the near-future as it relates to the far-future that is the ground of 
contestation in debates over the deployment of biotechnologies. In other words, policymakers 
and bioethicists must deliberate over whether or not to create the conditions of possibility that 
will foster or inhibit the future implementation of not-yet-developed technologies. My argument 
here is that this looking-forward to the far-future and then looking back to the near-future is a 
type of temporal imaginary highlighted by debates over biotechnology, and thus, can serve as an 
important microcosm in the larger field of public moral argument and the rhetorical strategies 
deployed in debates not only about the nature of the "human," but also public deliberation over 
how we ought live. 
Entelechy and the Future Perfect 
In both the Grammar and Rhetoric of Motives, Kenneth Burke highlights the temporality 
inherent in theorizing the essence of an object. He argues, "there is ... an ultimate 'Grammatical' 
incentive behind [imagining an essence] since a history's end is a formal way of proclaiming its 
essence or nature ..."37 Thus, there is a two-forked road one may travel when imagining the 
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essence of an entity: "the logical idea of a thing's essence can be translated into a temporal or 
narrative equivalent by statement in terms of the thing's source of beginnings ... there is also an 
ultimate of endings, whereby the essence of a thing can be defined narratively in terms of its 
fulfillment or fruition"38 This latter path is of particular interest to us here. To make this 
argument about essence-through-culmination, Burke draws upon Aristotle's conception of 
entelechy, "which classifies a thing by conceiving of its kind according to the perfection (that is, 
finishedness) of which that kind is capable.”39 To explain this process, Burke gives the example 
of the narrative of tragedy. He argues that the essence of the tragic plays out by identifying the 
motive "with a narrative figure whose acts lead to some fitting form of death.”40 In other words, 
the tragic poet "could define the essence of a motive narratively or dramatistically ... by showing 
how that motive ended.”41 What constitutes the essence of the tragedy qua tragedy is its 
completion, its "perfected" outcome that retroactively affixes meaning to the rest of the narrative. 
It is my contention here that, while Burke provides a twinned path for conceptualizing the 
essence of an object, the two are, in fact, one and the same. To imagine the essential "substance" 
of a thing is to imagine it in its perfected form – to imagine it from its beginning is to anticipate 
its full realization. This is precisely why arguments about the desirability of biotechnology 
necessarily require a definition of the “human.” By understanding the nature of humanity we can 
imagine its ideal form, deriving how biotechnology would enhance or detract from that ideal. In 
other words, when Burke speaks about the "narrativizing" grammar of essences, both looking for 
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origins and culminations ultimately rely on the same conceptual move: anticipating the 
perfection of the object, either through facilitating the conditions of its possibility, or pushing the 
concept to its logical limit. In each moment of anticipation, a narrative is formed; one that both 
advances the concept of the object and retroactively assigns the conditions of possibility for its 
perfection. This "narrativizing" of the concept of essence, Burke points out, is an inherently 
rhetorical (or artificial and concealed) act, one that presents a constructed teleology out of the 
context of an object and then presents that teleology as "natural." For, "there is ... an ultimate 
'Grammatical' incentive behind such imagery, since a history's end is a formal way of 
proclaiming its essence or nature ..."42 This serves as the basis for Burke's system of symbolic 
action compelled by motive, since, "Stimuli do not possess an absolute meaning ... Any given 
situation derives its character from the entire framework of interpretation by which we judge it. 
And differences in our ways of sizing up an objective situation are expressed subjectively as 
differences in our assignment of motive.”43 The use and concealment of artifice, the cornerstone 
of what I conceive of as the basis for rhetoric, is understood in Burke's terms as a motive – one 
that presents subjective, contingent experience as objectively fixed. To anticipate an end to a 
narrative is to retroactively affix it with an essence. 
This construction of an anticipation operates, among elsewhere, at the level of 
signification as demonstrated by the study of narratology. As Peter Brook asserts, "Perhaps we 
would do best to speak of the anticipation of retrospection as our chief tool in making sense of 
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narrative, the master trope of its strange logic.”44 Here then, the tropological nature of 
anticipation is not just a ritualized way to generate meaning, it also constitutes the formal charge 
of discourse as such. That is to say that Brook's determination that anticipation allows us to make 
sense of a narrative is not simply one way out of many, but rather is the fundamental 
precondition for the possibility of investment in a discursive economy; simply, anticipating the 
future motivates subjects to invest their signifying labor on the assumption that it will facilitate 
discourse to continue to work in the future. Bryan C. Short characterizes this anticipatory act as a 
condition for the production of meaning, stating, "A text progresses by anticipating its ending; 
that ending is not known but read toward through a process which tells its appropriateness by 
untelling other possibilities which are given by the text as possible conditions of meaning.”45 
Here we can expand on the work of the narratologists to the Aristotelean conception of rhetoric: 
the "end" in this case is not of a narrative, but rather an attempt to influence a particular outcome 
by a rhetor. To do this, the rhetor anticipates a world in which the audience undertakes an action 
(an act of conceptual fiat) and then outlines how the status quo would benefit from such an 
action. As Short argues, "In order to anticipate a truth whose foundations will emerge in the 
future (i.e., in practice), rhetoric relies on a corresponding anticipation of the responses of an 
audience.”46 Here Aristotle is coupled with Burke in that the attempt to persuade an audience 
relies on the projection of a possible future, narrativizing the outcome by linking it to the present.  
Psychoanalysis parallels this reliance on the future perfect, and thus situates itself as a 
suitable counterpart to rhetoric for understanding how we argue about the future. The entire 
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analytic process is predicated on the narrative restructuring of past events into an intelligible 
story of the history of the subject. Lacan characterizes the process: 
What we teach the subject to recognize as his unconscious is his history – in other 
words, we help him complete the current historicization of the facts that have 
already determined a certain number of the historical "turning points" in his 
existence. But if they have played this role, it is already as historical facts, that is, 
as recognized in a certain sense or censored in a certain order.47. 
Historicization in this sense follows along the same entelechological path as the retroactive 
restructuring of deliberative fiat. Each relies on the deployment of the future perfect. Lacan states 
in no unequivocal terms, "What is realized in my history is neither the past definite that was, 
since it is no more, nor even the perfect as what has been in what I am, but the future anterior as 
what I will have been, given what I am in the process of becoming.”48 Indeed, Short argues, 
"Analysis moves forward on the promise that at some point in the future the past will be 
understood. Understanding will always remain in the future, in the tense of 'what will have been,' 
because the repressed can never be disabled or put aside in the ongoing life of the personality.”49 
This brief digression into psychoanalytic nuance is necessary for our purposes here 
because it links together, in a critical way, the study of rhetoric and psychoanalysis. Specifically, 
the twofold movement as the defining characteristic of rhetoric, namely the use and effacement 
of artifice, gains a counterpart in psychoanalytic discourse through the concept of repression. 
Repression is seen as an attempt to present the inherently lacking and unstable signifying chain 
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as stable and natural, and in order to do so it must repress the fact that there is no primordial 
signifier, no zero degree relation between affect and the signifier – the split signifier, the $ for 
Lacan, we can conclude, is thus irreducibly rhetorical in nature; that is, the presentation of 
feigned unicity must comport to the fact that that unicity is always in a state of failure. This 
contortion of feigned and failed unicity occurs in the future perfect tense, the presentation of a 
discourse as natural is always displayed as having fended off a future in which the linkages fall 
apart. This is precisely why I have emphasized the retroactive nature of a variety of discursive 
operations throughout this dissertation – since each operation ultimately deals with anticipating 
the adoption of some technology or process, that anticipation must efface its own contingency. 
To accomplish this, it must be presented as if it always existed as such. Thus, at the moment of 
invention, these operations work rhetorically to efface their moment of inception by projecting 
an appearance of a history. 
Doubling the Future Perfect and Beyond 
Since both rhetorical theory and psychoanalysis have, at their core, a concern with 
understanding the temporal elements in signification, knitting the two together proves to be 
helpful in analyzing arguments about the future and their effects on and by the sign. But those 
operations are also constitutive of the structuring principles shared by each discourse – knitting 
them together in a conceptual congruency that yields insight into the formal charge of the sign. 
However, what separates rhetoric and psychoanalysis from other heuristic frameworks that 
deploy the future perfect is their characterization of the activity of an audience that engages, 
through investment, in the signifying process. Be it the audience of a speech, the analyst, or those 
who engage in a particular discursive economy, both the act of analysis and the use of rhetoric 
facilitate a second-order of the future perfect – a doubling of the tense that situates both analysis 
and rhetoric in a unique position via their characterization of the signifying process. As Short 
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argues, "[Psychoanalysis'] analytic principles legitimate the analyst's reading of the future 
direction of the analytic discourse," meaning, "psychoanalysis as a practical discipline 
necessitates a second, parallel level of the future perfect.”50 Concurrent with the patient's 
temporalized history, there is a second, parallel history – the direction of the analysis that 
undergoes the same narrativizing process. 
Likewise, rhetoric doubles the future perfect. Just as with psychoanalysis, there is a 
second-order of narrativizing that occurs through the act of criticism itself. Rhetoric, writes 
Short, "necessitates the emergence in the reading act of a seemingly a priori category of the 
literary, commonly understood in terms of the conventions of style, plot, and representation.”51 
Both rhetoric and psychoanalysis rely "on a doubled future perfect, on the emerging promise of 
seemingly a priori principles which in turn promise to validate and be validated by linguistic 
production.”52 However, the narrative of analysis does not guarantee itself in advance. Rather, it 
is emergent; it discloses itself in an anticipation of future linguistic interactions that will then 
ground current ones. In other words, rhetorical economies operate at the level of the future 
perfect – tropes are presented as a priori, or naturalized, in order to justify the labor that goes into 
naturalizing them as such. The double move of the use and effacement of artifice exists through 
just such an anticipatory gesture. 
Thus, when Derrida offers his critique of structuralism in "Structure, Sign and Play," he 
facilitates the movement toward a sort of poststructuralist poetics predicated on the anticipatory 
nature of tropological interaction. In other words, the move from "simple" oratory to 
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philosophical rhetoric, the study of the effectivity of language and discourse on rhetoricity 
depends on locating the double move inherent to rhetoric itself. Simultaneous use and effacement 
exist in what Derrida classifies as a "contradictorily coherent" state, "And as always," he writes, 
"coherence in contradiction expresses the force of a desire.”53. This gesture toward 
psychoanalytic theory is noted by the translator of the piece, Alan Bass, and coheres, I argue, 
with the temporalizing nature of both philosophical rhetoric and the psychoanalytic endeavor. 
Like Burke, Derrida makes a gesture towards the narrativizing nature inherent in the effacement 
of artifice. He argues, "And again on the basis of what we call the center (and, which, because it 
can be either inside or outside, can also indifferently be called the origin or the end, arche or 
telos), repetitions, substitutions, transformations, and permutations are always taken from a 
history of meaning [sens] – that is, in a word, a history – whose origin may always be 
reawakened or whose end may always be anticipated in the form of presence.”54. In other words, 
the Lacanian and Derridian insight that "there is no primordial signifier," or, "the signifier, as 
such, signifies nothing" indicates that there is a double gesture at the heart of any signifying act – 
the substitution of a signifier for an absent center and the presentation of that linkage as 
naturalized. In other words, the attempt to efface the artifice inherent in the linkages between 
signifiers and signifieds operates as a gesture forward that then looks back in order to provide the 
grounding for a linguistic economy as if it always-already existed as such. 
This brings us back to the future perfect. For Lacan, the temporary halting of the sliding 
chain of signifiers occurs retroactively by forming metaphors that anchor the anxious movement 
of the chain, but only in such a way that establishes “what will have been the conditions under 
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which signification can anchor itself.” The retroactivity anticipates the future conditions of stable 
linkages between signifiers and signifieds by positing itself as the basis for that stability. 
Analysis then doubles this anticipation by formulating a set of possible what-will-have-beens, 
allowing the analyst to ask the question what “what will have been” will have been the condition 
for anchoring the sliding chain of discourse? 
To circle back, perhaps fittingly (or retroactively), to Aristotle: We can now see, with the 
insight of poststructuralist assumptions about the nature of the sign, why the deployment of 
conceptual fiat is necessary in deliberative rhetorical argument. When we argue about the future, 
we do so in the context of the future perfect – not as a simple act of imagining the future, but 
rather because the basic conditions of the possibility of signification require that we do so. To 
argue about the implementation and development of near- and far-future technologies, the 
deliberative mode of rhetoric demands that we do not simply forecast their existence. Rather, we 
imagine their existence and then retroactively look back at the conditions of possibility that 
enable that existence. Put another way, we ask "what will have been the conditions of the present 
that allowed for the development of these technologies?" The Aristotelean insight is that when 
we study the nature of argument, the simultaneous deployment and effacement of artifice, we 
double this conceptual act. The premium on contingency emphasized by Aristotle allows the 
rhetorician to compare competing claims about the desirability of near- and far-future 
technologies in a way that asks: "what ‘what will have been’ will have been?" This future perfect 
can thus be understood both as the fundamental force for the imposed naturalization of the 
various tropes of the “human” I will explore throughout this dissertation and its doubling can be 
understood as a basic parameter for analyzing the tropes and their effects. 
Laying Out the Argument 
The dissertation is divided into three sections. In the first and second sections I attempt to 
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deconstruct the various facets that broadly characterize the scope and character of the 
biotechnology debate. In so doing, I hope to "diagnose" the problems in the debate by pushing at 
the boundaries of the various discourses and examining where and why they have led to 
stagnation. Most of the chapters explore a series of reports put out by the President’s Council on 
Bioethics (PCB), a grouping of scientists and ethicists assembled under executive order by then-
president George W. Bush. I chose to deal with these texts in the most detail because they 
represent the most sustained exploration of the potential uses and abuses of future 
biotechnologies at the highest level of government in the United States. While I also examine 
other key texts in the debate, my sustained focus is on the most visible documents that have 
provoked the most responses – meaning the President’s Council reports take center stage. 
The first section, comprising of chapters one and two, deals specifically with the 
argumentative strategies deployed by both sides of the biotechnology debate. In the first chapter, 
I explore a volume published by the PCB on the potential applications of the concept of "human 
dignity" in bioethics dealing with future biotechnological developments. While the concept has 
gained significant momentum in recent years – by those both in favor and opposed to new 
biotechnologies – its definition remains frustratingly deferred. The report studied in the chapter 
attempts to provide some possible definitions, but, I argue, it cannot provide any grounds for 
those definitions. Simply: if we ought use the concept of dignity as a guiding principle in our 
bioethical policies, we ought also be able to define the term, yet as it stands, we seem no closer 
to coming up with an acceptable definition. To explain this phenomenon, I develop the concept 
of "definitionality" as a characteristic of key terms in a debate that have no definition, yet entire 
moral or ideological systems rely on the attempt to define them. Since requiring a concrete 
definition of "dignity" is, at best, a near Sisyphean task, I posit a reformation of the notion of 
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stasis points in debates that rely on arguments from definition. I argue that if we were to abandon 
the Aristotelean notion that all stasis points require pre-given topoi to be determined, we could 
better understand the point of contention in the debate over "dignity," allowing for new forms of 
public moral argument to take place. 
The second chapter continues to explore arguments from definition, this time examining 
a PCB report on the desirability of future biotechnologies that will significantly alter a human’s 
physiological and psychological makeup. Here the contested concept is no less than the 
definition of the "human." In order to untangle the debate between conservative bioethicists 
(represented by the PCB’s report) and transhumanists over the desirability of human 
enhancement, I theorize how the discourse is not fully reducible to a process of signification 
because it purports to define the real, or that which is beyond the grasp of the signifier. To do 
this, I explore a Lacanian theory of affect in order to understand both why attempting to define 
the "human" exists in a state of failed unicity, and how the artifice deployed by both sides is 
concealed by feigning a zero-degree relationship between ontological concepts and signifiers.55 I 
believe an understanding of the psychoanalytic conception of affect, often under-theorized due to 
the popularity of Deleuze’s use of the term, also provides insight into how investment occurs in 
discourses about values. Thus, I believe the concept, in its psychoanalytical valence, can become 
a useful way for rhetoricians to locate and talk about discourse that not only is pushed to the very 
limit of signification, but also explore the basic conditions for its very possibility. It is at this 
limit, I argue, that investment in a discourse is most pronounced. This is because, at those sites, 
the desire to conceal artifice is at its highest – in other words, it is at its limit that a discourse is 
                                                
55 Zero-degree is here understood as a direct relation between signifiers and signifieds, or a 
method of signification that is not inherently tropological in nature. See: Groupe Mu, A General 
Rhetoric (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981). 
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most rhetorical in nature. Taken together, chapters one and two provide a reading strategy for 
locating the places where the biotechnology debate "breaks down" into stalemate at the 
argument-level. 
The next section, chapters three and four, explore how proponents and detractors of 
biotechnology utilize not just competing arguments, but also competing understandings of 
difference and novelty. This section has two goals: First, whereas the first section looked 
primarily at the level of the arguments used by each side, this section examines the basic 
presuppositions that authorize the making of those arguments. Second, I theorize how we might 
begin to triangulate the theoretical insights of poststructuralism, psychoanalysis, and rhetorical 
theory. Chapter three, the only chapter where I do not explicitly deal with a PCB report, 
examines the debate over so-called "sex-verification" practices at the Olympic Games. Known 
previously as "sex checks," these testing regimes are meant to verify that athletes who identify as 
female and enter in sex-segregated events do not have any "unfair advantages" over their 
competitors – to ensure that they are not "men masquerading as women." To understand this 
controversy, I deploy Lacan’s concepts of feminine and masculine knowledge, outlined in 
Seminar XX, to demonstrate what the psychoanalytic paradigm can tell us about multiple ways 
of conceptualizing difference – in this case, sexual difference. This psychoanalytic reading also 
provides insight into the ways that discourse constantly responds and reshapes to expressing a 
perfected form that cannot be realistically attained – namely by the endless proliferation of 
invented tropes that refer only to each other in a deferred relationship from their referents. 
In chapter four I take up trope and invention. There, I shift my exploration of difference 
from psychoanalysis to poststructuralism and rhetorical theory. By examining a PCB report on 
human cloning, I argue that proponents and detractors of human cloning technology rely on 
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seemingly incommensurable understandings of novelty and difference. Drawing upon both Paul 
de Man’s and Gilles Deleuze’s readings of Nietzsche, I lay out those different understandings of 
difference in terms of dialectical negation and Nietzschean affirmation in order to theorize how 
discourses on human cloning engage with novel applications of reproductive technologies. While 
affirmation and negation have traditionally thought of as incommensurable with each other, I 
attempt to theorize a possible "third way" by exploring de Man’s concept of undecidability – a 
concept that exists as a foundation of his understanding of rhetoric. Undecidability, I argue, 
provides a helpful way for thinking about impasses in debates over reproductive technology and 
allows us to imagine a way to interpret their development in a way that is neither wholly 
skeptical nor blindly permissive. For de Man, rhetoric is stuck in an undecidable position 
between the study of persuasion and the study of trope, I advance this argument by connecting 
these two poles to the modes of affirmatively and negatively engaging difference, respectively. 
To explain how the fusing of affirmation and negation with the study of persuasion and trope 
implicate both the study of rhetoric and the debate on cloning specifically, I theorize an 
understanding of rhetorical modalities, taken from narratology, to explain both why affirmation 
and negation appear incommensurable and how we might fuse the two together. I argue that 
understanding how proponents and detractors of human cloning technology operate on different 
modal planes of signification in an attempt to account for the impasse in the debate. A modal 
understanding of each discourse is therefore critical to beginning to theorize a way of 
interpreting various biotechnology debates that allows for the possibility of both increased 
pragmatism and more robust public deliberation. 
Having attempted to deconstruct the problems of the biotechnology debate on both the 
level of the arguments made and the presuppositions those arguments follow from, I conclude 
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with a potential reconstruction and direction for inviting more robust public deliberation on the 
topic. I examine one last PCB report, this one on artificial reproductive technologies, along with 
the inaugural work done by the Obama Administration’s Presidential Commission on the Study 
of Bioethical Issues on future biotechnologies. Both reports, along with much of bioethical field, 
call for increased public deliberation to assess the ethical status of biotechnological development. 
Uniting these calls is a demand to strip away the “mere” rhetoric in much of the debate, isolating 
the “facts” of the issues from the “values” of the stakeholders. I argue that this is both impossible 
and represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the rhetorical nature of the debate due to its 
very structure. To propose an alternative, I turn to Lacan’s work on the concept of “full speech.” 
I argue that in order for the contemporary biotechnology debate to foster the type of public 
deliberation all sides agree is necessary, we must reorient ourselves to the debate and its goals. 
Specifically, I argue that a possible role for the critic in this instance is to operate much like a 
Lacanian analyst. In so doing, I outline a call for a more “full deliberation,” or one that both 
acknowledges the rhetorical structure of the debate and abandons a rationalist communicative 
model. I believe that this framework advances the debate in a direction that not only allows for 
the possibility of better public deliberation, but also allows for ways in which rhetorical critics 
can analyze public debates that stagnate in seemingly immobile, deadlocked perspectives. 
Ultimately, the goal of this dissertation is twofold: to explain why the biotechnology debate has 
reach a point of stagnation and to outline one possible method to address it. While the alternative 
provided in the conclusion is only one way to refigure the debate, the work done in the previous 
four chapters, I believe, can at least start a conversation – a more "full" conversation – about the 
state of the debate over biotechnological development that will, hopefully, through the rhetorical 
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analysis of its arguments and presuppositions, provide a way to move past the stalemate that 
makes up much of the field. 
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PART I: READING MORAL ARGUMENTS PUBLICLY 
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Chapter 1: What Makes Us Special: Definitionality and the Debate over the Concept 
of "Dignity" in Contemporary American Bioethics 
 
Given the nature of rapid technological advancements in the fields of biomedical 
science, genetics, nanotechnology, and other related fields, there is increasing pressure on 
the part of policymakers, philosophers and bioethicists to ensure that our moral 
understanding of those technologies keeps up with their rate of growth. This is no easy 
task, since, as Adam Schulman, the former senior research consultant of the President’s 
Council on Bioethics (PCB), argues, "the march of scientific progress that now promises 
to give us manipulative power over human nature itself … will eventually compel us to 
take a stand on the meaning of human dignity, understood as the essential and inviolable 
core of our humanity."1 Because of the nature of the questions involved with the 
development and eventual implementation of these technologies, understanding the 
definitional specificity of the "human" has taken a lead in contemporary bioethical 
debates, with the notion of "human dignity" as its companion. However, Schulman 
continues, "That human dignity might be at least problematic as a bioethical concept is 
suggested by the many ways it gets invoked in bioethical debates, often on different sides 
of the same issue."2 Thus, in order to attempt to clarify some of the ambiguity of the 
concept the PCB issued a 555-page 2003 report on the concept, appropriately titled, 
                                                
1 Adam Schulman, “The Tangled Sources of Human Dignity,” in Human Dignity 
and Bioethics, ed. The President’s Council on Bioethics (Washington D.C.: The 
President’s Council on Bioethics, 2008), 17. 
2 Ibid., 24. 
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Human Dignity and Bioethics. Then President George W. Bush commissioned the PCB 
in 2001 with Executive Order 13237, which established a council to "advise the President 
on bioethical issues that may emerge as a consequence of advances in biomedical science 
and technology." 3 Human Dignity and Bioethics is one of several reports put forth by the 
council, which cover a range of topics from stem-cell research and end of life care to 
biotechnological enhancement and human cloning. The goal of the report on dignity is to, 
in part, respond to critics like Ruth Macklin, who argue that, "Dignity is a useless concept 
in medical ethics and can be eliminated without any loss of content."4 Thus, according to 
the former executive director of the research staff at the PCB, F. Daniel Davis: 
… after carefully reading and reflecting on these essays, most readers will 
reject Macklin’s conclusion that human dignity is a "useless." concept and 
will, instead, find their understanding of questions and issues in 
contemporary bioethics deepened and enriched. That is the hope and aim 
of the President’s Council in publishing this volume of essays on the 
bioethical significance of human dignity.5  
The report consists of six parts, each attempting to outline the potential for the concept of 
human dignity in various aspects of the biomedical field and serves as a microcosm for 
the larger debate over dignity in bioethical debates over biotechnological advances. 
So too does it serve as a microcosm for a specific form of public debate: it is an 
                                                
3 George W. Bush, “Executive Order 13237,” (2001). 
4 Ruth Macklin, “Dignity is a Useless Concept,” BMJ 327, no. 7429 (2003), 1420. 
5 F. Daniel Davis, “Human Dignity and Respect for Persons: A Historical 
Perspective on Public Bioethics,” in Human Dignity and Bioethics, ed. The President’s 
Council on Bioethics (Washington D.C.: The President’s Council on Bioethics, 2008), 
54. 
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example of competing public moral arguments over the interpretation of a term that 
cannot be finally defined. As I will argue in this chapter, these terms represent a special 
case of public moral argument, one where the Aristotelean notions of stasis cannot be 
reached, and thus under the current rubric of much of the field of the study of the form, is 
therefore a failure – hence Macklin’s objection. However, it is my contention that these 
arguments should not be abandoned because they allow for mutually exclusive 
definitions of the same term, but rather should be studied because of it in order to explain 
a necessary refiguration of the study of public moral argument for cases such as the 
debate over "dignity." This refiguration relies on three key moves:  The first is an 
explanation of the concept of "definitionality," understood as a set of characteristics 
inherent to polysemous terms which channel high levels of affective and ideological 
investment, are undefinable, and yet the entirety of the contestation over them requires 
the impossible attempt at a final definition. Second, I look to alter the conception of stasis 
as understood by Aristotle in order to move to a model developed by Hermagoras. This 
move, I argue, is essential to understanding how a stasis point can and is reached in the 
impasse of attempting to define terms with high levels of definitionality. The move is 
also a normative one: instead of embracing an Aristotelean stasis predicated on shared 
topoi, I argue that we should seek to foster an antagonistic model that ensures the 
continued debate over highly definitional terms such as "dignity" in order to facilitate the 
radical possibility of judgment. This brings me to the third move, a shift of emphasis 
from a search for answers to the question of "dignity" to what Michel Meyer calls a 
"problematological" approach. This approach seeks to constantly "problematize" the 
possibility of finally answering the question of "dignity" in order to facilitate continual 
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attempts at defining the term. Far from embracing argumentative nihilism, this approach 
seeks to both admit and foster the impossibility of affixing a final definition to a term 
with high definitionality. Rather, the debate is socially productive though its indefinite 
continuation, and with it, the possibility for judgment that is not artificially constrained to 
any set of possible answers. This possibility for judgment, I argue, is the foundation for 
public moral argument. Unlike the current debate, more robust forms of public argument 
cannot be given in advance. In other words, the stasis points in the current debate 
prefigure the outcome prior to any actual debate. A reformulation of the debate is then 
necessary, one that does not render judgment as a mere fait accompli based on each sides’ 
initial presumptions. 
This chapter proceeds in four sections. In the first I lay out the foundations for the 
debate over dignity and provide a theoretical grounding from where the concept is 
derived from in the PCB report. Second, I explain the concept of "definitionality" as it is 
expressed in the debate over dignity and argue that the report itself is a microcosm for 
public moral arguments over highly definitional terms. Third, I critique and move away 
from an Aristotelean conception of stasis as it is articulated in contemporary scholarship 
on public moral argument. I offer a move instead to a Hermagorean theory of stasis, one 
that does not prefigure the possibility of argumentative closure in advance, and thus 
serves as a better framework for understanding how arguments over terms with high 
levels of definitionality "work." Finally, I conclude with some implications for public 
moral argument theory more broadly, arguing that this alternative view of stasis 
demonstrates a possible addition to the field when debates with high levels of affective 
and ideological investment occur over terms with high definitionality.   
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Foundations of Dignity 
The lineage of the notion of dignity as it is used in contemporary American 
bioethics is located around a set of four sources. The first stems from antiquity in the 
classical tradition. According to Schulman, "The word ‘dignity’ comes to us, via the 
Latin dignus and dignitas, from Greek and Roman antiquity, in whose literature it means 
something like ‘worthiness for honor and esteem.’"6 Dignity played the most prominent 
role in the philosophy and outlook of the Stoics, who believed that all human beings 
possessed the capacity to live a dignified life. As Schulman points out, "For the Stoics, 
human beings have dignity because they possess reason, and the best life, the life 
according to nature, is available to anyone who chooses to live in a thoughtful or 
reflective way."7 This thoughtfulness and reflexivity is intrinsic to the human itself – it 
cannot be added to by external circumstances such as wealth, food or social standing, and 
thus cannot be stripped away by any misfortune that may befall a subject. This, according 
to Martha Nussbaum, creates a problem when the Stoic account is used as a foundation 
for political thought since it does not take in to consideration any aspects of social justice 
or politically-granted rights or healthcare.8 As she argues, "But it turns out that dignity, 
radically secure within, invulnerable to the world’s accidents, doesn’t really need 
anything that politics can give. So the appeal to dignity grounds a practical attitude that is 
either inconsistent or quietistic."9 Thus she seeks to develop an account, still within the 
                                                
6 Schulman, “The Tangled Sources of Human Dignity,” 6. 
7 Ibid., 7. 
8 Martha Nussbaum, “Human Dignity and Political Entitlements,” in Human 
Dignity and Bioethics, ed. The President’s Council on Bioethics (Washington D.C.: The 
President’s Council on Bioethics, 2008), 355. 
9 Ibid. 
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classical tradition, that takes into consideration external factors based on circumstance 
that can be the foundation of a political theory of dignity. 
Turning to Aristotle, Nussbaum argues that dignity, similar to the Stoic 
conception, is based upon the capacity sentient beings. However, she departs from the 
quietist Stoic view by arguing that, "These capacities are, however, dependent on the 
world for their full development and for their conversion into actual functioning."10 Thus: 
The Aristotelian view sees capacities as worthy of respect, but as yet 
unfulfilled, incomplete. They are dynamic, not static: they tend toward 
development and toward exercise, or at least the opportunity for exercise. 
They are preparations for something further, they demand space within 
which to unfold themselves. Human beings (like other sentient beings) are 
endowed with capacities for various forms of activity and striving, but the 
world can interfere with their progress toward development and 
functioning.11  
This view, according to Nussbaum, facilitates the possibility of a capacity-based view of 
dignity allowing for a foundation of bioethics that escapes the pitfalls of the Stoic view. 
However, the definition of capacity is itself vague and still open to contrasting 
interpretations based on this view of dignity. At best, it seems, Nussbaum’s view seems 
to "pass the buck" from dignity to capacity, continuing the problems of dignity for 
bioethics, just twice-removed from the concept. For example, it is possible that two 
potential, mutually exclusive arguments can be made, forming an antinomy in the 
                                                
10 Ibid., 357. 
11 Ibid., 358.
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following way: Take, for example, that the debate over biotechnology (the genetic 
enhancement of the physiological and psychological capacities of the human). 
Simultaneously, an argument for enhancement can be made based on the belief that 
enhancement technologies will enrich our capacities for intelligence and strength, while 
an argument against these same enhancements can be made by stating that they will 
diminish our capacities for understanding and valuing human limitations, thus falling into 
the trap outlined by Macklin of the concept of dignity being used to argue both sides of a 
bioethical issue. 
The second possible approach, according to Schulman, stems from the Bible. 
Here, dignity, as, "suggested by the Book of Genesis, has to do with the special position 
of man in the natural world: within that realm man is like God not only in having 
stewardship or dominion over all things, but also because he alone can comprehend the 
whole and he alone concerns himself with the good of the whole."12 According to David 
Gelernter, a bioethicist and fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, all conceptions of 
dignity, as understood from contemporary bioethics, is derived from a Judeo-Christian 
lineage. Specifically, "It seems to me that ‘human dignity’ as bioethics understands it is 
actually a sanitized version of "human sanctity"– one that has been purified of all traces 
of religion."13 This notion of sanctity carries with it an enthymematic argument that 
human beings are inherently "set apart" from other animals, and that setting apart occurs 
because they are made in the image of God. The problems with dignity in contemporary 
                                                
12 Schulman, “The Tangled Sources of Human Dignity,” 355. 
13 David Gelernter, “The Religious Character of Human Dignity,” in Human Dignity 
and Bioethics, ed. The President’s Council on Bioethics (Washington D.C.: The 
President’s Council on Bioethics, 2008), 395. 
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bioethics, therefore, occur when the religion is sanitized from the discussion. Gelernter 
argues, "When we switch from sanctity to dignity, we switch from a world in which the 
unique set-apartness of man is grounded in our ideas (or perceptions) of God to a world 
in which the unique set-apartness of man isn’t grounded in anything, is indeed 
merely asserted."14 This line of argument has prompted several bioethicists, including the 
former president of the PCB, Leon Kass, and others, to attempt to inject Judeo-Christian 
beliefs back into bioethical debates.15 Opponents to this brand of thinking argue that 
bolstering bioethical claims with religious doctrine is inherently problematic. Not only 
does it violate the fundamental tenant of the separation of church and state, but, as 
philosopher Daniel C. Dennett argues: 
On the face of it, the idea that all our striving and loving, our yearning and 
regretting, our hopes and fears, depend on some secret ingredient, some 
science-proof nugget of specialness that defies the laws of nature, is an 
almost childish ploy: "Let’s gather up all the wonderfulness of human life 
and sweep it into the special hidey-hole where science can never get at!" 
Although this fortress mentality has a certain medieval charm, looked at in 
the cold light of day, this idea is transparently desperate, implausible, and 
risky: putting all your eggs in one basket, and a remarkably vulnerable 
basket at that. It is vulnerable because it must declare science to be unable 
to shed any light on the various aspects of human consciousness and 
human morality at a time when exciting progress is being made on these 
                                                
14 Ibid. 
15 See: "Defending Human Dignity" by Kass in Human Dignity and Bioethics as 
well as the chapters from Robert P. Kraynack and John Neuhaus in the same volume. 
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very issues.16  
While Dennett states the issue quite strongly, his discomfort with basing federal science 
policy on Judeo-Christian conceptions of dignity resonate with many bioethicists given 
the increasingly hostile attitudes toward scientific research leveled by the religious right. 
Furthermore, locating dignity firmly within the Judeo-Christian tradition falls into yet 
another antinomy: As Schulman points out, "‘being made in God’s image’ could even be 
taken to imply a special responsibility on our part to perfect nature in order to finish 
God’s creation. Interpreted in this way, the idea of human dignity could lend support … 
to a defense of such activities as in vitro fertilization or even cloning, here understood as 
fixing nature in a godlike way."17 At the same time, Kass argues, "Yet man is, at most, 
only godly; he is not God or a god. To be an image is also to be different from that of 
which one is an image. Man is, at most, a mere likeness of God," and thus the 
technologies mentioned by Schulman should be considered ethically dubious.18 
The third conception of dignity used in contemporary American bioethics is 
informed by the work of Immanuel Kant. Whereas the conservative viewpoint articulated 
by thinkers such as Kass relies on biblical or religious interpretations of the concept, most 
liberal-secularist bioethicists turn to Kant. Specifically, he links together the concept of 
dignity (Würde) with autonomy and thus offers an attractive definition of the term, one 
                                                
16 Daniel C. Dennett, “How to Protect Human Dignity From Science,” in Human 
Dignity and Bioethics, ed. The President’s Council on Bioethics (Washington D.C.: The 
President’s Council on Bioethics, 2008), 44–45. 
17 Schulman, “The Tangled Sources of Human Dignity,” 8. 
18 Leon R. Kass, “Defending Human Dignity,” in Human Dignity and Bioethics, ed. 
The President’s Council on Bioethics (Washington D.C.: The President’s Council on 
Bioethics, 2008), 325. 
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that even Macklin, in arguing we should abandon dignity altogether, prefers as a 
conceptual replacement.19 As Deryck Deyleveld and Roger Brownsword argue in one of 
the few other comprehensive texts on dignity and bioethics, liberal-secularist views on 
bioethics should draw on the work of Kant, and in particular "we need to begin our 
engagement with Kantian thinking, for it is in Kant’s writing that we have not only the 
seeds of many of our ideas about human dignity but also a serious attempt to ground 
those ideas."20 According to Susan M. Shell, Kant’s conception of dignity stems from his 
notion of the categorical imperative, expressed as a command that states, "So act that you 
use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the 
same time as an end, never merely as a means."21 The idea that human beings can never 
be a means to an end is intrinsically linked to their unique capacity for autonomy as a 
value that is "beyond price." In other words, it is linked to a belief that there is something 
impervious to commodification that is inherent to any human being. Specifically, Shell 
argues that, "A physician or researcher informed by Kantian principles will thus retain a 
sense of the ultimate mysteriousness of life – not on dogmatically religious grounds but 
as an extension of the speculative modesty that flows from a critical awareness of the 
necessary structure and limits of human cognition."22 However, problems with this 
account arise when put into practice. As many have pointed out, the problem with this 
                                                
19 Macklin, “Dignity is a Useless Concept,” 1420. 
20 Deryck Beyleveld, and Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and 
Biolaw (Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 2001), 47–48. 
21 Susan M. Shell, “Kant’s Concept of Human Dignity,” in Human Dignity and 
Bioethics, ed. The President’s Council on Bioethics (Washington D.C.: The President’s 
Council on Bioethics, 2008), 355. 
22 Ibid., 343–44. 
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view of Kant’s concept of dignity is that its basis on the categorical imperative provides 
little flexibility in the context of modern bioethics. The arguments leveled against Kant’s 
inflexible deontological position are particularly prescient in bioethics circles, where the 
discipline prides itself on ethical applications on a case-by-case basis. Furthermore, as 
Schulman points out, "the doctrine of rational autonomy itself, clear and unambiguous 
though it may be in theory, can be difficult to apply in practice, especially in a biomedical 
context."23 For example, Schulman argues, how are we to take into account those with 
diminished or not-yet-existing rational autonomy – specifically the very old and the very 
young? Kant’s conception of dignity seems to have purchase in the middle of human 
existence, but provides little help around the edges. 
The final source of inspiration for the current trend of dignity in contemporary 
American bioethics comes from international declarations and constitutions written in the 
wake of World War II. Both the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights contain the concept in order to, "point beyond the prosaic 
safeguarding of ‘rights’ advocated in the American founding … or in the writings of John 
Locke … and other modern natural right theorists."24 However, according to Nathan 
Rotenstreich, "precisely because the idea has become so current, the justification behind 
it and its particular meaning has become rather blurred, vague, or even ambiguous."25 
Thus at best it seems like these documents seem to gesture toward the concept of dignity 
without outright defining it. Their gesture in using dignity, similar to the way it is used 
                                                
23 Schulman, “The Tangled Sources of Human Dignity,” 11. 
24 Ibid., 12. 
25 Nathan Rotenstreich, Man and His Dignity (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1983), 9. 
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currently in bioethics, seems to be that there is something intrinsic to being human that 
requires safeguarding against, or enhancement from, biotechnologies. This leads 
Schulman to conclude, "because of its formal and indeterminate character, the notion of 
human dignity espoused in these constitutions and international declarations does not 
offer clear and unambiguous guidance in bioethical controversies."26 In the end, these 
documents echo a move made by the Belmont Report, issued by the National 
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral 
Research, the original precursor to the PCB and the first major, government-sanctioned 
report on bioethics in the United States. Belmont concludes that there needs to be a strong 
respect for persons in biomedical research, specifically outlining the uniqueness afforded 
to human subjects in the wake of the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment. The report outlines 
autonomy as one of the driving factors in the concept of uniqueness, and does not 
specifically use the language of dignity, but its gesture seems to resemble the UN 
declarations mentioned above, namely that there is something special about being human, 
something that needs to be protected in the field of bioethics. Ultimately however, 
Belmont is no clearer than the UN declarations, Kant, the Bible, nor the Ancient Greeks 
and Romans when it comes to laying out the specific principles of human dignity as they 
ought to apply to contemporary biotechnological research and its implementation.  
Rhetoric, Definitionality, and Public Moral Argument 
So why the fuss over the concept of dignity? Lacking a substantial definition, it 
seems the field of American bioethics could be served by heeding Macklin’s advice and 
abandoning the concept. Yet as the PCB’s report on the concept demonstrates, there is a 
substantial investment by the bioethical community, especially in the field of public 
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moral argument, to hold fast to the claim that simple patient autonomy is necessary yet 
insufficient given current and near-future biotechnologies. Both proponents and 
detractors of the implementation of new forms of biotechnological advancement utilize 
the term in order to justify their positions. For example, Leon Kass outlines a laundry list 
of "various aspects of human dignity that are at risk in our biotechnological age," from 
"the dignity of human procreation." and "the dignity of nascent human life," to "the 
dignity of dying well," and nearly every conceivable aspect of dignity in-between.27 On 
the other end of the political spectrum, Nick Bostrom argues that biotechnology would 
enhance dignity, stating, "This dignity would not consist in resisting or defying the 
world. Rather, [it] would be a dignity of the strong, consisting in self-restraint and the 
positive nurturance of both internal and external values."28 Given this clear example of 
Macklin’s objection to the term, the temptation to expunge dignity from the vocabulary 
of bioethics is a strong one. But dignity as a concept is not going anywhere, and thus it is 
important, if not necessary for any bioethicist or critic to explain its use given its 
prevalence. I aim to explore how the concept of dignity is used in a specifically rhetorical 
way in the above instances as well as throughout the PCB’s report. In fact, it is not in 
spite of Macklin’s objection to the concept, but precisely because of it that investigation 
into the rhetorical use of the concept is warranted, since, if we are stuck with dignity as a 
founding principle of contemporary American bioethics, then explaining how, and more 
importantly, why it is deployed is critical to perhaps untangling the knot not only of 
dignity in bioethics, but the contour of public bioethical argument in the United States – a 
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task that becomes increasingly relevant given the inevitable march of biotechnological 
development in the coming century. 
Publics 
Carole Blair, Greg Dickinson, and Brian L. Ott offer a broad conception of the 
study of rhetoric as, "The study of discourses, events, objects, and practices that attends 
to their character as meaningful, legible, partisan, and consequential."29 Specifically, they 
argue, what separates rhetoric from other methods of criticism, "is that it organizes itself 
around … what it means to be ‘public.’"30 This last point is especially critical – the study 
of rhetoric must be mindful of the ways in which a specific audience, or public, is created 
and maintained by a mode of address. In the context of bioethics, as Christian Lundberg 
and Ross Smith argue, the study of rhetoric takes as its "pedagogical object the 
cultivation of general capacities for public discourse," and those capacities are "practiced 
not by informing a public that exists in advance, but rather by building a specific public, 
endowed with specifically public capacities, around issues of bioethics."31 Lundberg and 
Smith note that publics, "are made by concrete moments of attention to the circulation of 
texts … text-based arguments about bioethics issues only succeed insofar as they cobble 
a public of attention around an issue or a story. The task for reporting and critical 
commentary on bioethics issues is thus to constitute a public around an issue, not to 
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inform ‘the public’ of an issue that is presumed to be of its interest in advance."32 
Therefore the first step in untying the dignity knot is to take notice of the public(s) 
constituted by public moral argument over the concept. Specifically, the work by the 
PCB on dignity can and should be read as calling forth (and not merely addressing) a 
public interested in its findings. This conclusion brackets the constitution of the public 
formed (be it the Executive branch, Congress, policy and lawmakers, or "the general 
public." writ large) and instead focuses on the types of publics that are called into being 
through the discursive economy in which the text enters. I am less concerned with the 
specific members of address in which the text aims, and rather at the discursive 
circulations of text-based publics the PCB report enters in to.  
This view seems corroborated by the stated goal of the report, and indeed the 
PCB’s mission in general, not to reach a consensus on bioethical issues. John D. Moreno 
explains: 
Although there was much criticism of the intellectual orientation of the 
most influential members of the Council, what I found most interesting 
was the fact that its charter explicitly excluded consensus as a goal of the 
Council’s deliberations. Evidently those who participated in developing 
the Council’s charter believed that consensus too often suppresses 
important viewpoints, that it thereby slippery slope reasoning … I only 
note that the formal anti-consensus orientation distinguished it from other 
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bioethics commissions.33  
This anti-consensus stance frames the debate over “dignity” by locating competing 
definitions of the concept as the frame for the debate that takes place in the report. In 
order to assess the quality of the debate in the report, specifically as it relates to fostering 
the types of public engagement required by the mission statement of the PCB, we first 
need to look at the way bioethicists have traditionally understood moral argument as it 
relates to the other main subset of the field: medical ethics.  
According to Nancy M. P. King and Michael J. Hyde, "Scholars of public moral 
argument make their living by studying the symbolic capacities of human beings, 
especially as these capacities show themselves in situations that call for the production of 
discourse as a means to coming to terms with the matters at hand."34 Within this context, 
there is an underlying assumption that, "Science and society have built an exceedingly 
and increasingly complex community around biomedical technology. Scholars, scientists, 
policymakers, and the public all therefore need to be able to talk together in this 
community."35 Uniting this call for community is the belief that there must be a capacity 
of publics to interface with the scientific, scholarly, and policymaking community in 
order to achieve a clearer framework about what ought to be done given the new 
challenges that arise out of biotechnological advancements. In other words, societies, 
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especially democratic ones, need to be able to argue about values. Since there will 
inevitably be competing claims about the way we believe the moral contours of the 
society should take (and increasingly, the role and status of the "human" in those 
societies as exemplified by arguments about dignity), there needs to be a way to address 
these competing claims through public discourse while still maintaining our democratic 
system. Hence, scholars of public argument believe that the need for developing an 
understanding of public moral argument is becoming increasingly prescient. 
Outside of the biotechnology debate, public moral argument in the context of 
bioethical inquiry relies on two key assumptions. The first is the idea that arguments 
about values cannot take place in the abstract, but rather are reliant on the application to 
specific cases. As David Zarefsky notes, this is one of the critical moments where the 
study of rhetoric intersects with the study of moral argument. Specifically, he argues, "we 
have to make value judgments by arguing for the applicability of one or another value to 
the specific case. This involves the ancient faculty of prudence, or what the Greek’s 
called phronesis, practical wisdom. It is not conclusive, nor final, nor generalizable. The 
same methods and materials are available to advocates on both sides of the dispute."36 
Zarefsky concludes that in a democracy, "moral authority comes from the ability to make 
arguments, grounded in both moral principle and in the circumstances of a specific case, 
and to gain the assent of one’s fellows."37 Thus there is an inherent tension between the 
idea of phronesis and the application of moral principles independent of the case. For 
                                                
36 David Zarefsky, “Arguing About Values: The Problem of Public Moral 
Argument,” in Bioethics, Public Moral Argument, and Social Responsibility, ed. Michael 
J. Hyde, and Nancy M. P. King (New York: Routledge, 2012), 6. 
37 Ibid., 13. 
54  
example, those who believe that biotechnology will impinge upon human dignity often 
(and especially in the case of a few contributors to the PCB report) argue for a universal 
ban on certain technologies based on moral grounds. The often ideal call in the study of 
public moral argument in bioethics for a level of pragmatism is often eschewed in the 
context of specific cases for the generalizable application of a given technology. In other 
words, all forms of cloning, or abortion, are unjustified regardless of the specific 
instances of cases at hand. Ultimately the specificity of phronesis, or capacity for 
judgment in specific cases, takes a back seat to the general phronesis of the technology 
writ large. 
This has led thinkers such as Moreno to raise the point that debates about 
biotechnology, and indeed bioethics in general, is fundamentally different from other 
debates about medical ethics.38  This leads Moreno to ask the question: "is bioethics 
merely ideology masquerading as public moral philosophy?"39 He ultimately believes 
that this is not the case, but there is still debate on the issue. The reason Moreno’s 
question is exceedingly salient is that foster’s a belief that in order to establish a fulcrum, 
a stasis, in which discussion can take place requires the disclosure of the assumptions 
made behind the arguments advanced a priori. In this sense, according to Moreno, 
consensus on an issue can be reached "only in the historical context of the preconditions 
and preconceptions that define our everyday existence and its ‘worlds of know-how’: 
those domains of traditions, customs, rules, norms, and routines that inform the common 
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and the ‘normal’ ways we perceive, think, and act in our daily lives."40 Only once we 
disclose and understand our preconceptions, the argument goes, can we find points of 
common ground that allows us to argue from a position of stasis whereby "real" or 
"thick" moral public argument can occur. The PCB’s report on dignity can be seen as one 
such "ground-clearing" task, one that seeks to lay out the potential starting points of 
conceptions of dignity that will allow for engaged discussion over biotechnological 
issues, not "mere" ideological posturing that refuses to engage with the other side. This 
quest for stasis is expressed by John Lyne in arguing that, "the general culture 
incorporates scientific and quasi-scientific language, authority and modes of explanation 
into its talk about matters of common interest."41 
Arguing About Definitions 
The biotechnology debate strays from a case-by-case analysis in favor of 
sweeping claims about the desirability of the technology writ large. This is because all 
arguments about biotechnology inevitably stem from a definitional prerequisite. 
Questions such as "when does life begin?", "how ought life end?", and "what makes for a 
dignified life?" all hinge on the hinge on specific definitions of the nature of the human 
lifecycle and indeed humanity itself. John Lynch notes the importance of the act of 
defining in public argument about scientific practices, stating, "Rhetorical practices fulfill 
two functions for public deliberation. The first function is the creation of ‘real 
definitions,’ argumentative strategies establishing quasi-stable points from which 
individuals can make sense of the world and argue for various courses of action. The 
                                                
40 Ibid., 15–16. 
41 John Lyne, “Quantum Mechanics, Consistency, and the Art of Rhetoric: Response 
to Krips,” Cultural Studies 10(1996), 128. 
56  
second function is to make these real definitions comport with the public’s ideological 
commitments so they can become the basis for collective action … Definition is a key 
step in any debate or discussion."42 The idea of the "real definition" of a term stems from 
a rhetorical act whereby the rhetor argues that "definitions are grounded in timeless or 
eternal essences."43 Specifically, as Richard Weaver argues, the goal of this position is, 
"getting people to see what is most permanent in existence, or what transcends the world 
of change and accident. The realm of essence is the realm above the flux of phenomena, 
and definitions are of essences and genres."44 Edward Schiappa outlines the criticism of 
this position that stems from an indictment of metaphysical certainty. He argues that 
arguments for "real definitions" are part and parcel of a naïve realism that assumes a 
zero-degree relationship between objects and words. This belief, that we have access to 
the "real" of the object by locating its essence and then are able to uniquely suture that 
essence to a word in a one-to-one relationship has largely fallen out of style with many 
philosophers.45 This leads Schiappa to conclude that, "proponents of new definitions can 
produce better arguments if they recognize that definitions do not and cannot describe 
things-in-themselves but report or advocate functional relationships between words and 
people.46 Schiappa’s conclusion is thus that public discourse intent on defining terms 
ought "to eschew ‘real’ definitions as ethically suspect and philosophically 
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problematic."47 This line of argument characterizes much of the thinking against "real 
definitions" and toward the social construction of concepts in much of rhetorical theory 
dealing with arguments about definition. 
However, the alternative proposed by Schiappa is simply to point out the 
contingent nature of the definitional apparatus and warn against the dangers of supposed 
zero-degree language in definitions.48 Lynch points of the shortcomings of this position, 
arguing that, in actual public discourse, definitions are fluid and serve to provide a stasis 
point for public deliberation.49 Specifically, Lynch argues, "rhetorical scholars should 
reconfigure their understanding of real definitions and view them not as manifestations of 
naïve realism but as the precondition for collective social action. Definitions play an 
important role in shaping people’s psychological consensus about the world. This 
consensus determines what counts as 'real' for a given group of people."50 In the context 
of issues related to scientific definition, Lynch points out that, "Definition’s capacity for 
creating our consensus about the ‘real’ dovetails with the positioning of science as the 
source of objective knowledge about the world … arguments made through definition can 
become the basis for collective action more readily when the definition is treated as a 
matter-of-fact observation the arguer merely notes in passing. By treating a definition of 
fact and presenting it in language borrowed from science, one bolsters the strength of the 
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argument by making it appear as a feature of the world beyond debate."51 This last point 
is critical to bioethical public moral argument. Essentially Lynch is arguing from a 
position that states, "Yes, I concede Shiappa’s position, but that’s not how debates 
function in the real world. In actual public moral argument, definitions are couched in 
scientific discourse that attempts to present itself as outside of debate." 
Here I would like to split the difference between the two positions. I agree with 
Lynch’s characterization that both the general assumption in bioethics, and more 
specifically much of the literature on theorizing public moral argument, rely on the 
assumption that terms can and should be defined, and that those terms tend to change 
meaning over time. However, Schiappa and others are right to point out that the task of 
formulating "real definitions" is always an artificial and arbitrary act. Perhaps a more 
fruitful way to understand the parameters at play in the debate over "dignity" is to fuse 
the discussion about the rhetorical construction of "real definitions" with the application 
of persuasive definitions to the theory of strategic maneuvering as outlined by Frans H. 
van Eemeren and Peter Houtlosser. Their theory follows the pragma-dialectic model of 
argument theory developed by the same authors, which seeks to "survey ... all speech acts 
and combinations of speech acts that have a constructive function in the various stages of 
the process of resolving a difference of opinion."52 In its initial stage, the pragma-
dialectic theory of argument analysis attempted to outline the parameters of any speech 
acts engaged in resolving a difference of opinion by fusing dialectical analysis, or the 
"maintenance of critical standards of reasonableness," with pragmatics that seek to define 
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"all argumentative moves as speech acts functioning in a context of disagreement."53 The 
result, they hoped, was to develop an "analytic description for what argumentative 
discourse would be like if it were solely and optimally aimed at resolving a difference of 
opinion."54 van Eemeren and Houtlosser later added a rhetorical dimension to the theory 
by acknowledging that people engaged in argumentative discourse are not only interested 
in adhering to the normative rules of debate, but are also "interested in resolving the 
[debate] in their own favor."55 To explain this dimension, they developed the concept of 
strategic maneuvering, which accounts for the ways in which "parties seek to meet their 
dialectical obligations without sacrificing their rhetorical aims. In so doing, they attempt 
to exploit the opportunities afforded by the dialectical situation for steering the discourse 
rhetorically in the direction that serves their own interests best."56 The definition of 
rhetoric utilized by van Eemeren and Houtlosser is quite specific: "As far as it is pertinent 
to pragma-dialectics, rhetoric is the theoretical study of the potential effectiveness of 
argumentative discourse in convincing or persuading an audience in actual argumentative 
practice."57 Within this narrow definition, they limit the concept of strategic maneuvering 
to cover roughly what the speaker chooses to say in terms of the "topical potential" of the 
debate and how he or she constructs the speech act in terms of "audience-directed 
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framing" and "presentational devices."58 Strategic maneuvering thus attempts to bridge 
the "yawning conceptual and communicative gap" between the two strands of 
argumentative analysis characterizing the field up to that point: a dialectical approach that 
seeks to outline the normative parameters of the arguments used in a debate to determine 
their soundness and validity, and a rhetorical approach that seeks to analyze the strategic 
ways in which speaker utilize arguments to achieve their argumentative goals.59 
Zarefsky insightfully applies the concept of strategic maneuvering to arguments 
about "persuasive definitions," in that arguments over how to apply "non-neutral 
characterizations of a concept that conveys a positive or negative attitude about 
something in the course of naming it."60 In these instances, two of the goals of strategic 
maneuvering are explicitly present: taking "advantage of connotative meaning, using 
language in a way that will give a boost to one's position," and advancing "claims and 
evidence that are acceptable to a particular audience but might well is unacceptable to a 
different particular audience."61 By applying the concept of strategic maneuvering to the 
practice of formulating persuasive definitions, Zarefsky seeks to further unite the strands 
of dialectical and rhetorical approaches to the study of argument. Specifically, in 
persuasive definitions: 
[Explanations] of strategic maneuvering in dialectic and rhetoric are 
different but analogous. The differences reflect the fact that dialectic takes 
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place between interlocutors and is an interactive mode in which 
commitments can be made explicit, whereas rhetoric takes place between 
an advocate and an audience and is a relatively one-way presentational 
mode in which audience commitments must be guessed or anticipated. 
The analogues are that in both cases the allegation of faulty strategic 
maneuvering is itself a strategic maneuver, that making the allocation is 
just the beginning of an inventional process rather than the end of the 
matter, and that even sustaining the allegation may not be enough (since 
the par- ties may not be committed to the rule), so that disputes about the 
legitimacy of strategic maneuvering coexist with other disputes in an 
actual controversy.62 
Of course, for Zarefsky, persuasive definitions are a specific type of argumentative 
strategy in which naming something prefigures its value. As an example, Zarefsky 
explores the naming of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 as an act of war, which 
thus authorized then-president George W. Bush to enact his desired response to the 
attacks based on a framing that the country was united in a war against terrorism.63 For 
Zarefsky, arguments about persuasive definitions explicitly differ from arguments about 
definitions "in which the dispute is overtly and explicitly about whether a concept or 
situation should be defined in a certain way ..."64 In other words, his application of the 
concept of strategic maneuvering applies specifically to arguments over naming 
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something in this or that way instead of arguments over how a certain name applies to 
this or that concept. 
However, I believe that the application of the concept of strategic maneuvering 
can be applied equally to both directions of arguments, both the naming of objects 
(persuasive definitions) and the attachment of objects to names (argument about 
definition). However, in the case of the latter, the distinction between the dialectical and 
rhetorical analysis of the arguments are drastically altered – particularly in arguments 
about the definition of conceptually ambiguous, highly ideologically and affectively 
invested terms. Whereas in the case of persuasive definitions, Zarefsky points out that 
"strategic maneuvering has exactly the same meanings and implications in dialectical and 
in rhetorical argument, as a normative idea" since "[from] the dialectical perspective, 
strategic maneuvering coexists with but does not trump the desire to resolve a 
disagreement; the goal of the activity is a constraint that influences judgments about the 
acceptability of any case of strategic maneuvering. From a rhetorical perspective, the goal 
of persuading an audience is not only not a constraint but would seem to encourage 
whatever strategic maneuvering would be effective; in that sense, strategic maneuvering 
is all there is."65 Yet in arguments about definition, specifically in the case of debates 
over the concept of "dignity," it is much more difficult to synthesize the distinction 
between a dialectical analysis of the arguments which aims to develop a normative 
framework for optimizing the argumentative strategies aimed at resolving the debate and 
a rhetorical one that seeks to examine the effectivity of those arguments independent of 
their normative status. This is because, unlike persuasive definitions, dialectical and 
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rhetorical analyses do not yield the same result. Simply, there can be no normative rules 
for the arguers to follow until the rhetorical effectivity of the arguments presented by 
each side are evaluated by demarcating the purview of the contested concept. Put another 
way, there are essentially two mutually exclusive normative frameworks at play in the 
debate over "dignity," one advanced by each side, that are in a state of undecidability 
that's resolution is contingent upon resolving the debate over the definition. 
Paradoxically, once the definition of the concept is settled, the normative rules for 
arguing over what the definition is will also be clearly outlined. This, of course, can only 
happen retroactively; the rules for the debate will be applied to the entirety of the debate 
once its resolution is reached. Thus, various arguments about how to define "dignity" are 
attempting not only to define the term itself, but also to provide a framework over how 
we go about defining the term in the first place. 
In the debate over "dignity," we can see several levels of strategic maneuvering at 
play, confirming Zarefsky's assertion that "the charge of [the] invalidity [of a particular 
strategic maneuver] does not permit a self-evident resolution. Making the charge is itself 
a strategic maneuver and is only the beginning of a process of invention, not the end of 
the matter."66 Of course, the assertion is confirmed in a way that differs from his 
intention. For Zarefsky, the layers of strategic maneuvering operate procedurally, that is, 
once the parties debating agree on the parameters of the debate (call it the first level of 
strategic maneuver) they then can proceed to the specifics of the debate itself (the second 
level where strategic maneuvering takes place) and so on. However, in the case of the 
debate over "dignity," all levels of strategic maneuvering operate concurrently, not 
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procedurally, in that the resolution of one level resolves all the other levels. For example, 
in attempting to define "dignity," one might assert that dignity defines the finite length of 
the human lifecycle and humanity's inherent physiological and psychological limitations. 
In so doing, one is not only making arguments from a rhetorical perspective in an attempt 
to persuade others to the desirability of defining "dignity" as such, but one is also 
outlying the normative rules for defining the concept in the first place: "dignity" is an 
inherently restrictive concept that requires us to interpret it from a perspective of the 
types of limitations it places on the capacity of human beings. Likewise, if one were to 
argue that "dignity" is the capacity for human beings to alter themselves and their 
environment in an attempt to produce the most human and non-human goods, the concept 
is expansive in that it cannot only be diminished, but also enhanced. In its expansive 
sense, the potential enhancements of human capacity must be weighed against human 
limitations, rigging the game in favor of increasing human capacity, whereas in its 
restrictive sense, those expansions of capacity cannot be evaluated since they intrinsically 
result in a reduction of dignity in the first place. Therefore, the normative rules that 
authorize what we can even consider to fall under the purview of "dignity" are 
paradoxically only established once the concept is defined in the first place. 
However, far from rendering the concept of strategic maneuvering useless, this 
understanding of the inherent contestation over the normative framework of the debate 
and its reliance upon its substantive resolution frames the concept in a new way. The 
implication of Zarefsky's claim that "there is no alternative to persuasion in order to 
influence the judgment of a specific audience; it is all strategic maneuvering, all the way 
down," applies not only to the ways in which participants attempt to frame their 
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arguments to fit within the normative parameters of the debate, but also to the ways in 
which they attempt to frame the normative parameters themselves.67 
In sum, the application of the concept of strategic maneuver to arguments about 
definition accounts for the rhetoricity of what I will call the defininitionality of a term: 
the act of presenting a definition as if it were an essential definition, as if its 
characterization were beyond debate, is a rhetorical act that inherently simultaneously 
discloses and effaces its own artifice. While the goal of defining terms as discussed by 
Lynch is to establish "quasi-stable." points of stasis that serve as the location in which 
each side of an issue can argue and prompt collective action, my argument here is that 
this is a fundamental mis-reading of the effect of stasis points. Rather than escape the 
aforementioned "Schiappa problem," the points of contention exemplify it. The endless 
attempt to define a term by disclosing the long string of ideological assumptions each 
side brings to the table in a public bioethical debate does not allow us to move forward 
through establishing a common vocabulary but rather facilitates the very antinomies 
inherent in the PCB’s report through the nature of a term’s definitionality. Stasis in this 
sense, therefore, does not represent a point that allows sides to argue from a common 
ground and progress forward, but rather fosters incommensurable definitions of the same 
term that ensures the continued stalemate of the debate. 
Definitionality and Stasis 
A term contains a high level of definitionality when it is definitionally ambiguous, 
ideologically invested, and the existence of a moral or ethical system rests on its 
attempted definition. There are three sources that I draw on to reach this provisional 
understanding of the concept. The first is Michael Calvin McGee’s ideograph. Defined as 
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a term that is inherently "pregnant" with meaning, ideographs, "signify and ‘contain’ a 
unique ideological commitment; further, they presumptuously suggest that each member 
of a community will see as a gestalt every complex nuance in them."68 Terms with a high 
level of definitionality are ideographs since the compulsion to define them serves as the 
main site of ideological investment. Concepts like "dignity" are ideological in that their 
definitions are presented as "real," in Weaver’s sense even if they are metaphysically 
pluralist as per Schiappa’s argument. This explains the inherent unquestionability of the 
ideograph as outlined by McGee.69 Definitionality thus accounts for the way in which 
ideographs become saturated with ideological commitments, specifically in the way that 
the compulsion to define is how they become situated "in real discourse, functioning … 
as agents of political consciousness."70 That concepts such as "dignity" can serve as the 
locus of competing ideological investments speaks to its high level of definitionality. 
However, even within a framework of competing interpretations, there is one consistent 
commitment that unifies all parties in attempting to define the highly definitional term. 
To explain this, I turn to the second foundational source of the concept. 
The second source of inspiration for the concept of definitionality comes from one 
of McGee’s readers: Maurice Charland's notion of constitutive rhetoric. He gives an 
account for the processes of ideological interpellation inherent to the mode of address of 
a rhetorical act:  
[Interpellation] occurs rhetorically, through the effect of the addressed 
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discourse. Note, however, that interpellation does not occur through 
persuasion in the usual sense, for the very act of addressing is rhetorical. It 
is logically prior to the rhetorical narratio. In addition, this rhetoric of 
identification is ongoing, not restricted to one hailing, but usually part of a 
rhetoric of socialization. Thus, one must already be an interpellated 
subject and exist as a discursive position in order to be part of the audience 
of a rhetorical situation in which persuasion could occur.71  
Along this line of reasoning, a term with a high level of definitionality is constitutive in 
that, regardless of how it is defined, the mere attempt at a definition calls into existence a 
particular public. Recall that for scholars of public moral argument, the ideal character of 
an argumentative exchange relies on the notion that the rhetors on both sides can disclose 
their ideological presuppositions in order to formulate a point of stasis from which to 
argue coherently. This ideological expulsion, while, as I will argue, is impossible, its very 
attempt hails into existence a public that becomes invested in the debate. In the context of 
the PCB report, the compulsive attempt to define "dignity," regardless of the specificity 
of the definition, creates a mode of address that calls forth a public into an attempted 
point of stasis. By attempting to establish a point of contention through competing 
definitions of the term, "dignity’s" high definitionality calls forth a public invested in 
competing over its definitional ground. Both sides with competing interpretations over 
the same highly definitional term share one ideological presupposition: the desire to enter 
into contested definitional terrain. This presupposition, regardless of the other ideological 
commitments of the participants, is the core constitutive nature of the mode of address 
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facilitated by attempts to define terms with high definitionality. In fact, this mode of 
address, ultimately prevents the possibility of moving outside of the framework of 
competing interpretations since there is an inherent enjoyment derived by the shared 
ideological commitments in engaging in the debate. Often these shared commitments 
masquerade as incommensurable ideological positions (transhumanist and 
bioconservative) in order to maintain the shared investment of definitional competition. 
The last foundational component of definitionality is the Lacanian notion of 
metaphor. For Lacan, metaphor represents the psychic phenomenon of condensation. 
Whereas he defines the other component of the Freudian dyad, displacement, as 
metonymy – a simple linkage between signifiers – metaphor, "deflects, commands, the 
use of the signifier to such an extent that the entire species of preestablished … lexical 
connections comes undone."72 The ability of metaphor to command the use of the 
signifier is explained by Christian Lundberg as, "two discrete but interrelated processes. 
First, metaphor describes the function whereby a metonymically generated signifying 
connection comes to stand in for its referent … Second, metaphor is a particularly 
affectively saturated connection that organizes a field of metonymic connections around a 
central figure."73 There are two elements of note here: First, the notion of affective 
saturation, which is Lacan’s account of the relationship between affect (or the element of 
the psychical experience that drives language) and the signifier.74 It is my contention that 
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terms with high definitionality are inherently affectively saturated, and this explains their 
polysemous meanings since the subject cannot fully signify their content in a zero-degree 
relation. Furthermore, the notion of metaphor speaks to the idea that an affect, by its 
nature asignifying, can only link up to a concept indirectly through the trope of metaphor. 
Hence the term's designation as an affectively saturated referent. 
The second component of Lundberg’s formulation of metaphor is the idea that it 
organizes, retroactively, a chain of signifiers around a central figure. The figure is the 
ideograph with a high level of definitionality. This process of organization, which 
Lundberg classifies as investment is predicated on the compulsive, repeated use of the 
term. Lacan points out in Seminar XI that the concept of repetition is always a "missed 
encounter" with the real: the subject is compelled to repeat the attempt to signify the 
affect, always falling short, again and again.75 But the capture is never complete, the 
encounter is always missed, and it is this missed encounter that characterizes the nature 
of the affective saturation in a discourse – it is a process of investment. Lundberg 
explains investment as the mechanism for what makes language work: 
A given signifier must be habitually repeated and therefore sanctioned by 
social usage. Implicit in the labor of signification is a concept of 
investment, because although it is a necessary condition for discourse, the 
abstracted formal logic of the signifier is not a sufficient condition for 
discourse: the economy of discourse also requires the speaking subject’s 
investment in the habitual usage of signifiers in determinate ways. This 
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investment in a signifier’s habitual usage links and differentiates 
signifiers, and perhaps most crucially, it ritually repeats the labor whereby 
a signifier is taken to metaphorically stand in for a referent.76  
If investment is designated by repeated use, or, more specifically, recollected use, 
affective investment is designated by the compulsion to repetition or the attempt to define 
and redefine the concept via its high level of definitionality. This is what we see in the 
PCB’s report on dignity – the designation of a highly affectively invested discourse that 
centers on a highly definitional term. The discourse is affectively invested because the 
concept of "dignity" requires some modicum of definitional specificity in order to 
function as the fulcrum of an ethical discourse on biotechnology, yet it constantly eludes 
that definition, requiring the continued circumlocution by the authors. This explains both 
the polysemous definitions of the concept and the justification of the project’s repeated 
attempts to define the term. 
These three concepts, ideograph, constitutive rhetoric, and metaphor triangulate 
the notion of definitionality. The implication this has for public moral argument theory is 
that it fundamentally rearticulates the notion of stasis to account for the arguments about 
definition in American bioethics. Since Hermagoras, stasis theory has remained relatively 
static, particularly in its application to public moral argument. While the topic is not often 
touched on in medical ethics, it has become increasingly prescient in the context of the 
biotechnology debate. Both Zarefsky and Moreno speak about the debate in the context 
of disclosing ideological presuppositions inherent in the definition of terms that will serve 
as the cornerstone of developing bioethical theories in the light of new technological 
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developments. Definitions are important, the argument goes, and if we can all just agree 
on one consistent definition for a concept like "dignity," we can push the debate forward 
and deliberate about how to apply it. This is sensible given bioethics’ heritage in medical 
ethics. Concepts like "informed consent." need to be clearly defined and applied on a case 
by case basis; hence Zarefsky’s emphasis on the case-based nature of the biotechnology 
debate. However, what happens when the term in question has such a high degree of 
definitionality that it is impossible to establish a stasis point with a concrete definition? 
As Macklin and Pinker suggest, we could just abandon the term in favor of concepts such 
as patient autonomy, but that just simply kicks the stone down the road since "autonomy" 
seems to have a similar degree of definitionality as "dignity." 
In other words, what are we to make of a doctrine that is predicated on the 
disclosure of ideological presuppositions in favor of reaching a consistent definition 
when the disclosure of those presuppositions is impossible? Consider the back of the 
PCB report, which lays out the basic parameters of the problem: "‘Human dignity’ – is it 
a useful concept in bioethics, one that sheds important light on the whole range of 
bioethical issues … Or is it, on the contrary, a useless concept – at best a vague substitute 
for other, more precise notions, at worst a mere slogan that camouflages unconvincing 
arguments and unarticulated biases?" 77 The fundamental question asked by the framing 
of the back of the book is one of stasis; the criticism leveled by Macklin, Pinker, and 
others, eloquently summarized here, is that the concept ought to be rejected because a 
point of stasis cannot be reached. More specifically, the biases inherent in the concept 
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remain unarticulated and thus it serves as a shield for "mere (ideological) slogans." Thus, 
if the measure of "dignity" as a useful concept is its ability to serve as a point of stasis, it 
seems to fail the test. That is, unless we rethink the conception of stasis in order not only 
to account for the problem of dignity, but also to understand why it is so difficult to reach 
a point of argumentative consensus from which to move the dialectic of argument away 
from attempts to define the term. 
Traditionally understood as an attempt to, "classify rhetorical problems … 
according to the underlying structure of the dispute that each involves." stasis theory 
seeks to "identify an appropriate argumentative strategy; for example, patterns of 
argument appropriate to a question of fact," and exclude those questions that, "may be 
irrelevant in an evaluative dispute."78 According Malcolm Heath, in his reading of stasis 
theory in antiquity, Hermogenes lays out a specific system for determining the stasis 
point of a given argument. Specifically, Hermogenes, in Heath’s characterization, states 
that one must look to the krinomenon, or the fundamental question at issue, to determine 
the nature of the stasis in question.79 Hermogenes characterizes the interpretation of the 
krinomenon as the location of the stasis point in the debate. While he develops a complex 
system of different types of stasis depending on the nature of the krinomenon, what 
interests me here is the stasis of definition, where the krinomenon "is clear but 
incomplete."80 This seems to be the case of the problem of "dignity" as discussed in the 
PCB report; the issue at hand brackets the question of the usefulness of the concept by 
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assuming it is in fact useful if we can determine a specific definition that allows for its 
application to specific cases. What is at issue, then, is the incompleteness of the question 
presented to the bioethicist: what is the definition of dignity? According to scholarship on 
public moral argument, the question of definition becomes one of the disclosure of 
particular ideological commitments to establish a common ground from with the 
argument can progress forward. As Lynch argues, the act of defining discloses particular 
ideological commitments because it attempts to present certain "facts" as grounds for the 
definitional specificity of a term of art. "The acceptance of one version of ‘facts’ 
presented by a group rather than the perspective and ‘facts’ of another group," Lynch 
argues, "occurs because scientistic idioms make definitions comport with public 
ideological commitments. A definition comports with those commitments when it 
presents a reality – a set of ‘facts’ – wherein the interests of a given public can be 
furthered."81 Lynch concludes then, following the position outlined by much of public 
moral argument scholarship, which in the case of stem-cell research, "Defining the policy 
options for ES cell research in terms of the values represented by opponents and 
proponents would allow for greater and more fruitful public deliberation on this issue. 
Ideally, such a move could shape many public debates about biotechnology."82 We can 
assume that the debate over "dignity" is one such issue. The idea of disclosing the values 
inherent in the attempt to define dignity can be seen as an integral part of the krinomenon 
since it is the location at which its incompleteness can be minimized and stasis reached. 
This model for stasis seems consistent with the way it has been interpreted from 
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Hermogenes, where, as Heath points out, "The question of how to identify the 
krinomenon comes down, therefore, to the question of how to identify which of the 
circumstances given in a rhetorical problem are materially relevant."83 The question of 
"material relevance" in the biotechnology debate, and hence the question of "dignity," is 
congruent with the ideological presuppositions by which a particular definition comports 
with various publics' own ideological commitments. 
But what about the question, then, of incommensurable definitions? If there is one 
conclusion arrived at by the PCB’s report, it is that there is no conclusive definition of 
"dignity." The krinomenon of the report seems to remain definitively incomplete, thus 
relegating the question of definition, of stasis, to the realm of the impossible. If the entire 
doctrine of stasis, as outlined in the classical tradition, rests on the assumption that there 
are predictable kinds of questions (for example the question of definition), and that those 
questions can be moved past by the disclosure of the ideological presuppositions of the 
parties in dispute, then it seems like the question of "dignity" is relegated to stalemate. 
But this is the case if and only if the notion of stasis is reliant upon an Aristotelian notion 
of topoi as the fundamental goal of achieving agreement. Put another way: the search for 
commonplaces (topoi) through the disclosure of ideological commitments is taken as the 
fundamental grounding of public moral argument’s understanding of the possibility of 
stasis, a possibility that is already foreclosed within the debate over "dignity." This debt 
to Aristotelian stasis theory, and its derivation from his Topics can be found in the two 
foundational authors of modern argumentation theory, Stephen Toulmin along with 
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Chaim Perelmen and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca.84 The problem with this position is that it 
prefigures the discussion in advance since the topoi are viewed as a sort of common 
argument deposit from which the proponents on each side can draw. This, as A. 
Theodorakaku points out, requires a suspension of judgment, because the judgment has 
already been made in advance: 
The Aristotelian problem already belongs to a closed system, a topos, 
which determines its nature: It is not subjected to judgment because it has 
already been judged, having eliminated unwanted difference from the 
outset. This strategy, that essentially excludes contradiction, renders 
judgment artificial and it results to tautology, since the answer is already 
prejudged from the formation of the problem – question. In this case, 
dialectic lacks any inquiring performativity.85  
However, if we formulate a non-Aristotelian concept of stasis, one derived from 
Hermagoras, who speaks most clearly on the concept of the krinomenon, we can provide 
insight into what exactly occurs in the debate over "dignity." Specifically, using his 
conception of the krinomenon – emphasizing that it is fundamentally a choice: How do 
we frame the debate? Thus, for Hermagoras, the krinomenon is not about establishing the 
topoi for the debate in advance, but rather each side makes a deliberate choice in what 
topoi to utilize as the debate is taking place.  
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Hermagorean Stasis 
Hermagoras expands the centrality of the krinomenon in a non-Aristotelian view 
of stasis to make explicit the relationship between the question itself and the conditions of 
judgment. According to Theodorakaku, "The term ‘judgment’ (iudicium) in the doctrine 
of krinomenon is used to denote critical selection of material suitable for 
argumentation."86 This has important consequences for a theory of stasis derived from 
Aristotelian topoi since judgment is already foreclosed due to the tautological nature of 
the already-agreed upon terms. In other words, if the foundations for the definition of 
"dignity" were already agreed upon by the PCB report, the required judgment for 
determining the scope of "material suitable for argumentation" would be predetermined, 
making the exercise of the report all for naught. However, since there is no agreed upon 
topoi for the definition of "dignity" in its content, the faculty of judgment, of deciding 
between applicable, at times contradictory definitions, becomes paramount. This is the 
foundation of a Hermagorean rhetoric. Theodorakaku lays out this distinction from 
Aristotelian propositionalism, stating, "The merit of krinomenon rests exactly on an 
utterance’s relation with its other, with the possibilities that it itself introduces, whereas 
the proposition dismisses its own problematization, considering the orator only has to 
start from a statement and find its premises …"87 This fundamentally alters the role of 
judgment in the Hermogorean conception of stasis, since: 
Defeating the propositional positiveness, krinomenon disengages 
judgment from the artificial context of a predecided verdict remaining to 
be certified or shown and it places it in its natural context where an 
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utterance finds meaning in its other. The essence of krinomenon is inquiry 
itself, the construction of the issue that allows judgment to be performed, 
precisely because the issue does not include a reply, the question does not 
imply its answer and it is not identified with it, because the question is not 
just an interrogative proposition. Judgment is performed by inquiry of an 
issue that manifests the manifest difference between a question and an 
answer.88  
The resulting schematic of stasis, "negates closed systems of identities, expressed as 
demands for a common language or homogeneity or integration or assimilation, a 
negation dictated by identity’s very non-necessity, i.e. its non-essential character: 
Judgment is neither necessary (as in syllogism) nor an empty form that can have any 
content."89 Thus, "krinomenon does not necessitate impossibility of judgment; on the 
contrary, it is its very condition."90 
This is especially salient in the context of debates over terms with high levels of 
definitionality. What the Hermagorian understanding of krinomenon establishes is a 
concept of stasis that, freed from the predetermining closed system of the topoi, 
facilitates a definitional practice not predicated upon essential identity, but rather 
constructed, competing definitions that gain their affective value predicated upon their 
mutual exclusivity. Since terms with high levels of definitionality require but one level of 
common ideological investment between parties, that of the intent to define the concept 
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within competing interpretive frameworks, the possibility for judgment, true judgment 
not tautologically given in advance by the topoi, never occurs. Therefore it is the very 
antinomy that is created by competing definitions of dignity that fosters its point of stasis. 
In other words, the quest to define that which has no concrete definition is what 
guarantees the continued affective investment in the project. "Dignity’s" lack of 
definitional specificity is what allows it to maintain its highly affective and ideological 
charges, and the stasis of the compulsive repetition to define the term over and over is 
what gives frames the character of the debate. Locating the krinomenon as the site at 
which there is no possible, essential answer, no closure to the question of stasis in the 
Aristotelian sense, ensures that the faculty of judgment remains free from all 
preconditions, and thus is intrinsically linked to the concept of definitionality. Only when 
stasis is refigured this way, can we gain the understanding that debates over terms with 
high levels of definitionality are not failures to reach a stasis point, but rather are engaged 
in a stasis of indefinite definition, and as such, sustain their affective and ideological 
investments that constitute the publics who comport with those competing investments. 
In sum, investment in the continued framework of competing definitions supersedes 
reaching an agreed upon framework for progressing the dialectic of argument from an 
Aristotelian stasis point. Here, argumentative contestation produces more affective 
investment (enjoyment) than conceptual synthesis. Once the Aristotelian conception of 
stasis through topoi is jettisoned in favor of a Hermagorean one that emphasizes the 
krinomenon not as a question to be resolved, but rather as an indefinite, anti-essentialist 
question of competing possibilities, we can gain insight into the continued debate over 
concepts with high levels of definitionality such as "dignity." 
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Conclusion: Fostering Public Moral Argument 
According to Leon Kass: 
Today, human dignity is of paramount importance especially in matters 
bioethical. As we become more and more immersed in a world of 
biotechnology, we increasingly sense that we neglect human dignity at our 
peril, especially in light of gathering powers to intervene in human bodies 
and minds in ways that will affect our very humanity, likely threatening 
things that everyone, whatever their view of human dignity, holds dear. 
Truth to tell, it is beneath our human dignity to be indifferent to it.91  
Conversely, Nick Bostrom proffers a wholly different definition:  
[The] idea of dignity as a quality, a kind of excellence admitting of 
degrees and applicable to entities both within and without the human 
realm. I argue that dignity in this sense interacts with enhancement in 
complex ways which bring to light some fundamental issues in value 
theory, and that the effects of any given enhancement must be evaluated in 
its appropriate empirical context. Yet it is possible that through 
enhancement we could become better able to appreciate and secure many 
forms of dignity that are overlooked or missing under current conditions. I 
also suggest that, in a posthuman world, dignity as a quality could grow in 
importance as an organizing moral/aesthetic idea.92  
So what are we left with? Given that both Bostrom and Kass argue for dignity in their 
respective camps, each an individual public with mutually exclusive ideological 
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commitments and ideas about the nature of biotechnological enhancement, should we 
jettison the concept altogether? Without a viable Aristotelian stasis point, indeed without 
an agreed upon framework of topoi to begin with, should we assert, along with Macklin 
and Pinker, that the concept should be abolished? It has been the contention of this 
chapter that the opposite is in fact true: the above antinomy, established in the PCB report 
on "dignity" means that we ought not to abandon the concept due to its mutually 
exclusive interpretations, but rather we should study it because of them. 
However, in order to provide insight into the unique rhetorical features of this 
debate, two moves are necessary: the first is the deployment of the concept of 
definitionality, apparent in the concept's ideographic and constitutive nature. It is a vague 
term without a clear set of essential qualities that in turn begs to be continually defined. 
Yet formulating a definitive understanding of the concept is impossible, allowing for 
multiple, often mutually exclusive definitions. In other words, "dignity's" power to serve 
as a site for both affective and ideological investment lies not in its ability to foster 
consensus but rather facilitate enjoyment from the compelled, repetitive act of definition. 
This produces a framework of competing interpretations as a groundwork for the sites for 
shared investment. This results in a fundamental lack of Aristotelian stasis and occurs 
when the attempt to disclose all ideological and affective investments is properly 
impossible. However, instead of bemoaning the loss of a concrete stasis point that is 
grounded in a set of topoi, we ought to reformulate the conception of stasis to develop a 
more Hermagorean understanding of the concept. Applied in instances of debates over 
terms with high levels of definitionality, this reworked formulation provides a 
framework, through a rereading of the krinomenon, which offers two insights: first, the 
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shared commitments by the multiple publics created by the competing definitions are 
manifested in the enjoyment derived from attempting to define the term rather than 
agreeing upon a set of topoi to formulate stasis. Second, the possibility of judgment is 
introduced in that, absent topoi, it cannot be given in advance. This reinjection of 
judgment, fostered by an eye toward the rhetorical act of defining breaks the tautological 
nature of the term in Aristotle’s formulation and radically opens the possibility for 
contradiction and thus the foundation of judgment. 
So far, I have asserted that the possibility for contradiction is the precondition for 
judgment. Recall that for Theodorakaku the Aristotelian topoi are inherently restrictive 
because they establish a set of pregiven possibilities in which the public of a given debate 
is free to choose from. These possibilities, while potentially diverse in nature, all rest on 
the underlying assumption that they are appropriate responses that bracket a full range of 
possible judgments in favor of ones that are considered "prudent." The aim of abandoning 
the topoi in a Hermagorean theory of stasis is to forge open the possibility of radical 
possibilities in judgment, hence the claim that breaking from the tautology established by 
the topoi is the precondition for judgment. This requires the abandonment of the principle 
of non-contradiction. To make this claim, Theodorakaku draws on the work of Michel 
Meyer, who, in his theory of "problematology" notes that the principle of 
noncontradiction cannot be validated since, "its validation presupposes its existence."93 
While Meyer’s project is analytical in nature, he is helpful for our purposes here. 
Specifically, his understanding of the role of questioning in the realm of rhetoric provides 
insight into the relationship between public moral argument and highly definitional terms. 
                                                
93 Michel Meyer, Of Problematology: Philosophy, Science, and Language (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 193. 
82  
Meyer’s system rests on the notion that foundation of all human discourse is not, 
as in Aristotle, the preposition, but rather the question. As David L. Jamison explains, 
"The formulation and direction of questions are stimulated by the need to solve problems, 
to respond to the crises and issues of daily life. And questions for which there is an 
interlocutor, even including questions which are intrapersonal, necessarily involve 
language."94 Since propositions – or answers – are not foundational, they all presuppose a 
question or questions, hence Meyer’s linking of the question-answer pair; there is no 
answer that does not assume the existence of a question that is prior to it. To reinvigorate 
the importance of the question, Meyer develops a system that emphasizes the 
contingency of potential answers to a given question. This type of answer, in Meyer’s 
terminology, is called a "problematological answer," and, as Nick Turnbull explains, "[it] 
is not what is usually meant by a ‘solution.’ Rather, the answer is the formulation of a 
problem that brings the unthought out from thought, setting a new range of alternatives 
and meanings … Such answers cannot be exhaustive by definition."95 This is opposed to 
"apocritical answers," which are the foundation of most analytical endeavors. These 
answers, "both solve and suppress a problem. An apocritical answer closes inquiry by 
repressing what is problematic and detaching itself from the question to which it refers, 
becoming autonomous. Answers accumulate in the apocritical whereas problems are 
expressed in the problematological."96 The shift in emphasis from answers to questions 
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and problems is essential for our purposes here because, for Meyer, it is the realm of 
rhetoric. He argues: 
Rhetoric is a discourse in which one can hold opposite judgments on the 
same question. What is problematic remains so through the displayed 
multiplicity of judgments. We find the same multiplicity in language, and 
it is called polysemy. Equivocality and the existence of a plurality of 
answers, which lie at the core of the rhetorical debate, are intrinsically 
related. An equivocal answer to a question is not the answer to that 
question, since other answers are equally possible. The question is then 
left unsolved. An equivocal answer is not an answer, or, rather, it is 
another expression for the problem: it is a problemotological answer.97  
This is the formulation of the problem of definitionality. Concepts with high levels of 
definitionality cannot be "answered" in that they cannot be unequivocally defined. The 
presence of polysemous "answers" to the question of the definition of the term means that 
by its nature the highly definitional term cannot be expressed by an apocritical answer. If 
definitionality can only be expressed problematologically, that means that the 
preconditions established by the topoi, those answers that are assumed to "resolve" the 
question in advance and are therefore apocritical in nature. They truncate the question – 
their attempt to "resolve" the issue, paradoxically, prevents the possibility of a solution. 
Radical judgment instead formulates the possibility for any possibility, a dramatic 
opening for making a decision not already determined in advance. 
In the context of public moral argument, the fundamental reconfiguration of stasis 
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away from Aristotle and toward Hermegoras represents a shift away from the apocritical 
and toward the problematological. In practice, this means that the critic looking to 
analyze the points of contestation in debates over terms with high definitionality should 
look not at common investments (since there is only the common investment of 
competition over interpretations), but rather explore the regressive nature of the levels of 
ideological and affective investment on all sides of the debate as comprising the stasis 
point as such. The debate over "dignity" is useful in public discourse not because the 
competing sides can reach some sort of agreed interpretation on its meaning, but rather 
because the debate refuses to close itself off. Here the possibility of judgment on the part 
of the public is laid most bare: in offering a continuing debate about competing, mutually 
exclusive interpretations of the same term, publics created in the debate can judge the 
possibilities of its interpretation without a pre-given set of topoi. Absent a disclosure of 
ideological investments, common ground is established by the very fact of contestation, 
and therefore as scholars of public moral argument we should seek not to forestall the 
competition of definition, but rather foster its continuation as a method for advancement. 
The problematological nature of debates over terms with high levels of definitionality is 
an end in and of itself, and refusing to shut off the continued impossibility of its 
resolution is what authorizes the possibility for judgment on the part of the publics who 
are invested in it. Resolution of the debate will not be found in its answers to the question 
of "dignity," but rather through continually problematizing the question itself. Only then 
can we emphasize argument in the study of public moral argument and foster the 
question-asking procedures in debates over terms with high levels of definitionality such 
as "human dignity." 
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Chapter 2: Should We Enhance the Human? Affect, Rhetoric, and the Trope of the 
"Human" in Contemporary American Bioethics 
 
As the Liberty lads o‘er the sea 
Bought their freedom, and cheaply, with blood, 
So we, boys, we 
Will die fighting, or live free, 
And down with all kings but King Ludd! 
 
(Lord Byron, "Song for the Luddites") 
 
Human life, at its best, is fantastic.  
I‘m asking you to create something even greater.  
Life that is truly humane. 
Yours sincerely, 
Your Possible Future Self 
 
(Nick Bostrom, "Letter from Utopia") 
 
Looking beyond the arguments over definitions of "dignity," there is a broader debate 
taking place in the field of American bioethics, one that the PCB has also weighed in on. It is a 
debate about the nature and outlook of the human species moving forward in the face of rapid 
biotechnological advancement. This point of contention extends the arguments made by both the 
transhumanists and the bioconservatives in the previous chapter to make claims about the larger 
impacts of the potential uses and abuses of biotechnology for enhancing the human species. As 
such, the debate is fundamentally about what makes us human in the first place. A term with just 
as much definitionality as "dignity," the trope of the "human" falls under much of the same 
definitional pitfalls of competing interpretations I outlined in the previous chapter. However, 
there is one important difference: whereas the very usefulness of the concept of "dignity" is in 
question, nearly no one in the bioethical field thinks we should abandon the concept of the 
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"human." As such, the levels of investment in attempting to define the term are even higher since 
there is more at stake — in sort, the question of the "human" forces us to answer not what makes 
us special, but what makes us who we are. 
The debate over biotechnology showcases high levels of what I have described as 
"investment," both ideological and affective, due to the nature of the questions it raises and the 
stakes of those questions. In this chapter I will focus on the latter type of investment, dealing 
specifically with a psychoanalytic theory of affect, and I will outline what debates with high 
levels of affective investment can tell us about the study of rhetoric and methods of rhetorical 
criticism. While I will focus on the specific case of competing claims over whether or not 
biotechnologies should be used to enhance human beings’ physiological and psychological 
capacities, I believe this debate yields insight into broader questions about the nature of affect 
and language, and refigures some concepts that are central not only to the nature of the "human," 
but also rhetoric itself. 
This chapter proceeds in three sections. In the first I look at a Derridian and Lacanian 
theory of affect as it relates to signification. Second, I look to previous theories of affect as they 
are used in rhetorical studies and discuss their shortcomings. Specifically, I look to what it means 
to read a series of texts in a rhetorical economy and how it can settle some of the debates over 
affect and its use in rhetorical criticism. I also outline my reading strategy for analyzing debates 
over so-called "enhancement technologies." In the third section I explore the debates over 
enhancement technologies from both sides of the debate, laying out the position and exploring 
the impact affect has in shaping the discourse. Finally, I conclude with some remarks about the 
nature of polysemy in rhetorical studies, showing how this specific debate can augment our 
current understanding the concept. Overall, I look to explore the uses and abuses of rhetorical 
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criticism in its relation to theories of affect, supplementing them with a psychoanalytic 
conception of the term that I hope will overcome some of the ambiguities it presents to the study 
of rhetoric and the role the critic plays in interpreting a given affective and symbolic economy. 
Affect and Signification 
The First Words 
 
As man’s first motives for speaker were of the passions, his first expressions were the tropes. 
Figurative language was the first to be born. Proper meaning was discovered last. One calls 
things by their true name only when one sees in them their true form. At first only poetry was 
spoken; there was no hint of reasoning until much later.  
(Rousseau, On the Origin of Language)1 
 
The above passage from Rousseau makes two things clear about the utterance of the first 
words: they were tropes motivated by the passions. But of course how can the initial utterances 
be figurative in nature? The history of rhetorical theory, partly concerned with the study of 
figures, tells us that there cannot be an original metaphor since the concept by nature is an 
ornament, a transportation (metapherin) from the literal to the figurative meaning of a word. At 
the very least it requires a proper meaning to deviate from. After all, as Derrida points out, "In 
what consists the precision and the exactitude of language ... Above all in literalness. A precise 
and exact language should be absolutely univocal and literal: nonmetaphorical. The language is 
written, and pro-regresses, to the extent it masters or effaces the figure in itself."2 Yet Rousseau 
challenges this notion by pointing to something anterior to language, something that can only be 
expressed by approximation, by a transport, or inadequation, that is responsible for the first 
words. This "something anterior to language" is only defined figuratively, or rather, its literal 
meaning is figurative in nature. Any representation of an object, writes Derrida, "signifying the 
object and signified by the word or by the linguistic signifier in general, may also indirectly 
                                                
1 Cited in: Derrida, Of Grammatology. 
2 Ibid., 271. 
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signify an affect or passion."3 This is an affect or passion. Its relationship to representation, or 
"its literal and proper meaning will be the relationship of the idea to the affect it expresses. And 
it is the inadequation of the designation (metaphor) which properly expresses the passion."4 Thus 
there can be no zero-degree relationship between the affect and the signifier, no one-to-one 
correspondence, since it requires a trope to express it – it is a signifying of the asignifying. 
Furthermore, this affect is always linked, in some way, to an object. This linkage 
necessitates a twofold operation of metaphor: the substitution of an object for a concept and the 
transference of an affect to the object/concept substitution. Rousseau gives the example of a 
person uttering the first words at witnessing another taller, stronger person and assuming that the 
other is a giant, provoking fear. Derrida sums up the metaphoric process: 
The idea "giant" is at once the literal sign of the representer of the passion, the 
metaphoric sign of the object (man) and the metaphoric sign of the affect (fear). 
That sign is metaphoric because it is false with regard to the object; it is 
metaphoric because it is indirect with regard to the affect: it is the sign of a sign, it 
expresses emotion only through another sign, through the representer of fear, 
namely through the false sign. It represents the affect literally only through 
representing a false representer.5 
Thus although the affect is "literally" expressed in the utterance of the first words, its literal 
expression is a figurative one. The metaphor is partly a linkage between the object and the affect, 
ultimately false in its representation of the object and indirect in its representation of the affect – 
                                                
3 Ibid., 275. 
4 Ibid., 271. 
5 Ibid., 277. 
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and thus is a dual operation. This gives us a provisional outline to the relationship between affect 
and signification: the affect can only be indirectly expressed through metaphor as it is linked to 
an object. The "falseness" of the metaphor in terms of the relationship between the concept 
(giant) and object (man) is what rhetoricians have traditionally understood as the location of 
metaphor, as a transference of literal to figurative meaning between an object and a concept or 
signifier. But the second part of the metaphoric operation in Derrida’s formulation is what 
interests me here: the indirectness or inexactitude of the signifier in relation to the affect, a literal 
expression of what can only be figurative. While Derrida’s reading of Rousseau pertains to the 
conditions of possibility for the first words, it is my contention that the affect plays a larger role 
than simply providing language its genesis. It is still with us today, when we try to signify that 
which we cannot signify, affect is present in the words we use. And while there is no one-to-one 
relationship between an affect and a concept, it nevertheless is ever-present in public discourse 
about far more than the fear of giants. 
Consider the case of one particular use for biotechnology: human cloning. Leon Kass 
argues against the cloning of human beings not on "rational" grounds, but rather because it is 
"repugnant." Kass argues that cloning of the human is a "pollution and perversion:" 
To pollution and perversion, the fitting response can only be horror and revulsion; 
and conversely, generalized horror and revulsion are prima facie evidence of 
foulness and violation. The burden of moral argument must fall entirely on those 
who want to declare the widespread repugnancies of humankind to be mere 
timidity or superstition. Yet repugnance need not stand naked before the bar of 
reason. The wisdom of our horror at human cloning can be partially articulated, 
even if this is finally one of those instances about which the heart has its reasons 
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that reason cannot entirely know.6 
Calling this the "wisdom of repugnance," or the "yuck factor," Kass argues that our initial, 
affective response to a proposed biotechnology is grounds for sound moral argument, even if we 
cannot, or at best indirectly, articulate it. This is an example of the inexactitude by which the 
signifier relates to the affect. Not only is there a first order metaphoric transportation of the 
concept of creating human copies to the signifier "cloning," but there is a second order 
transportation, one that unites, albeit indirectly, the affect, the ‘‘yuck," to the above signifier. 
While the first order metaphor is explained in detail through a wide array of poststructuralist 
thought, the second order is what I will explore in this chapter, specifically the effects that affect 
exerts on the signifier, making its presence known, albeit indirectly. Kass’ example of 
repugnance is salient here in that it represents an intensity that he feels toward the concept of 
cloning. An intensity that he can at best describe through repeated circumlocution. Kass states, 
"We are repelled by the prospect of cloning human beings not because of the strangeness or 
novelty of the undertaking, but because we intuit and feel, immediately and without argument, 
the violation of things that we rightfully hold dear. Repugnance, here as elsewhere, revolts 
against the excesses of human willfulness, warning us not to transgress what is unspeakably 
profound."7 The "unspeakableness" of Kass’ proposition, combined with its profundity indicates 
the intensity and indirectness in which he attempts to explain his feelings toward cloning. To 
develop a vocabulary for understanding what exactly happens to the signifier when it is 
confronted with an affect, I will turn to the psychoanalytic tradition to augment Derrida’s insight. 
The Other Side of Affect 
The opposition between the passions and the intellect has a rich and storied history in the 
                                                
6 Kass, Leon, “The Wisdom of Repugnance.” The New Republic, 1997, 21. 
7 Ibid., 20. 
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fabric of philosophy. This chapter is located squarely in the middle of that opposition, serving, in 
theory, as a fulcrum between the two poles. In the words of Jacques Lacan, the opposition 
between the affective and intellectual, "is one of those most contrary to analytic experience and 
most unenlightening when it comes to understanding it."8 My aim is to take this seriously, to 
think through the relationship between the affective and the intellectual, to explore how they 
interact, alter, and influence each other. More specifically, I aim to understand how the register 
of the affective exerts effects on the process of signification. Lawrence Grossberg surveys an 
array of affect theories and concludes that, "What unites these approaches to affect is an 
overlapping set of assumptions ... first, it is non-representational, non-cognitive, and a-
signifying; second, it is non-conscious and non-intentional, and therefore a-subjective and pre-
individual, although it may well be subjectifying; and third, it exists as intensity, or in intensive 
qualities."9 These different approaches to affect draw on a disparate array of influences, from 
cybernetics and neuroscience, to emotion theory and political philosophy.10 Recently, thinking 
on the "affective turn" has taken up a strand of philosophical thought stemming from Spinoza 
and his poststructuralist champion, Gilles Deleuze. This work seeks to find the ontology of 
affect, to explain how it operates often at the level of the "material," "the body" or beyond the 
human.11 While much good is being done by asking these questions, especially in an attempt to 
rectify some of the shortcomings of the "linguistic turn," I want to attend to the affect's relation 
                                                
8 Jacques Lacan, Seminar I: Freud’s Papers on Technique, trans. John Forrester, ed. 
Jacques-Alain Miller (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1988), 274. 
9 Lawrence Grossberg, Cultural Studies in the Future Tense (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2010), 173. 
10 Melissa Gregg, and Gregory Seigworth, eds. The Affect Theory Reader (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2010), 6-9. 
11 Ibid., 5-7. 
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to language. 
Thus, I will focus on the other side of the forked path of affect theory, one that draws on 
the psychoanalytic tradition to understand the paradoxical nature of the ways in which we 
attempt to signify the asignifiable. As Nigel Thrift points out, there are multiple modes of 
theorizing affect, and, "each of these approaches has a certain force ... as well as certain 
drawbacks ... in each approach affect is understood as a form of thinking, often indirect and non- 
reflective, it is true, but thinking all the same. And, similarly, all manner of the spaces which 
they generate must be thought of in the same way, as means of thinking and as thought in action. 
Affect is a different kind of intelligence about the world, but it is intelligence none-the-less, and 
previous attempts which have either relegated affect to the irrational or raised it up to the level of 
the sublime are both equally wrong-headed."12  If, drawing what we can from the Spinozists, we 
understand the affective realm to exert intensities and effects, what is the response to those 
intensities and effects by a subject, who, as Lacan points out, is by its very nature caught up in, 
and unable to escape from, the use of signs and signification? The answer, it seems, lies not in 
the ontological realm of affect theory, but rather, as Grossberg argues, in the empirical realm, 
one possibly explained by the psychoanalytic tradition.13 With its focus on the psyche in relation 
to the world around it in Freud, and its relation to language in Lacan, it seems like the 
psychoanalytic tradition is equipped with the theoretical vocabulary necessary to demonstrate the 
ways not only in which subjects come to invest meaning in the world around them, but also in 
the ways they try to communicate that meaning to others. This project is necessarily discourse-
                                                
12 Nigel Thrift, Non-Representational Theory: Space, Politics, Affect (London: Routledge, 
2008), 175. 
13 Lawrence Grossberg, “Interview with Lawrence Grossberg,” Communication and 
Critical/Cultural Studies 10, no. 1 (2013), 311-12. 
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based – a choice that is of some contention considering I am utilizing a concept that is expressly 
utilized to move "past" language-centered reading practices with its focus on the body and the 
material.14 But, as I hope to show, while affect is useful for thinking through the above 
phenomena, it also makes itself known in the world of the word any time we attempt to signify 
that which we cannot quite signify, or any time we have a discourse that we are particularly 
invested in, be it politically, interpersonally, or ethically – in other words, our language is 
absolutely saturated with affect. 
To first understand Lacan’s often complicated and ambivalent theory of affect, it is 
essential to note his fundamental differentiation between the real and "reality." Reality is 
inherently caught up in the world of signifiers and concepts whereas the real exists as that which 
is beyond signification. As Bruce Fink points out, there is always a real that "ex-sists" outside of 
language. "The real," he argues, "is perhaps best understood as that which has not yet been 
symbolized, remains to be symbolized, or even resists symbolization; and it may perfectly well 
exist ‘alongside’ and in spite of a speaker’s considerable linguistic capabilities.15 Fink explains 
that the real is in fact produced by symbolization, since, "the symbolic order ... produces 
something, in the course of its autonomous operation, that goes beyond the symbolic order 
itself."16 Furthermore, an economy of affects is understood as existing external from the realm of 
signification, albeit alongside it. But the relationship between the two is more complicated than a 
simple inside/outside distinction. Instead, just as with the real and the symbolic, affect is knotted 
                                                
14 Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2002), 26-27. 
15 Bruce Fink, The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1995), 25. 
16 Ibid., 27. 
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together with the signifying process, existing in what Lacan would classify as an "extimate 
relationship," one of intimate exteriority between the affective economy and the economy of 
signifiers.17 
To the selective reader of Lacanian theory, it is possible to read into his work a hostility 
toward the concept of affect. Critics of the Lacanian theory of affect often begin by citing a 
passage from Seminar I in which Lacan states, in no uncertain terms, "I believe that [affect] is a 
term which one must completely expunge from our papers."18 However, preceding that passage, 
Lacan points out what he means by this polemic, claiming that to study affect, one must not 
imagine it as a "special density which would escape an intellectual accounting. It is not to be 
found in a mythical beyond of the production of the symbol which would precede the discursive 
formation."19 This verifies that for Lacan, once an affect exerts an effect onto the signifier, it 
enters into a relationship with that signifier that, while artificial and irreducible, nonetheless 
modifies the intensity of the affect and the nature of the signifier. Specifically, affect does not 
exist wholly independently of the signifier once it interacts with the signifying chain; while it is 
asignifying, once it exerts intensity onto a signifier it changes the relationship the signifier has to 
its signified, which now includes the affect. In Seminar X, Lacan answers the charge that he is 
uninterested in affect, providing a salient point about the relationship between the affect and the 
signifier: 
Those who follow the movements of affinity and aversion of my discourse ... 
think no doubt that I am less interested in affects than anything else. This is quite 
                                                
17 Jacques Lacan, Seminar VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, trans. Bruce Fink, ed. 
Jacques-Alain Miller (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1992), 71. 
18 Lacan, Seminar I: Freud’s Papers on Technique, 275. 
19 Ibid. 
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absurd. On occasion I have tried to say what affect is not: it is not Being given in 
its immediacy, nor is it the subject in some sort of raw form ... it is not repressed 
... it is unmoored, it goes with the drift. One finds it displaced, mad, inverted, 
metabolized, but it is not repressed. What is repressed are the signifiers which 
moor it.20 
This concept of mooring and unmooring solidifies Lacan’s thinking in Seminar VII about the 
irreducibility of affect to the signifier. There, he explains this relationship between the signifier 
and affect in detail, arguing: 
As far as the psychology of affects is concerned, Freud always manages to give in 
passing significant and suggestive hints. He always insists on their conventional 
and artificial character, on their character not as signifiers but as signals, to which 
in the last analysis they may be reduced. This character also explains their 
displaceable significance, and, from the economic point of view, presents a 
certain number of necessities, such as irreducibility.21 
There are a few key things to consider in the above passage: First, Lacan is referring to the 
psychology of affects, meaning the way in which affects exert effects on a subject who is caught 
in language — he is referencing the effects wrought by affect in the play of signifiers that both 
produces and is produced by the subject. Thus we are well within Lacan’s realm of the imaginary 
and symbolic orders, registers that exist alongside, but are distinct from, the real. Fink’s 
characterization of the symbolic as producing an excess to itself is salient here; the economy of 
affect both affects and is affected by the play of signifiers in a given linguistic economy. Second, 
                                                
20 Jacques Lacan, Anxiety: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book X, trans. A. R. Price, ed. 
Jacques-Alain Miller (Cambridge: Polity, 2014), 14. 
21 Lacan, Seminar VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 102. 
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affect is characterized as a signal as opposed to a signifier. This is critical for our purposes 
because while affect is itself asignifying, the intersection between the signifying and affective 
economies takes on the quality of a signal that knots the two together. The relationship between 
the signifier and the signal is indirect. This is in contrast to the direct relationship between two 
signifiers in a signifying chain. 
The operation of repression itself is described by Lacan, following Freud, in two ways, 
each describing the relationship of affect to the signifier. The first is the primal repression 
(Urvergrängung), outlined by Lacan as the repression of the initial signifier, or a structural 
property of the incompleteness of language itself — hence the distinction between reality and the 
real.22 We can equate this notion of repression to Derrida’s first-order metaphor, the one where 
the transport between the affect and signifier is false, or does not adhere to a zero-degree relation 
between the two. Next, there is secondary repression (Verdrängung) which is defined by Dylan 
Evans as, "A specific psychical act by which a signifier is elided from the signifying chain. 
Secondary repression is structured like a metaphor, and always involves ‘the return of the 
repressed’, whereby the repressed signifier reappears under the guise of various formations of the 
unconscious ..."23 This "elision" of the signifier, only to return under different formations within 
the structure of a discourse, sheds light onto the second-order metaphor in Derrida’s formulation. 
The indirectness between the affect and the signifier, the necessary primal repression that occurs 
between the two, is supplemented by a secondary repression whereby the affect unmoors itself 
from the signifier and slips into non-discursivity. This slippage leaves a "gap" or a "split" in the 
                                                
22 Jacques Lacan, Seminar XX: On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and Knowledge, 
trans. Bruce Fink, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1998), 53. 
23 Dylan Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis (New York: 
Routledge, 1996), 127. 
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signifier, facilitating the compulsion to repeat the attempted recapture of the affect (the famed 
"return of the repressed"). In sum: this detour through psychoanalytic theory demonstrates to us, 
if we remove the jargon, that an affect moors itself to a signifier, meaning that there is no one-to-
one relationship between the two since the affect is itself asignifying. Because it is not directly 
linked to a signifier, unlike a signified such as "chair" or "book," the affect is free to "unmoor" 
itself from the signifier, leaving a void, a representation of a lack of representation, in its place as 
it slips into non-discursivity. The end result of this process is that the subject is left with a feeling 
that he or she cannot describe directly (Kass’ repugnance) but compulsively attempts to restate 
the feeling, recapture the affect, again and again, each time with a difference – a linguistic 
manifestation of intensity. 
Rhetoricity, Repetition 
Having explained the contributions affect makes to the life of the sign, we can now turn 
to the ways in which those contributions relate to the study of rhetoric. According to Lundberg, 
in one of the most comprehensive accounts of Lacan’s theory of affect and its relationship to 
rhetoric, "the signifier works to organize the expression and character of affective impulses, 
primarily by transposing and translating then into an economy of rhetorical production … 
Although rhetorical processes do not produce every movement of affect, they comport affective 
flows, which are, in turn, effected in part by the operation of the signifying economy."24 To 
provide backing for this argument, Lundberg cites the following passage in Seminar X: 
Where best does Aristotle deal with the passions? ... it is in Book Two of his 
Rhetoric. The best thing about the passions is caught up in the reference, in the 
net, in the network of the Rhetoric. It is not by chance. This is the net. This indeed 
is why I spoke to you about the net in connection with the first linguistic 
                                                
24 Lundberg, Lacan in Public: Psychoanalysis and the Science of Rhetoric, 110. 
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references that I tried to give you.25 
In light of this, according to Lundberg, Lacan "argues for a conception of affect as a set of forces 
organized, captured in, and mediated by the rhetorical functions of the Symbolic and the 
Imaginary."26 He concludes, "If affect is at first an uncoded ‘signal’ when captured in the net of 
discourse, it is subsequently transposed into the economy of signs that animates the subject’s 
production and movement within language."27 This is a reasonable position to take given Lacan’s 
often vague rumination on affect. But, as I hope to have demonstrated above, not only does the 
signifier comport the flows of affect within a rhetorical economy, but the affect also commands 
the movement of the signifier through its mooring and unmooring to it. Simply: signifiers 
comport affects, while affects command signifiers. 
My supplemental reading of affect in its relation to the signifier adds to Lundberg’s 
conception of the location of rhetoric in Lacan’s schema. Lundberg locates rhetoric in the fabric 
of the economy of signifiers, which are organized into a series of tropes — metonymies and 
metaphors — and thus the economy itself is rhetorical in nature. A subject engages in a 
rhetorical act through, "habitual investments ... in signs and representations" comprising a 
"feigned unicity" between signifiers and their referents.28 Rhetoric resides, for Lundberg, in 
making language work, in eliding the fact that the "feigned unicity" of the sign is, in reality, a 
"failed" one.29 Thus when he argues that the signifier comports affective flows, it lays the 
                                                
25 Lacan, Anxiety: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book X, 14. 
26 Lundberg, Lacan in Public: Psychoanalysis and the Science of Rhetoric, 110. 
27 Ibid., 112. 
28 Ibid., 85. 
29 Ibid., 2-4. 
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groundwork for the conditions of possibility for emotion as felt by the subject.30 Affect is 
channeled into a signifying economy and that economy organizes, attempts to make intelligible, 
the affective economy. Affect in Lundberg’s estimation then is both the condition of possibility 
for emotion and provides the enjoyment derived from the "set of predictable habituated 
relationships" that "gives coherence to the subject’s world by investing it with an identity..."31 
This is backed up by Lacan’s claim that, "there is only one affect, which is, namely, the product 
of the speaking being’s capture in a discourse..."32 For Lundberg, then, the comportment of the 
affective flow in the net of discourse is a rhetorical act in the same way that the signifying 
process itself is rhetorical: it is a failed unicity passing itself off as a feigned one. The key 
difference however, is that unlike a signified that can be said to "exist" in the real by a more 
direct link to a signifier, affect produces enjoyment and lays the groundwork for emotion as it 
yields to the signifier. 
I believe that this view encapsulates half of the equation — one that provides a 
unidirectional account of the relationship between rhetoric and affect. I would like to offer a 
bidirectional account of rhetoric and affect, one that not only accounts for the way in which the 
capture of an affect’s signal is rhetorical due to the nature of the discourse which ensnares it, but 
also provides an explanation for the rhetoricity of the sign, namely what accounts for its 
contingent and dynamic nature. Put another way, instead of positing that signifiers rhetorically 
comport affective flows, I argue that affects also command signifiers in such a way to provide 
                                                
30 Importantly, this is not to say that affect and emotion are equivalent. Rather it is point out 
that affect is itself the condition of possibility for emotion to be felt by the subject.  Ibid., 111. 
31 Ibid., 113. 
32 Jacques Lacan, Seminar XVII: The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, trans. Russell Grigg, 
ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2007), 151. 
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them with a rhetorical valence as such. In perhaps the most authoritative text on affect and 
psychoanalysis, Andre Green describes the process whereby an affect is unmoored from a 
signifier, stating that affect’s, "peculiarity is to recover, abolish, and replace representation. Its 
most striking effect is negative hallucination... negative hallucination is not a univocal negative 
concept referring to an experience of lack or deficit. Negative hallucination is not therefore the 
absence of representation, but a representation of the absence of representation…"33 Green 
provides an account for how affect thus facilitates the movement of the signifier: 
When discourse suspends representations, it is continued by an affect that signals 
the existence of a veritable gap in the succession of representations. The affect 
appears to be taking the place of representation. The process of concatenation is a 
chaining up of cathexes in which the affect has an ambiguous structure. Insofar as 
it appears as an element of discourse, it is subjected to that chain, includes itself in 
it as it attaches itself to other elements of discourse. But insofar as it breaks with 
representations, it is the element of discourse that refuses to let itself be linked by 
representation and arises in its place. When reaching a certain quantity of 
cathexis, a qualitative mutation occurs; the affect may then snap the chain of 
discourse, which then sinks into non-discursivity, the unsayable.34 
The unmooring of the affect from the signifier leaves in its place a negative hallucination, a 
representation of a lack of representation. Thus we reach a basic formulation for poststructuralist 
psychoanalysis: Lacan’s barred signifier, $. As Slavoj Žižek puts it, the $ represents, "the 
divided, split subject, and at the same time the effaced signifier, the lack of signifier, the void, an 
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empty space in the signifier’s network."35 The mooring and unmooring of the affect to the 
signifier brings the signifier out of its chain, halting the metonymic following of one signifier to 
the next. Žižek explains that, "at a certain point ... some signifier fixes retroactively the meaning 
of the chain, sews the meaning to the signifier, halts the sliding of the meaning."36 But this 
suspension of the signifying chain is, at best, only temporary. Enter Green’s argument that the 
negative hallucination fostered by the absence of affect compels repetition. Every act of 
repetition is repetition with a difference since it trades off with the will to simply recall the past. 
Lacan seems to concur with this reading of the repetition compulsion when he remarks, in 
Seminar XI, that, "in Freud’s texts repetition is not reproduction. There is never any ambiguity 
on this point: Wiederholen is not Reproduzieren ... Wiederholen is very close, so the most 
prudent etymologists tell us, to the verb ‘to haul’ (haler) — hauling as on a towpath — very 
close to a hauling of the subject, who always drags his thing into a certain path that he cannot get 
out of."37 
So what exactly is the "thing" that the subject hauls around? Lacan’s thinking on "the 
thing" in Seminar VII, which he refers to in German as das Ding, "is that which is the beyond of-
the-signified. It is as a function of this beyond-of-the-signified and of an emotional relationship 
to it that the subject keeps its distance and is constituted in a kind of relationship characterized 
by primary affect, prior to any repression ... the Thing only presents itself to the extent that it 
becomes word …"38 What the subject hauls, through the compulsion to repeat, is an inherent lack 
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in the signifying chain — the negative hallucination that results from the unmooring of the affect 
from the signifier, designating it as $. What is repeated (hauled) in an affectively saturated 
discourse is the "bar" ( | ) of the $, the emptied out signifier and its negative hallucination. The 
subject is compelled to repeat the attempt to signify the affect, always falling short, again and 
again. Each attempt affixes the ( | ) to another signifier, temporarily and retroactively halting the 
sliding chain of metonymies and creating a new metaphor, $, to replace the old. But the capture 
is never complete, the encounter is always missed, and it is this missed encounter that 
characterizes the nature of the affective saturation in a discourse — it is a process of investment. 
Thus, not only does the signifying economy comport the affect, but the affect, by its 
unmooring from the signifier, by transforming the signifier into the $, facilitates a dynamism 
through its intensity that animates the sign. For Green, this dynamism is characterized as an 
articulation that, "passes through the retroactive effect of the repetition compulsion."39 The 
repetition compulsion gives affective investment its characterization as a compelled repetition 
with a difference. This is the crucial point I believe Lundberg misses in his theory of affect and 
rhetoric: the fundamental transformation of the sign once it has its missed encounter with an 
affect. While Lundberg is right to point out the rhetorical nature of channeling affective flows, 
the rhetoricity of the sign is produced by the absence of a representation of a nonrepresentational 
affect. A sign’s rhetoricity, its dynamic nature that accounts for its status as trope, is facilitated 
by the mooring and unmooring of an affect to it. Thus, if the investment of labor in a discourse is 
understood as the rote recollection of signs in order to solidify their connection, affective 
investment is understood as the compelled repetition of that which cannot be easily repeated due 
to the dynamism of the signifier and its barred nature as $. Ultimately, Lundberg’s account of 
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affect in relation to rhetoric assumes that the economy of tropes is rhetorical through its 
investment. My account provides an explanation of how the economy is tropological in nature 
and how investments occur in usage — after all, in the simplest terms, if signifiers lined up to 
objects in a one-to-one relation, there would be no compulsion to repeat in an attempt to solidify 
those connections. Taken together, the theory I have outlined here, coupled with Lundberg’s 
account of the channeling of affect in a tropological economy accounts for both the rhetoricity of 
the sign as well as the nature of feigned unicity as a rhetorical act. One theory provides an 
explanation for the life of the sign, the other of its essential qualities, each in relation to affect, 
and each providing insight into the relationship between affect and rhetoric from a 
psychoanalytic viewpoint. 
Affective Economies, Reading Strategies, and Rhetoric 
The intersection between affect and rhetorical criticism has gone in several directions in 
recent years. The concept has been deployed to augment and complicate several key rhetorical 
concepts such as the public and the rhetorical situation in favor of "circulating affective publics" 
and "rhetorical ecologies."40 Other scholars have looked to the "circulation of affect" to explain 
methods of interpolation and subjectivization in various political contexts.41 Still others focus on 
the sensual aspects of affect, returning to a sort of phenomenology in explaining rhetorical 
effectivity.42 Finally, there has also been a turn to wed neuroscience with affect theory in an 
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attempt to outline the physiological effects of rhetoric on the brain.43 Despite the wide array of 
contexts in which the term is deployed, they are united in an understanding of affect, at least on 
some level, is a form of intensity that exerts effects on beings. In each of the above instances, 
affect is viewed as a non-representational effect that is not reducible to the subject. The hesitance 
to link affect as being reducible to the subjective experience is due in large part to its Spinozist 
heritage, especially as rendered by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, along with more recent 
work that takes up the tradition, albeit in contrasting ways, by Brian Massumi and Lawrence 
Grossberg.44 If the work being done in the "affective turn" in rhetoric is understood, largely, as a 
reaction against iterations of the discipline that overly focus subject-centered readings of texts, 
representation, and mediation, it then serves as an interesting counterpoint to much of the 
traditional understandings of the field. 
However, it is my contention that these works can be supplemented with a psychoanalytic 
conception of affect, one that seeks to join together the linguistic and affective turns. Put another 
way, by rushing to affect, critics have attempted to think through the concept of intensive flows 
and structures of feeling without using the subject as a starting point. This allows them, perhaps 
usefully, to think through conceptions of rhetoricity independent of signification.45 What I am 
trying to do, then, is bring the pendulum of rhetoric back to the middle, between the poles of 
affect and symbolicity. I aim to think through these concepts from "the front door," as it were, of 
subjectivity. In sum, how can we utilize the vast canon of rhetorical tools used to interpret the 
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effects of signifying processes while still taking heed of the insights granted by the 
understanding that asignifying processes also compel subjects to act? Lundberg provides a 
thoroughly Lacanian justification for this project, stating: 
Indeed, in Lacan’s reading, the Deleuzian attempt to escape the reduction of 
reality to representation and subjective mediation in the name of recovering a 
global sense of ’affect’ is impossible. The human, both in terms of its genesis as a 
subject in its symbolic interaction with the world ... is always ... given over to the 
rhetorical logic of the sign ... As a result, such a reading of affect is effective only 
when it resides squarely in the Real, but as soon as one reduces it to reality by 
naming and enframing it as a conceptual object, one is accountable to the 
structuring principles of the Symbolic.46 
To theorize affect in empirical terms, as it affects subjects, one must account for how affect 
engages with the structuring principles of the signifying processes intrinsic to the conceptual 
thought those subjects remain trapped within. While this is not a critique of scholars who look at 
the a-subjective and asignifying aspects of the concept, it is to simply point out that a reading of 
the intersection between affect and signification is not only justified, but perhaps necessary. 
Rather than a theoretical "category error," theorizing the unity between affect and the symbolic is 
permissible once one develops an adequate vocabulary for how affect affects the signifier and 
not how affect is represented in language; doing the latter would constitute the category error 
since it is a contradiction in theoretical terms. 
Another potential objection to this method of inquiry is the use of text-based artifacts. 
Lawrence Grossberg levels a series of critiques against current theorizations of affect, one of 
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which is of particular interest here: 
[Affect] has been taken up in a return to textuality. Just as we had to argue, in and 
beyond cultural studies, that one couldn’t read the ideology of a text off the text, 
that ideology is a complex series of relationships not only between texts and 
audiences but with the larger intertextual and contextual articulations, after all of 
that, it seems to me that we now have returned to a large extent, under the banner 
of political motivation, to the notion that not only can we read ideology off a text 
again, but that we can read affects off texts. I find that disheartening because I 
would have thought that affect is the lens through which it becomes quite obvious 
that you can’t do that. That troubles me because the multiplicity of affects and 
articulations of the sorts of texts we’re interested in are so overwhelmingly 
obvious.47 
On face, this appears to be a straightforward critique of the reading of affect I have presented so 
far. However, an understanding of the psychoanalytic conception of affect sheds light on a 
solution to this problem. Grossberg’s critique, it seems, is leveled at a wide array of critics, 
rhetorical and otherwise, who seek to explain the "feelings" or "movement" in a text (this text 
moved me, or, it made me feel something). Brian L. Ott and Diane Marie Keeling clarify this 
position in terms of rhetorical theory by forging a dichotomy between the "symbolic" and 
"material" effects of rhetorical acts. They argue, "Whereas the symbolicity of rhetoric elicits 
primarily ‘meaning effects,’ the materiality of rhetoric induces principally ‘presence effects’ — 
effects that touch and move bodies in sensory-emotive ways."48 Catherine Chaput links this 
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notion of "presence effects" to ideology while reinforcing its distinction from symbolicity, 
stating that they, "operate on an entirely different level than rational deliberation and self-
interested choice."49 Further, she argues that affect is inherently rhetorical in that, "rhetorical 
circulation implies that some element moves throughout material and discursive spaces to 
connect the differently situated moments comprising its organic whole ... While a given 
rhetorical exchange can be located and bound, the rhetorical energy circulating within that 
situation cannot," and this energy, "might usefully be theorized as a persuasive power affectively 
sustaining the overdetermined ecology of our life worlds."50 
The conception of affect used by Ott and Keeling, Chaput, and others, seems to rely on 
an ontological reading of the concept that imagines it as some type of non-signifying "energy," 
one that, in Chaput’s words, exists by: 
[Moving] between human beings via communicative practices that inspire 
behavior instinctively. Affect, in the form of something as taken for granted as a 
gut sense, exerts pressure on our decision making and does not crumble under the 
deliberative weight of better arguments or more information. As a continuous 
process linking disparate actions, sensations, and events, affect operates within a 
transssituational and transhistorical structure and energizes our habituated 
movements as well as our commonsensical beliefs.51 
However, note here that both in the Lacanian distinction between the "real" and "reality," as well 
as the psychoanalytic definition of the concept of affect, Chaput’s characterization is both 
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inattentive to the effects it exerts on symbols and thoroughly impossible. It is impossible in that 
it refuses to acknowledge that we cannot "conceptualize" affect without concepts, thus rendering 
an empirical investigation of its effects on subjects a sort of category error as I explained above. 
It is inattentive because it does not provide an account for the intersection between symbol use 
and affective intensity, thus reinforcing the dichotomy between affect and signification that 
swings the conceptual pendulum too far away from the all-encompassing realm of symbols 
within which all humans are caught. Thus, in my estimation, the Lacanian insight into the 
relationship between affect and signification is that the two, while perhaps logically separate 
since affect is a-subjective and asignifying, cannot be ontologically separated since we cannot 
conceptualize one without the other — hence the need to abandon the dichotomy between the 
two. 
So how does a Lacanain conception of affect survive Grossberg’s critique? In a short, but 
thoroughly psychoanalytic response: it is the not the reading of affect off of texts, but a reading 
of the enjoyment that produces discourse. As Lundberg explains, "If affect is at first an uncoded 
’signal’ when captured in the net of discourse, it is subsequently transposed into the economy of 
signs that animates the subject’s production and movement within discourse."52 As I hope to 
have demonstrated, affect signals the signifier, becoming moored into the net of discourse, then 
slips into non-discursivity, leaving in its place a representation of the absence of representation 
— and it is this absent representation that animates the signifier's movement within discourse. In 
effect, I am not attempting to "read" affect off of a text, but point to its effect on the discursive 
economy as it is revealed in texts. The distinction is fine, but significant. Instead of attempting to 
point to the level of intensity or energy within a text, I am attempting to demonstrate the 
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presence of an affect by the discursive effects it produces in an economy of tropes. Instead of 
"showing" the uncoded signal’s presence, I am showing the repetitive structure in a discursive 
economy that indicates affect has paid a visit. This is coherent within a Lacanian framework 
where there is but one affect: enjoyment. Lundberg summarizes enjoyment as, "a mode of 
affective organization that does not aim at the production of a specific end, but that revels in the 
mere fact of its repetition. It is the repetitive character of affect that induces Lacan to claim that 
enjoyment ‘is what serves no purpose.’"53 Just as with ideology, one cannot read the affect of a 
text off of the text, however one can point to the effects it produces within a discursive exchange. 
Instead of saying "the affect of this text is..." we ought to say, "the effects of affect on this text 
are..." and that is precisely what I aim to do when reading discourses on biotechnology. 
In order to explore the role affect plays in instances of public debates over terms with 
high levels of definitionality, such as "dignity," or in this case, the "human," it is necessary to 
examine the mark it leaves in particular discursive economies. The distinction between reading 
and economy and just a single or series of texts is important. Part of the strength of reading affect 
through instead of off of texts relies on the ability to explore the effects of affect on the signifier 
in a given economy. To avoid the pitfalls pointed out by Grossberg in regards to reading affect 
off a text, it is essential to explore those texts as an economy and not a series of individuated, 
isolated textual entities. Affect has been read out of (and thus, ironically into) texts in rhetorical 
criticism in two primary ways, neither of which are attentive to the economic reading of the 
signifier. The first, as demonstrated by Ott and Keeling, tends to attempt to develop a heuristic 
for reading affect from a singular text such as a film. The problem with this approach, apart from 
the fact that it falls squarely within Grossberg’s critique, it that it tends to produce a vague or 
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unverifiable heuristic of reading affect. Often times, this approach devolves into remarking on 
how the text moved the critic, and then in turn it is generalized into how the text moves readers 
more broadly. This move, while attentive to the way in which the critic engages with the text, is 
theoretically warrantless, such that a particular instance of the "affect" is universalized to a 
broader public. By only looking at singular texts or even a series of texts read as discrete 
elements, this approach to linking affect and rhetoric tends to minimize the attention to 
publicness critical for rhetorical scholarship as a discipline, reducing it to a sort of reader-
response form of criticism. 
The second approach to linking affect and rhetoric, exemplified by Chaput and Jenny 
Edbauer, seeks to demonstrate the omnipresence of affect in a given rhetorical "ecology" or 
circulation of political economic systems. Edbauer’s conception of the rhetorical ecology is used 
to theorize affect into a critique of Bitzer’s rhetorical situation. She argues that instead of 
viewing rhetoric as situationally based, we ought view it far more promiscuously: "The intensity, 
force, and circulatory range of a rhetoric are always expanding through the mutations and new 
exposures attached to that given rhetoric, much like a virus. An ecological, or affective, 
rhetorical model is one that reads rhetoric both as a process of distributed emergence and as an 
ongoing circulation process."54 The effect of this reading is to expand the heuristic of rhetoric to 
account for their effects beyond a given situation. She argues, "we can begin to recognize the 
way rhetorics are held together trans-situationally, as well as the effects of trans-situationality on 
rhetorical circulation ... Our rhetorical theories can thus acknowledge the affective channels of 
rhetorical communication and operation by ’testifying’ to them. Such testimonies would invent 
new concepts and deploy them in order to theorize how publics are also created through affective 
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channels."55 While this move seeks to abandon the confinement of rhetoric to particular texts, it 
seems to sweep the rhetorical heuristic too far in the other direction. Apart from an, at best, 
vague understanding of affect as an intensity located in the real, a move that is thoroughly 
impossible, it also over-inflates the scope of rhetoric. In other words, within the ecological 
framework, nearly everything can be rhetorical, provided it is somehow linked to affect. 
Furthermore, affect is linked to everything since it is used as a framing for, "movement, 
sensation, and qualities of experience couched in matter in its most literal sense (and sensing) ... 
without falling into either . . . naive realism or . . . subjectivism ..."56 Since almost all of 
subjective (and non-subjective) experience falls into this characterization of affect, and in turn, is 
rhetorical, the purview of Edbauer’s heuristic is almost infinite. This promiscuity of rhetoric and 
affect, along with the near equation of the two, ultimately reduces the concepts to theoretical 
unintelligibility. Similarly, Chaput’s characterization of affect as a "transssituational and 
transhistorical structure" links it to rhetoric such that, "rhetorical circulation implies that some 
element moves throughout material and discursive spaces to connect the differently situated 
moments comprising its organic whole."57 Here this linking of affect to rhetoric, and then the 
creation of extra-rhetorical elements to rhetorical exchanges themselves leads to a hyper-
inflation of the discipline that leads to a problematic heuristic in terms of locating rhetoric in 
relation to other fields. In Edbauer’s and Chaptut’s readings, affect is used to push the study of 
rhetoric into omnipresence and thus reduce the benefit of its theoretical specificity. 
So how is it possible to both expand the relationship of affect and rhetoric beyond the 
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individual text and its production of reader-response heuristics without falling into the ecological 
move’s over-inflation of both concepts? The answer, I believe, lies in a reading practice that is 
attentive to the circulation of specific tropes within a discursive economy. Here I will make two 
moves: the first is to narrow the focus of rhetoric in its intersection with affect to examining the 
effects of affect on the signifier. This, as I have argued, provides an explanation for the 
production of trope and the investments required to sustain them. With this move, the 
understanding of affect is expanded from Ott and Keeling’s reader-response paradigm to 
exploring its relationship to an economy of texts on their own terms or, in the text itself, instead 
of reading it out of and thus onto the text. However, this also restricts the understanding of affect 
in its relationship to rhetoric from the promiscuous model outlined by Edbauer and Chaput by 
isolating affect to its exerted intensities on the signifying process. Instead of an omnipresent 
force that is extra-rhetorical, it constrains rhetoric to the study of symbols in textual economies 
with a corollary that not all affects are rhetorical. Furthermore, textual economies in this instance 
are not restricted to words on paper, but rather are processes of meaning-making whereby 
particular artifacts (be they written words or "material" objects) are rendered intelligible through 
the use of symbols. Thus the "materiality of rhetoric" is maintained, without the hyper-inflation 
of emphasizing extra-rhetorical acts as falling under rhetoric’s purview. 
The second move that is necessary for this conception of the relationship between affect 
and rhetoric is the deployment of a reading strategy different from the two outlined above. 
Instead of reading singular texts, a series of texts understood in their independence from one 
another, or a general circulation of "rhetorical flows," this reading practice understands the 
relationship of texts to one another in terms of participating in an economic exchange with a 
larger public. Here the metaphor of economy is borrowed from Lacan’s understanding of 
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discourse. In Seminar III, he writes that an "economy of discourse" is the exchange of, or "the 
relationship between meaning and meaning," between specific, "discourse and the common 
organization of discourse ..."58 According to Lundberg, this metaphor characterizes discourse, 
"as a set of contingent regularities in exchange that can only be understood heuristically – that is, 
after the fact of exchange," or, "an emergent association of regularities in exchange."59  
Furthermore, "specific economies of tropological exchange are discrete configurations of tropes 
that individuals and groups take up in assuming public identitarian commitments."60 However, 
Lundberg’s formulation of economies of exchange in this sense relies on an unstated premise 
that those structuring tropes, the currency of the economy, are formed in the first place in public 
usage. It is here that I would supplement Lundberg’s theory with an understanding of another 
economy, that of affects, that fundamentally structures the tropological economy. In other words, 
the tropes put up for public exchange are structured by the affects that moor and unmoor from 
signifiers, turning them into metaphors in the Lacanian sense, and thus as sites of investment in a 
discursive economy. This understanding posits that the affective economy, existing logically 
prior to the tropological one, serves as the motor engine of signification, it is the intensity exerted 
on the subject that compels him or her to speak. Rhetoric, in this context, is understood as a 
twofold process: the representation of a lack of representation left by the unmoored affect must 
be signified in a rhetorical way through the tropes of metaphor and metonymy, and the act of 
investment through discourse is a rhetorical one, presenting the metaphors that halt the chain of 
discourse as existing prior to their use, in other words, retroactively. Put another way, rhetoric in 
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this sense takes on a properly Aristotelean valence, one that relies on the simultaneous use and 
concealment of artifice. The use is apparent in the artificial nature of the tropes that comprise the 
discursive economy, and the concealment resides in the metaphoric suturing of the sliding chain 
of signifiers. 
To understand this process, Lacan develops the metaphor of the "quilting point." In 
Seminar III, Lacan draws on the concept of the "fear of God" to explain that, "The quilting point 
is the word fear, with all these trans-significant connotations. Everything radiates out from and is 
organized around this signifier, similar to these little lines of force that an upholstery button 
forms on the surface of material. It’s the point of convergence that enables everything that 
happens in this discourse to be situated retroactively and prospectively."61 The fear of God is 
thus used to structure the intelligibility of the existence for an entire worldview, and it is 
presented retroactively, that is, as if it were always already present. For Lacan, the concept of the 
quilting point is paramount to any understanding of a discursive economy; he goes so far as to 
say that the quilting point is the, "point around which all concrete analysis of discourse must 
operate..."62 Thus to understand the rhetorical economy of tropes, one must understand its 
quilting points, and to understand the quilting points, one must understand how they are formed 
— through the interaction between affect and a signifier and the enjoyment derived from the 
repeated use of its representation of a lack of representation left in the affect’s wake. The task of 
the rhetorical critic, then, is to find these quilting points within an economy of texts. Instead of a 
singular text, reading a series of texts, understood as operating within an economy, allows the 
critic to point out sites of particular investment by examining the metaphoric quilting points in 
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the discourse. To pay attention to the quilting points provides a rubric for understanding how 
publics are formed in the rhetorical act of attempting to capture an affect in discourse and then 
the repeated use of the created trope as if it were always already the anchor of the discourse. 
Hence Lacan’s formulation that, "The signifier doesn’t just provide a ... receptacle of for 
meaning. It polarizes it, structures it, and brings it into existence."63 This understanding of 
economy, investment, and quilting points provides an account of the effectivity of rhetoric, how 
it compels action by way of the repeated labor of investment. The more invested the public, the 
more the economy they engage in solidifies the artificially transcendent nature of the quilting 
points that formulate a communitarian identity. Not only does this heuristic capture the benefits 
of reading a discourse as it is economically instantiated in texts, it also escapes the problem of 
reading texts in a singular manner and the personalization of affect that comes with it. As Lacan 
points out, "A complete catalog" of quilting points in an economy "would enable us to discover 
some surprising correlations and appreciate that it isn’t just any old way that the subject 
depersonalizes his discourse."64 This depersonalization, here understood as the bidirectionality of 
the effects exerted on the affect and signifier, helps guard against the internalizing reading of 
affect into texts. 
The Biotechnology Debate 
So how does this reading strategy, with an attention to affect’s relation to signification 
play out in practice, and what kinds of insights does it authorize for rhetorical criticism? To 
answer this question, I will turn to a particular discursive economy created around debates over 
biotechnological enhancement. Specifically, I will look to the ways in which this public 
organizes an entire discursive economy around a specific conception of the "human" as it relates 
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to so called enhancement technologies. It is important to note that the reading practice I will 
deploy here is one that is attentive both to specific texts and the larger economy in which they 
circulate. By reading a series of texts from prominent democratic transhumanists and 
conservative bioethicists, I aim to offer a comparative analysis of the ways in which specific 
metaphors and quilting points gesture at the presence of an affect as it exerts effects on the 
signifier. In this instance the affect manifests itself around definitions of the human, constantly 
defined and redefined by both sides of the debate, yet often in contradictory ways fostering a 
stalemate. 
Democratic Transhumansim 
Defined by The President’s Council on Bioethics (PCB) as "those well-meaning and 
strictly voluntary uses of biomedical technology through which the user is seeking some 
improvement or augmentation of his or her own capacities, or, from similar benevolent motives, 
of those of his or her children," biotechnological enhancement consists of near- and far-future 
technologies that have the capacity to significantly alter human beings’ physiological and 
psychological makeup.65 As the PCB points out in their report on biotechnological enhancement, 
largely structured as a response to democratic transhumanism, Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology 
and the Pursuit of Happiness, these technologies are, "also a conceptual and ethical outlook, 
informed by progressive aspirations."66 It is this outlook that structures the primary foundations 
of democratic transhumanism. Fusing modern liberalism with more contemporary insights from 
cybernetics, the movement seeks to foster and embrace biotechnological enhancement as the 
next step in human evolution. According to Simon Young, in his Transhumanist Manifesto, the 
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"essence" of transhumanist philosophy rests on the notion that, "The world is a process of 
evolutionary complexification toward evermore complex structures, forms, and operations," and, 
"As conscious aspects of evolutionary complexification in nature, human beings are imbued with 
the innate Will to Evolve - an instinctive drive to expand abilities in pursuit of ever-increasing 
survivability and well-being."67 Ramez Naam, another transhumanist, concurs, stating, "far from 
being unnatural, the drive to alter and improve ourselves is a fundamental part of who we 
humans are. As a species we’ve always looked for was to be faster, stronger, and smarter and to 
live longer."68 This belief, the Will to Evolve, portrayed as inherent to any living system carries 
with it a systematic tension between cybernetic and liberal investments. Here there is an attempt 
to downplay the "unique" character of the human along the lines of the cybernetic tradition — 
the integration of the human as one of many systems whose goal is to reduce the entropy 
inherent in any environment. As Norbert Wiener points out in his foundational cybernetic text, 
The Human Use of Human Beings, both humans and machines "exemplify locally anti-entropic 
processes, which perhaps may also be exemplified in many other ways which we should 
naturally term neither biological nor mechanical."69 Thus the cybernetic tradition seeks to 
deemphasize the distinction between humans and other biological systems and technological 
machines. In fact, the entire discipline carries with it a drive to question the ontology of 
humanity. Transhumanists carry with them this drive, arguing that the Will to Evolve is inherent 
in any living entity, and humans, for all their exceptional qualities, are no different. 
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Yet, at the same time, transhumanists wish to keep one element of the uniqueness of 
humans — their concept and exercise of free choice. James Hughes, a transhumanist, argues that 
free choice is one of the foundational linchpins of the movement. In formulating a theory of 
democratic transhumanism, he argues that transhumanists must, combine an, "old strain of 
progressive optimism about reason, science and technology with a strong defense of individual 
liberty ... By embracing the right of each person to control their body and mind and freely use 
technology to realize their fullest potential, the Next Left can decisively break all associations 
with authoritarianism."70 Naam furthers this point, explaining that traditionally, democratic 
society, "has its roots in two simple phenomena. Individuals generally want to improve their 
situation. They want to live longer, remain in good health, increase their capabilities ... and so 
on. Given the choice, they’ll work in this direction. In addition, millions of individuals weighing 
the costs and benefits have a greater collective intelligence, better collective judgment, than a 
smaller number of centralized regulators and controllers."71 These "two simple phenomena" hold 
fast to the bastions of liberalism: the autonomous, individual subject who seeks to maximize its 
freedom. Thus the tension inherent to the transhumanist notion of progress and choice: the 
simultaneous desire to downplay the ontological specificity of the human while emphasizing its 
ethical uniqueness. 
The implication of this tension manifests itself in transhumanist politics aimed at 
advancing their agenda. The movement is, at its heart, still a reactionary one — reactionary to 
what many transhumanists classify as "bio-luddites," or, the conservative bioethicists who seek 
to impose restrictions on the development of technologies that enhance human physiological and 
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psychological capacities. One look at a wide array of foundational transhumanist texts and one 
can see that they are often structured with lengthy rebuttals of the conservatives, breaking down 
as many objections as possible and refuting them point-by-point. Yet for the specificity of these 
answers, they all share a few key points in common: the fundamental tension of downplaying the 
human’s unique character in terms of its ontology while emphasizing ethical imperatives that are 
unique to human in spite of its role as "just another system in nature." This downplaying of 
certain aspects of human uniqueness while emphasizing others is strategic for the movement, 
allowing them to on-face rebut many of the claims levied against them from both sides of the 
conservative paradigm. From the right-leaning, religious side they are able to offer a contested 
view of the human, one that does not posit Homo sapiens as a special entity, removed from all 
other natural and mechanical systems. Instead of being endowed with a "giftedness" to life, what 
characterizes humans is the same as what characterizes any other natural system, the Will to 
Evolve. The only difference, they argue, is that humans are endowed with the capacity to 
technologically alter our evolution — something that differentiates from other systems in terms 
of degree and not kind. This is what Young classifies as "the essence of humanism: the belief in 
the ongoing progress of the species through reason, science, and technology."72 The Will to 
Evolve argument carries with it a corollary argument in terms of answering the right-wing bio-
luddite position: if the only constant drive that makes us human is the Will to Evolve, then, other 
components of "human nature," can, and have, changed over time. The "giftedness" of life, 
transhumanists argue, has not just been endowed by God, or by biological evolution, but rather 
has been altered by a sort of cultural evolution. Joel Garreau lays out this position as "the central 
argument about the future of human nature is whether it is fixed and immutable, once and 
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forever, or whether it can continue to evolve."73 He concludes that if: 
[You] agree with Thomas Hobbes that the life of our 10,000-year-old man in 
nature is nasty, brutish, and shot — the product of unfettered selfishness — then I 
think one has to conclude that all these millennia of billions of humans storing 
and sharing and cooperatively building on each other’s wisdom — the content — 
has to count as part of evolution. It is inheritable, has variation and contributes to 
reproductive fitness. Even the least educated among us is not raised by wolves, 
feral and wild. He grows up shaped by contemporary humans who own 
televisions, who have been shaped by modern society.74 
The argument then, follows that we, as humans, have continued to evolve well beyond our 
biological origins. Cultural evolution is no different from biological evolution, and technological 
evolution is no different either. In fact, many transhumanists are quick to point out that we 
already use kinds of enhancement technology in the status quo: eyeglasses, blood transfusions 
etc. all constitute low-level enhancements that humans employ every day. Gregory Stock 
outlines the position as follows, arguing, "To some, the coming of human-directed change is 
unnatural because it differs so much from any previous change, but this distinction between the 
natural and the unnatural is an illusion. We are as natural a part of the world as anything else it, 
and so is the technology we create. As we consciously transform ourselves, we will become no 
less human than we became tens of thousands of years ago..."75 Thus there is no way, in many of 
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the transhumanists’ eyes, to draw a bright line where human enhancement should stop since we 
have already irrevocably "enhanced" ourselves from millennia of cultural, and thousands of years 
of technological evolution. 
Thus the politics of the transhumanist movement, and more importantly the way a 
rhetorician studies them, comes down to the way in which the movement attempts to shift the 
levels of affective investment around the key concept of the human. By shifting the investment 
away from the notion of "natural givenness" and to the ideas of the Will to Evolve and free 
choice as the defining characteristics of the human, transhumanists are attempting to create new 
ways of feeling about the idea of the human. Until this shift occurs, their arguments in favor of 
enhancement will fall on deaf ears. Stock seems most prescient on this issue: 
The biggest challenge will be our changing image of ourselves. At the outset I 
said that these new technologies would force us to examine the very question of 
what it means to be human. As we follow the path that germline choice offers, we 
are likely to find that being human has little to do with the particular physical and 
mental characteristics we now use to define ourselves, and even less to do with 
the methods of conception and birth that are now so familiar. Adjusting to new 
possibilities in these areas will be hard for many because it will demand a level of 
tolerance and acceptance that until now has been the exception rather than the 
rule. But perhaps the drama of the shift will itself ease the change by capturing 
out attention and forcing us into new patterns of relationship. Until now, to accept 
each other we often have had to pretend that we are all the same, but maybe when 
we see that we are all different and unequal - increasingly so - we will learn to 
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accept our differences.76 
If the rhetoric and the politics of the transhumanist movement is to have any purchase on the 
larger political landscape, they need to successfully re-articulate ways of caring about the 
concept of the human that are drastically different not only from their conservative counterparts, 
but also that challenge and eventually replace the understanding of the human in a public that 
does not share their views. This is more than just a matter of persuasion or identification; rather, 
it is a question of investment — investment that causes people not just to be persuaded by the 
transhumanist view, but to actually care about it. 
Quilting Points and Retroactivity in Defining the "human" 
Thus the discursive economy that these texts enter into is rife with affective investment. 
If there is any tenable distinction between reason and affect (albeit one that is troubled by my 
above analysis), then it certainly applies to the transhumanist position whereby they are 
attempting to articulate a way of caring about their project. The project rests on the attempt to 
define the "human," and in the process of this act, affect exerts its effects on the signifiers used. 
If an affect leaves in its wake a representation of a lack of representation, the so-called negative 
hallucination serves as a vehicle for a wide array of additional metonyms to become stand-ins for 
the initial concept. Those metonyms do not have to be consistent with one another, and can even 
be contradictory, but what remains constant is the investment in linking a barred signifier with a 
metonym through investment. Hence the existence of the tension I outlined above in the 
democratic transhumanist conception of the "human." By allowing for both metonyms of "free 
choice" and the "Will to Evolve" to occupy the same metonymic space, each becoming their own 
metaphors, the definition of the "human" points to the unmooring of an affect with its 
representation of a lack of representation locked into the rhetorical net of discourse – allowing 
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for a polysemous confluence of competing and contradictory metonyms to take their place as 
retroactively structuring metaphors. This is all made possible by the barring of the metaphor of 
the "human," from (S) to ($), that empties it out, allowing it to become a vessel for additional 
metaphoric configurations. This is one of the primary characteristics of the relationship between 
affect and signification I have outlined above — the necessary transference of a structuring 
metaphor to another structuring metaphor, or in this case metaphors, each serving as a quilting 
point for an anchor in the rhetorical net of discourse. 
The other characteristic of affect’s exertion of force on the signifier I will point out here 
is the retroactive suturing each of the new metaphors exerts on the structuring chain of signifiers 
in the discursive economy. Each successive definition of the human, when looked at in one side 
of an economy of debate such as this one, posits itself as an "objective" or "naturalized" linkage 
between a concept and its content. This means that the concept of the "human" is linked, 
metonymically, to its content (which in this case themselves are concepts) such as "free choice" 
or the "Will to Evolve." In turn, those linkages are presented as structuring metaphors that have 
always been linked to the concept, independent of their presence in the texts. The key term here 
is presented as, since the connections between concept and content are arbitrary metonyms that 
happen to be condensed through the act of invested labor as structuring terms. Hence the 
rhetorical nature of defining the human, the necessary use and effacement of artifice that is 
required for the transition from the metaphor of the "human" to its metonymic contents, which 
themselves become metaphors that structure other metonyms. Gilbert Chaitin remarks that this is 
one of the ways Lacan expands his maxim that the signifier is that which represents the subject 
for another signifier. Using this formulation, Chaitin argues that, within a discursive economy, 
"The sup-position of the subject is the assumption that each member of this ‘swarm’ of marks 
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has something in common with the others, beyond their differences ..."77 This is the subject’s 
presupposition of the ‘unitary trait." But, as he remarks, "As a pure potentiality ... as something 
that can only be anticipated, this unitary trait never actually appear: it always remains outside the 
set of signifiers."78 The conclusion is thus, "The place reserved for the subject can only be that of 
the incompleteness of the system of signifiers, and the subject is a metaphoric covering over of 
that place."79 In the above argument it is important to note that for Lacan the subject is itself a 
barred signifier, an ($), meaning that when Chaitin talks about the subject, he could equally be 
referring to that which is a metaphoric covering over a representation of a lack of representation. 
In other words, the "subject" in Chaitin’s formulation can stand in for the concept of the "human" 
in the discourse of transhumanism. 
Therefore, it is critical to note that there is always an incompleteness to the signifying 
system comprising the rhetorical economy of transhumanist discourse. If the system was 
hermetically sealed, if it was autonomous and there was a cogent, unitary trait that could be 
traced within the system to the "human," there would be no need for rhetoric — indeed no need 
for the economic function as an economy, it would instead be a structure. Yet the system is not 
closed, in fact its closure is impossible in that the unitary trait of the metonyms that comprise the 
"human" remains outside of the field of signifiers, within the affective economy. The fact that 
affect is able to permeate and exert effects on the signifier means that the discourse is alive, that 
is, rhetorical. This is the essence of Lundberg’s "feigned unicity" of the subject in a discursive 
economy: the symbolic order of signifiers is never complete and autonomous — the linkages 
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between concepts and their content is never guaranteed, thus requiring investment to "work." The 
retroactive nature of metaphoric condensation thus is the fulcrum on which the entire discourse 
pivots, requiring investment in a particular economy to establish and maintain. In other words, 
the unitary trait that transhumanists look for in attempting to define the "human" exists as an 
extra-linguistic entity, belonging to the affective economy and manifesting itself in the signifying 
chain as a representation of a lack of representation, of the unrepresentable. The lack of a 
representable unitary trait compels repetition, each time in a different form (human to choice to 
Will to Evolve), all derived from the enjoyment of attempting the impossible: to capture the 
unitary trait, to represent the unrepresentable. 
Bioconservatism 
The conservative bioethics movement sees the coming wave of bioethical technologies 
aimed at augmenting our physiological and psychological capacities as potentially detrimental to 
species. Specifically, they argue that the promise of eternal life, superhuman strength and 
intellect, and other potential "benefits" of enhancement technology threaten to abdicate the 
central components of what it is that makes us human. The movement is centered on two 
governing metaphors for the human: "giftedness" and "limitation." The human contains an 
element of "giftedness," given from some type of giver (God), that we, cannot comprehend and 
should not alter. Second, the very limits of the human body – our subsequent strength and frailty 
and eventual demise – contribute to the essential lived qualities of life. The fact that we will all 
eventually die, combined with the fact that there has to be some reasoning beyond human 
comprehension for the way we are, they argue, is what gives our lives meaning — and to change 
that would make us less, not more, than human. According to Leon Kass, "many people are 
increasingly worried about where biotechnology may be taking us. We are concerned about … 
what we might do to ourselves. We are concerned that our society might be harmed and that we," 
127  
might be diminished, "in ways that could undermine the highest and richest possibilities of 
human life."80 As such, these two structuring metaphors serve as the quilting points around 
which the entire discourse settles. In the same way as with the transhumanists, these structuring 
metaphors are metonymic replacements for the "human." 
Many conservatives in bioethics come from both the left and right politically, united by 
their opposition to human enhancement. For example, apart from Kass, who both represents the 
"right-wing" of the movement, which emphasizes a strong spiritual connection between "dignity" 
and the "giftedness" of life, there are those on the "left-wing" branch, like Bill McKibben who 
emphasizes the "limitedness" of human beings as something worth preserving. Since the 
movement is fractured along diverse political lines and united by their opposition to 
enhancement technologies, I will address each aspect of the movement as it is structured by the 
essential metaphors I outlined above. 
According to Kass, who cites another prominent conservative bioethicist, Michael 
Sandel, "What is wrong with biotechnological efforts at enhancement and re-creating ourselves," 
is what Michael Sandel, “calls ‘hyper-agency, a Promethean aspiration to remake nature 
including human nature, to serve our purposes and to satisfy our desires.’ The root of the 
difficulty seems to be both cognitive and moral: the failure properly to appreciate and respect the 
‘giftedness’ of the world."81 For Kass, the given nature of the human relates to its biological 
evolution: "Most of the given bestowals of nature have their given species-specified natures: they 
are each and all of a given sort. We need more than generalized appreciation for nature’s gifts. 
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We need a particular regard and respect for the special gift that is our own given nature…."82 
Thus to engage in any sort of human enhancement, a sort of evolution through technology, 
would be to disrupt the biologically "given" nature of the human. The concept of givenness, of 
course, implies a giver — something who has bestowed the human with its nature. It speaks to 
something outside of human rationality that has endowed the human with its qualities, and those 
qualities ought to be preserved. Thus tied with the articulation of the nature of the human with a 
giver, there is a second articulation: the idea that there is something greater than the human, 
something the human cannot understand. The implication against enhancement technologies is 
thus not only that there is a givenness to life that we would irrevocably alter if we were to pursue 
these technologies, but we would be toying with a realm of creation that we do not belong to. 
Kass relates this argument to human hubris, arguing: 
... if there is something inherently good or dignified about the ways in which we 
engage the world as … seekers of our own special excellence and flourishing in 
whatever arena to which we are called – only then can we begin to see why those 
aspects of our nature need to defended … We must move from the hubristic 
attitude of the powerful designer to look [at] the proposed improvements as they 
impinge upon the nature of the one being improved.83 
As Michael J. Hyde points out in his characterization of this argument, conservatives speak "to 
us of the giftedness of life like postmodern philosophers speak to us of the lived body and the 
‘otherness’ that characterizes human existence. We did not create the spatial and temporal 
structure, the openness, of our being and its inherent call of conscience. We are not wholly our 
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own doing."84 The alterity created by the metaphor of givenness implies that there is a certain 
threshold which humans, in their quest to perfect themselves, cannot cross; thus the argument 
against human enhancement. 
The trope of "human limits" is one definition of the "human" utilized by both the left- and 
right-wing branches of the conservative movement. The arguments are mostly divorced from any 
religious undertones, emphasizing instead the role that death plays in the essentialness of the 
human. For example, Bill McKibben, an environmentalist and left-wing conservative argues that 
the choice we have in debating enhancement technologies is to: 
[Give] up our citizenship in the land of the finite, which is a place that humans 
have known, and trade it for a passport to the infinite. To be launched into a future 
without bounds, where meaning may evaporate. To live always in the future, and 
never in the now where humans have mostly dwelt. When Miranda exults in The 
Tempest, "O brave new world that has such people in it!" her father replies: "Tis 
new to thee." Always before, that has been enough — that the world has meaning 
and that it continues on after we depart it. Bow we may actually have to choose 
— "live" without limits, or live and die with them.85 
The concept of the limits of human biological life are critical to McKibben, for they are, he 
argues, what gives meaning to life. "Germline engineering ... lies on the other side of the enough 
point," he argues, "If we adopt appropriate safeguards, we can do somatic genetic therapy ... 
without leaving behind the world as we’ve known it. We still live on Earth 1, we’re just a little 
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healthier. But if we start manipulating the germ cells of embryos, then we escape the 
gravitational pull of history and evolution and speed off into the dangerous and demoralizing 
wastelands of Earth 2, the world beyond meaning."86 In his argument against enhancement, 
McKibben vehemently defends the centrality of death to human existence, where, "Some of us 
have watched our parents go, and seen that the fact of their grandchildren playing at the foot of 
their deathbeds made it somehow okay and right. Life at peace with itself."87 Concurrent with 
McKibben’s emphasis of the importance of death is his emphasis of the ability to say "no" to 
enhancement: "Our gut revulsion at the coming ‘enhanced’ world is consciousness trying to save 
itself. As I’ve tried to show, the advent of these technologies, and this posthuman world, will 
quickly undermine consciousness. If we turn into engineered automatons, then consciousness as 
we know it — including the ability to make our own decisions, to say no — will eventually 
disappear. We will have reduced it to meaninglessness; human consciousness will have 
committed suicide."88 
Similarly, Kass outlines what he sees as three "human goods" that need to be protected. 
They are, "1) modesty and humility, about what we know and can do to ourselves; (2) the 
meaning of aging and the human lifecycle; and (3) the nature of human activity and human 
flourishing, and the importance of exercising the first and seeking the second through fitting 
means."89 The nature of the human lifecycle is critical to many right-wing conservative 
bioethicists, and the promise of immortality brought on by the transhumanists is simply out of 
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sync with their religious ideals. One of the primary tenants of the Judeo-Christian doctrine 
outlined by these right-wing conservatives is the idea that there is some type of existence after 
death. While they never explicitly come out and say it, the promise of some type of after-life is 
central to the religious doctrines followed by many right-wing conservatives. However, even 
apart from that, many conservatives agree fundamentally with McKibben - that the lifecycle is 
essential to human meaning. According to Kass’ PCB, "Age-retardation technologies make aging 
both more manipulable and more controllable as explicitly a human project, and partially 
separate from the moorings of nature, time, and maturity. They put it in our hands, but make it a 
less intelligible component of our full human life."90 In other words, to die — and to know that 
one is going to die — is an essential component of what makes life meaningful for humans. The 
natural life cycle, while drastically elongated over the past century, is still finite — and its 
finitude is what allows us to understand the concept of maturation. If we live to be 500 years or 
more, as many of the transhuamists believe we will with enhancement, then, the conservatives 
argue, we will become preoccupied with death. It will be a preoccupation "that leads us not to 
commitment, engagement, urgency, and renewal, but rather to anxiety, self-absorption, and 
preoccupation with any bodily mishap or every new anti-senescence measure."91 
Thus an anitomy is created over the definition of the "human" between the conservative 
and transhumanist camps. Viewed as a simple contradiction, it is easy to there is a stalemate 
created, stalling the debate. However, the nature of the competing interpretations, fostered by 
competing affective investments in the term extends beyond simple contradiction due to the 
retroactive nature of the quilting points created by the metaphoric sliding of the concepts used. 
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Therefore, in the case of a term with such a high level of definitionality such as the "human," it is 
more productive to explore the worldviews created by the competing interpretations rather than 
see how the debate operates on the level of the definitions themselves. Doing this, I believe 
provides an outlet for moving past the stalemate fostered by the antinomy of the "human." 
Conclusion: Incompossibity and Polysemy 
The conflicting nature of the definitions of the "human" in the conservative and 
transhumanist camps are central to how they formulate their positions on biotechnological 
enhancement. Since the metaphors that take the place of the "human" retroactively suture the 
instability of the signifying chain around the concept — due to the effects exerted onto it by the 
affective economy — entire, mutually exclusive worldviews are constructed within the same 
tropological economy. This helps to explain why the camps differ so dramatically, leading many 
to lament the stalemate of the debate over human enhancement in public discourse.92 This 
stalemate however, occurs because it is possible to have mutually exclusive metaphors filling the 
same conceptual space as the effaced signifier $, in this case the "human." Due to the 
retroactivity of the replacing structuring metaphors, the conceptual antinomy created by both 
sides of the biotechnology debate occupy a more complicated space than mere contradiction. It is 
not simply a case of A and not-A, since the competing camps do not actually disagree with each 
other on a definitional level — the Will to Evolve is not necessarily inconsistent with 
limitedness. In fact, they definitions of the "human" are not themselves mutually exclusive, but 
rather the irresolvable tension occurs in the worldviews that follow from them. 
To understand the distinction between the antinomy created in the biotechnology debate 
and simple contradiction I will turn to Deleuze’s reading of Leibniz. According to Deleuze, 
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Leibniz develops the concept of compossibility to explain the conditions of possibility for the 
existence of this world and not that one. For Leibniz, the world is comprised of a string of 
singularities that have various actualized predicates. This is largely where Deleuze develops his 
idea of the "virtual" and the "actual." Although the actualization of predicates, for Deleuze, is a 
question of ontology, I view Leibniz’s predicates in a more literal sense. Instead of rendering the 
actual conditions of the world, the actualization of particular predicates enable the conditions of 
possibility by which the subject understands his or her world — it is the establishment of a 
worldview. Since the subject can never match the symbols he or she uses directly with the Real, 
Lundberg’s "failed unicity," the actualization of particular predicates (again, taken literally as the 
symbols modifying a concept) creates the foundation of the "feigned unicity" between the 
subject, signifier, and Real. Compossibility, then, relates to the ways in which predicates are 
actualized by the subject in the symbolic as they imagine them in relation to the Real. According 
to Deleuze, for Leibniz: 
The expressed world is made of differential relations and of contiguous 
singularities. It is formed as a world precisely to the extent that the series which 
depend on each singularity converge with the series which depend on others. This 
convergence defines "compossibility" as the rule of a world synthesis. Where the 
series diverge, another world begins, incompossible with the first. The 
extraordinary notion of compossibility is thus defined as a continuum of 
singularities, whereby continuity has the convergence of a series as its ideational 
creation. It follows that the notion of incompossibility is not reducible to 
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contradiction. Rather ... contradiction is derived from incompossibility.93 
Thus the concept of the "human" is expressed through the two camps as a series of predicates 
that are incompossible with each other. While not contradictory, the predicates, linked through 
metaphors, enable particular worldviews that are retroactively mutually exclusive. This occurs 
because the representation of a lack of representation, designating the "human" from S to $, 
effectively allows for polysemous interpretations by disrupting its identity as a concept. 
According to Deleuze, this occurs when incompossible predicates are affixed to concepts. He 
argues, "Instead of a certain number of predicates being excluded from a thing in virtue of the 
identity of its concept, each ‘thing’ opens itself up to the infinity of predicates through which it 
passes, as it loses its center, that is, its identity as a concept or as self."94 
This loss of identity in the concept of the "human" destabilizes its ontological grounding, 
opening the possibility of the suturing of incompossible predicates to the term. Lacan’s quilting 
points can be read in this sense as the suturing of possible predicates onto concepts without the 
demand for compossibility. Instead of viewing these sutures as contradictions with each other, 
understanding their mutual exclusivity in the context of the worlds they retroactively create 
provides insight into the rhetorical functioning of the economy in which they enter. By 
presenting, retroactively, a quilting point enabled by the unmooring of the affective economy 
from the concept of the "human," the sutured predicates are rhetorical both in their actualization 
and effacement. In other words, the dual movement of linking the predicates to the concept and 
the presentation of those linkages as transcendent through feigned unicity comprises the 
contingent nature of effects produced by affect on the signifier. Rhetoric in this instance is thus 
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understood as the process of establishing contingent metaphors as well as the effacement of their 
contingent heritage. The effacement of the linkages between metaphors and their concepts 
comprises the establishment of the incompossible worldviews that denotes the concept’s 
polysemy. Polysemy in this sense does not refer to the potential of resistant readings that subvert 
power as argued by Raymie McKerrow.95 Nor does it refer to the intentional act by a rhetor to 
persuade an audience through strategic ambiguity as argued by Martha Solomon.96 Rather, it 
encompasses what Leah Ceccarelli classifies as "hermeutic depth." In her reading of the work of 
Carole Blair et al., Michael Hyde, and Robert Rowland, Ceccarelli argues that this form of 
polysemy demands a "both-and" reading of particular texts, or in my case, a particular rhetorical 
economy.97 She argues that this reading moves away from an intentional one that places agency 
on the rhetor or audience and towards one that demonstrates the role of the critic as providing the 
potential readings of a given text or economy.98 Similarly, Celeste Condit et al. point to a notion 
of polysemy in metaphors that is dependent on context. They argue, "Metaphors are pluripotent; 
that is, their meaning depends on selections from a polysemic universe of associations of a 
metaphoric vehicle and the polyvalent responses to each of those associations."99 For my 
purposes, polysemy can be understood not just as allowing for contradictory readings of a text, 
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but also the possibility for incompossible worldviews established in an economy around the 
same concept or concepts, all dependent on the context of the debate. Taken together with the 
simultaneous establishment and effacement of contingent quilting points, this understanding of 
polysemy grounds the rhetorical nature of an economy, specifically in the debate over 
enhancement technologies and the necessary definition(s) of the "human" that it demands. 
 
137  
 
 
 
PART II: ARGUMENT AND DIFFERENCE 
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Chapter 3: The Female Athlete Does Not Exist: Tropological Regress and the Sex-
Verification of Female Olympians 
 
In the highly competitive world of elite sporting events, a premium is placed on 
the idea that the events are "fair" for all who compete. Hence events are divided up by 
sex, since, the argument goes, men are stronger, faster, and generally more athletic than 
women. Thus, if sports like track and field were mixed, it would be inherently unfair to 
women. Starting with the modern adaptation of the Olympic Games, and escalating in the 
early and middle parts of the 20th Century, the fear that men would "masquerade as 
women" in order to win women’s events became instituted into policy in the form of 
mandatory sex testing, or sex-verification, in order to preserve the integrity of individual 
events. After a brief respite from 2000 to 2010, sex-verification was reinstated by the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) for the 2012 Games in London. This time 
however, the fear that men would enter female events was supplemented by the language 
of genetics and endocrinology: the committee feared that women with certain 
developmental sexual disorders would have an unfair advantage over "normal" 
contestants. Instead of testing to see if the women competing were "really men," the 
committee was interested in the level of testosterone and other androgenic hormones in 
their competitors’ bodies, arguing that the presence of these hormones would confer a 
competitive advantage in terms of strength and speed over other women who did not 
produce the same levels of testosterone. Athletes competing in men's events were not, 
and have never been, subject to such testing. 
139  
The shift to endocrinology marks a new way of thinking about sexual difference 
for the IOC. The goal of testing is no longer to explicitly determine whether or not female 
competitors were actually men, but to determine whether the female competitors are 
"female enough." Still, there is an implicit assumption that there is a biological bright line 
that determines what constitutes the female sex in sex-segregated sporting events. Similar 
to the previous discussions on biotechnological enhancement and the concept of 
"dignity," the committee’s attempt to demarcate the borders between men and women in 
sport can be seen as a move to distill the basic natural parameters between the sexes and, 
in turn, define the essential qualities of men and women. While the IOC does not 
explicitly take a stance on the definitional boundaries of the "human," they rely on 
similar argumentative strategies for demarcating the boundaries of what constitutes a 
"woman" in the context of competitive sport. Unlike the two previous chapters, the 
instance of sex-verification and the International Olympic Committee requires a 
suspension of the debate over where to draw the line in the definition of a component of 
humanness due to the fact that it must implement the line in policy. Thus, there is an 
empirical, traceable lineage of how the Committee seeks to define the "woman" in its 
various sex-verification procedures and the justifications it uses for those tests. As such, 
the case of female sex-verification in the Olympics is a prime example of the paradox I 
have thus far been exploring: the attempt to define some component of humanness, in this 
case the taxonomies of the sexes, as something that exists outside of language. Thus the 
relationship between affect and signification is ever-present, in this case serving as the 
linkage between policy and biology. Here I will argue that in every case of female sex-
testing in the Olympic games, actual female athletes are compared to an ideal conception 
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of "the Female Athlete" that is both necessary for the testing to justify itself and 
impossible for any female athlete to live up to. To explain how testing relies on an ideal 
that is both necessary and impossible, I will turn to Lacan's conception of the formation 
of the masculine and feminine subject in discourse. Since the justifications for sex-
verification regimes inherently exist in discourse – that is that they rely on concepts that 
are in turn matched to the reality of sporting events – Lacan's conception of how the 
sexes are taxonomized in discourse will provide a helpful starting referent. In this case, 
the relationship between the barred signifier and the Lacanian barred subject, both 
represented by $, mutually reinforce each other as phenomena in language. The barring 
of the subject is here demonstrated by the subject's separation from itself in language. In 
other words, it’s ideal is different from its existence. 
Concurrent with the sexual taxonomy of the subject (as the category of female 
athlete) as a rhetorical object is the effect exerted onto language in an attempt to signify 
its essential nature. Expanding on the previous chapter, rhetoric is thus understood as a 
double movement: the artificial linking of an "essence" to a signifier (or subject, $) and 
the presentation of that artificial linkage as a transcendent and naturalized entity. Thus 
rhetoric in the case of athlete sex-verification constitutes both the use and elision of 
artifice in an attempt to define the essence of the female. This brings about the second 
contention of this chapter: the effect of attempting to define the essential, biological 
nature of the "woman" in the case of female athletes produces a phenomenon that I call 
"tropological regress," or the endless procession of troping and retroping of the "woman" 
as it is linked to various scientific, genetic, and endocrinological discourses, each 
presented as transcendent in the International Olympic Committee’s reports justifying the 
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sex-verification practice. The IOC's linguistic regression is thus similar to the debates 
over the definitions of "dignity" I explored in chapter one. In this instance, a contingent 
metonym (the presence of a Y chromosome, the presence of genes indicating that Y 
chromosome, and finally the presence of androgenic hormones) is linked to the concept 
of the "woman," and then presented as a Lacanian metaphor – artificially suspending and 
organizing the flow of signifiers around a concept that is, through the use of scientific 
discourse, presented as transcendent. This regression of tropes, from metonym to 
metaphor to another metonym presented as metaphor and so on, is visible in the policies 
of the International Olympic Committee’s policies on sex-verification. 
The final contention of this chapter is that the tropological regress inherent in 
attempting to define the human is a product of what Lacan calls the masculine form of 
knowledge. Lacan decouples his concept of the masculine from physical, biological sex 
and moves instead to a model of sexuation whereby a subject’s sex is determined through 
discourse. Thus, while he calls it masculine knowledge, it does not have to do with the 
physical sex of the subject. In other words, not all men and not all women adhere to its 
logic. Instead, it is used as a rubric to determine how subjects who enter into language 
(Lacan’s concept of castration) engage with difference through negation by positing a 
subject that exists outside of the logic of language. In order to exist as a speaking subject, 
masculine knowledge must posit a subject that is not itself, that is not caught in language  
a subject that is not castrated. This subject, while necessary for masculine knowledge, is 
impossible such that no subject capable of entering into discourse is not caught in 
language. Hence Lacan’s declaration that "the Woman does not exist." It is important to 
note that Lacan is not saying that "women do not exist," but rather that the conception of 
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the ideal Woman is both necessary and impossible for the formation of masculine 
knowledge. The contention in this chapter is thus that the ideal female athlete, both 
feminine and athletic does not exist, yet the International Olympic Committee operates as 
if it does. The ideal female athlete is both necessary and impossible, and the Committee’s 
attempt to make all actual female athletes adhere to its standards is necessarily a 
rhetorical act as outlined above. 
Olympic Sex-Verification 
History 
The establishment of the IOC’s challenge-based system for sex-verification 
follows from a history of mandatory sex testing spanning from the 1968 Grenoble and 
Mexico City Olympics to the 1998 Nagano games. However, the question of the sex of 
women in the Olympics dates back to Ancient Greece. The first recorded incident of sex-
verification at the Olympic Games comes from an account of Kallipateria, mother to a 
boxer competing in the games around 400 BC.1 Since women were forbidden to attend 
the competition, Kallipateria disguised herself as a male trainer to coach her son and 
watch him compete. After he was victorious, she jumped a fence to congratulate him and 
as James L. Rupert explains, "Her male attire got snagged on the way over. 
Foreshadowing the ‘nude parades’ at games a thousand years in the future, she landed 
naked, her real sex revealed."2 
In the modern games, the scrutiny of sex turned to female athletes. Before the 
mandatory testing of 1968–1998, there were a few well-documented cases of male 
                                                
1 Laura A. Wackwitz, “Verifying the Myth: Olympic Sex Testing and the Category 
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2 James L. Rupert, “Genitals to Genes: The History and Biology of Gender 
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athletes posing as women, starting with the 1936 games in Berlin. Before the games, two 
high-profile female athletes, Mary Dalton from Great Britain, who revealed she had 
undergone a surgical procedure to become Mark Dalton after the games, and Czech 
athlete Zdenka Koubkova, who was "pronounced a man" after sex reassignment surgery, 
heightened calls for the sex-verification of female Olympians. The most outspoken 
proponent for sex testing was the then chairman of the United States IOC, Avery 
Brundage, who pronounced that female athletes competing in the games should be 
subject to a "thorough physical examination to make sure they were really 100 percent 
female."3 At the games themselves, the winner of the women’s 100m dash, Helen 
Stephens, was subjected to a physical examination after defeating Stella Walsh (who was 
bestowed the nickname "Stella the Fella").4 Another incident at the Berlin games was the 
case of high jumper Dora Ratjen, who admitted to being a male impostor forced to 
compete by Nazi Germany.5 After Dora re-identified as Heinrich in 1939, it was revealed 
that he suffered from gender dysmorphia and was assigned, incorrectly, as a female from 
birth through puberty.6 Speculation about the sex of athletes continued after World War II 
due in large part to Cold War tensions, where female athletes' from Eastern Bloc and 
Asian Communist countries sex was often in question.7 
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At the 1968 Grenoble winter games the IOC began random sex-verification. 
Officially called "sex verification of the women" according to the official report of the 
Grenoble games, fifty women were tested and all passed.8 According to Rupert, "at the 
1968 Summer Games in Mexico City, Polish sprinter Ewa Klobukoswa … became the 
first person to fail an Olympic sex test."9 Klobukoswa passed a physical test two years 
earlier in Budapest but failed the IOC’s chromosome-based test developed for the 
games.10 Reports surfaced that Klobukoswa mothered a child later in life, leading to the 
speculation that, famously, "she had one chromosome too many."11 Thus, in the first of 
many cases that complicated the chromosomal tests run by the IOC from 1968–1988, 
Klobukoswa was diagnosed as a "sex-reversed XXY woman," meaning she had an extra 
Y chromosome, disrupting the XX-XY dualism demanded by the IOC test.12 The 
chromosome-based test utilized by the IOC looked for a DNA-protein complex called the 
"Barr body" as well as looking for traces of a Y chromosome with a fluorescent dye.13 
The problem with these tests, according to Barry D. Dickenson et al., was that "sex 
chromatin tests screened out phenotypic women who had genetic differences that 
afforded no unusual physical advantage for sports, while potentially missing XX men and 
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women with medical conditions such as congenital adrenal hyperplasia that could offer 
competitive advantages."14 Thus athletes like Klobukoswa were excluded from the games 
without actually having the feared "competitive advantage" over other female 
competitors. 
Chromosomal testing continued throughout the 70’s and 80’s. At the 1972 Winter 
Games in Sapporo, so-called "sex checks" became mandatory for all female competitors. 
The report of the Sapporo Olympics was the first to provide a rationale for the tests: 
Women athletes are commonly required to undergo an examination to 
confirm their sexual identity because of the large number of individuals, 
who, although appearing to be female, have the physical characteristics of 
males. Conducted in the women’s quarters of the Olympic Village … the 
test consisted of taking a sample of oral mucus to examine the 
chromosomal pattern. Nothing abnormal was discovered in a check of the 
217 female athletes from 22 countries.15 
The tests did find "violators" in 1972. Three athletes were excluded from competition at 
the Summer Games at Munich.16 With the expansion of women’s events in the late 60’s 
and early 70’s to include team sports like volleyball, as well as new events in track and 
field and swimming, sex testing became more important to the IOC. As Laura A. 
Wackwitz notes, "Sex testing provided a means of verifying the gender of individuals 
who had broken the traditional molds of femininity by participating in these [new] 
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events."17 The 1984 Games in Los Angeles provided another rationale for the sex testing 
regime: 
The Medical Commission of the International Olympic Committee 
attempted to protect women against unfair competition. The control 
attempted to confirm an athlete’s gender with minimal interference to the 
dignity of the individual. Rule 29 of the Olympic Charter states that 
female competitors must comply with the prescribed tests for gender 
verification.18 
In 1985, between the Los Angeles and Calgary Games, Maria Patino, a Spanish hurdler, 
was disqualified from competing in the World University Games. According to 
Dickinson et al., "Ms. Patino had male pseudohermaphroditism with complete androgen 
insensitivity."19 She challenged the ruling and was eventually reinstated to compete in the 
next Olympics, becoming the first female athlete to successfully challenge a sex-
verification ruling.20 According to Rupert, "her case did much to publicize the problems 
with sex testing and provided ammunition to the opponents of the tests, including those in 
the IOC [Medical Commission]."21 
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The 1988 Winter Games in Calgary did not disqualify any athletes and the 
Summer Games in Seoul did not publish the results of sex-testing in their report. In 1992, 
at the Winter Games in Albertville and Summer Games in Barcelona, the IOC abandoned 
chromosomal testing in favor of examining female athletes' DNA. Instead of looking for 
the Barr body, these tests examined the DNA of subjects to look for "Y chromosomal 
material" by looking for the presence of the SRY gene and the DYZ1 region of the Y 
chromosome itself.22 Any samples that tested positive for the DYZ1 region were then 
tested for the SRY gene. At Barcelona, according to Dickenson et al., "2406 female 
athletes were screened for DNA located on the Y chromosome (DYZ1 repeat). Positive 
samples were reanalyzed for the presence of the SRY gene. Eleven were positive for 
DYZ1; of these, five were positive for SRY."23 However, it is unclear if the five who 
tested positive for SRY were excluded from the games.24 It is worth noting that the 
Barcelona report developed a new method for dealing with "borderline cases," one that 
adopted "a study of the secondary sexual characteristics, the morphology of the subject 
and the psychological behavior" of suspected violators of the testing.25 In 1996 at the 
Summer Games in Atlanta, eight women tested positive in the sex-verification 
screenings. However, all had been allowed to compete.26 In the report on the games, the 
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IOC seemed to indicate an increasing awareness of the "non-binary nature of human sex 
and the range of specialists who could contribute to evaluating a test."27 The report states: 
Cytogenetic blood chromosome analysis and endocrinologic evaluation 
could be performed for intersex medical problems. All test results were 
reported to the chairmen of the IOC Medical Commission or his designee. 
Athletes who screened positive were asked to allow further testing or 
examination. Qualified medical geneticists and gynecologists were 
available to further evaluate athletes that tested positive, if requested by 
the IOC Medical Commission. Other qualified specialists, such as 
psychiatrists, urologists, and endocrinologists, were on-call to assist 
female athletes in a sensitive and professional manner.28 
The 1998 Nagano Winter Games, the last Games to have mandatory testing, had 679 
athletes "who did not have an IOC gender verification card (83% of women competitors) 
were tested using DNA…."29 Starting at the 2000 Sydney Summer Games, the IOC 
"conditionally rescinded the 30-yr requirement for on-site gender screening of all women 
entered in female only events" because, as Dickenson et al. explain, "both sex chromatin 
and SRY tests identify individuals with genetic anomalies that yield no competitive 
advantage."30 Instead, "intervention and evaluation of individual athletes by appropriate 
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medical personnel could be employed if there was any question about gender identity."31 
Between 1966 and 1998, more than 10,000 female athletes were tested, and despite some 
women "failing" the test, "no men posing as women have been detected at the Olympics 
or other international events at which X chromatin analysis or SRY testing has been 
performed."32  
Sex Testing at the XXX Games in London 
Starting with the 2000 Olympic Games in Sydney, the IOC abandoned 
compulsory testing. Instead, it adopted a "challenge-based" system whereby female 
athletes would only be screened if there was a suspicion as to their sex.33 Currently, the 
International Association of Athletic Federations (IAAF) states that there will be "no 
compulsory, standard or regular gender-verification during IAAF sanctioned 
championships," noting that "determination [of sex] should not be done solely on 
laboratory based sex determination."34 If another athlete or team challenges the sex of a 
female athlete, "such challenges would result in a more comprehensive medical 
evaluation by a team of experts including a gynecologist, endocrinologist, internal 
medicine expert, geneticist, and an expert on gender/transgender issues."35 Also gone was 
the chromosome-based approach; the IOC would no longer test for the presence of a Y 
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chromosome based on the presence of the SRY gene. Instead they would test for female 
hyperandrogenism, also known as Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome (AIS). According to 
Ross Tucker and Malcolm Collins, AIS "is one of a number of different conditions that 
can result in ambiguity between the chromosomal and anatomical sex of an individual. 
Collectively, these conditions have been termed disorders of sex development (DSDs) 
and they are defined as the spectrum of conditions ranging from those with ambiguous 
external genitalia to those with normal female external genitalia by varying degrees of 
internal testis."36 According to the IOC Regulations on Female Hyperandrogenism, the 
official policy document outlining the testing procedures for the 2012 Summer Games in 
London, "human biology … allows for forms of indeterminate levels between the 
conventional categories of male and female, sometimes referred to as intersex. Usually, 
intersex athletes can be placed in the male or female group on the basis of their legal sex. 
However … intersex female athletes with elevated androgen production give rise to a 
particular concern in the context of competitive sports, which is referred to as ‘female 
hyperandrogenism’."37 
The concern for the IOC is that, "androgenic hormones have performance-
enhancing effects, particularly of strength, power and speed, which may provide a 
competitive advantage in sports."38 Therefore, each National Olympic Committee (NOC) 
"shall, as appropriate, prior to the registration of its national athletes, actively investigate 
any perceived deviation in sex characteristics and keep complete documentation of the 
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findings, to the extent permitted by the applicable law of legal residence of the concerned 
athlete."39 If a challenge is brought against a particular female athlete, the IOC report 
stipulates that an expert panel (consisting of the above specialists): 
may request that the investigated athlete and/or her team physician provide 
further information and/or that the investigated athlete undergo further 
examinations to determine whether female hyperandrogenism is present 
and can be considered to confer a competitive advantage … The Expert 
Panel shall examine all available information and establish (I) whether the 
investigated athlete’s androgen level, measured by reference to 
testosterone levels in serum, is within the male range, and if so, (ii) 
whether such hyperandrogenism is functional or not … if, in the opinion 
of the Expert Panel, the investigated athlete has female hyperandrogenism 
that does not confer a competitive advantage because it is non-functional 
or the androgen level is below the male range, the Chairman shall close 
the case, and the concerned athlete shall be eligible to compete in the 2012 
[Olympic Games] Competitions … If, in the opinion of the Expert Panel, 
the investigated athlete has female hyperandrogenism that confers a 
competitive advantage (because it is functional and the androgen level is 
in the male range), the investigated athlete may be declared ineligible to 
compete in the 2012 Olympic Games.40 
As Alice Dreger points out, “the IOC won’t just be looking at how much androgens a 
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woman’s body makes, but also how much her cells respond. This is because some women 
are born with testes that make a lot of testosterone, but they lack androgen-sensitive 
receptors, so the androgens have little-to-no effect on their cells."41 Thus in order for 
there to be a marked "competitive advantage" in the eyes of the IOC, the suspected 
female athlete must both be hyperandrogenic and respond to the increased amounts of 
testosterone her body produces such that it confers an unfair advantage. However, there is 
no clear boundary on how much androgenic hormone constitutes "too much," and how 
those hormones affect performance, since most of the studies on testosterone and athletic 
performance have been conducted on male subjects.42 Nonetheless, the IOC moved 
forward with androgenic hormone testing in the XXX Olympiad despite criticism from 
many academic and scientific circles. Prior to the games, the IOC recommended that each 
NOC establish "gender-testing centers" to test female athletes with suspected high levels 
of testosterone and treat athletes with DSDs.43 The new policy on androgenic testing and 
the establishment of the "gender-testing centers" came in the wake of the 2010 IAAF 
World Track and Field Championships, held in Berlin, in which a South African woman, 
Caster Semenya won the 800-meters and was subsequently forced to undergo sex 
verification tests, and the 2006 Asian Games, where Shanti Soundarajan, also a winner of 
the 800-meters, "failed" a sex verification test.44 
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As the shifting landscape of the testing procedures used indicate, the issue of sex-
verification at the Olympic Games, as well as other elite sporting events, is far from a 
settled issue. But independent from how authorities should attempt to verify the sex of 
female competitors, there is a debate about whether they should test them in the first 
place. According to Dreger, the debate is split along two lines, a camp that she classifies 
as "atomists," who believe that "the line imposed between putative male and putative 
female athletes must be biological," and "identifiers," who "believe the line between men 
and women athletes ought to be based in self-identity."45 The positions laid out by each 
side are mutually exclusive. It is important to note however, that the question of the 
science of the sex of female athletes is relegated to a secondary role, subsidiary to the 
question of whether or not the athletes should be tested in the first place. In other words, 
whether or not there is a biological determinate for sex, the question becomes does that 
determination lead to an unfair advantage in sporting competition and therefore, should 
that determination be policed to ensure fair competition. Once the initial question is 
answered, then the door is opened to determining what the biological markers of sex-
based advantages are. While on face, this seems like a debate between an objectivist 
position and a social-constructivist one, I argue that both sides rely on assumptions that 
place an onus on objects that exist outside of language – in this case, the biological 
determination of sex on the one hand, and the right to self-identification and free choice 
on the other. Each position therefore attempts to define some essential quality of 
"womanness" and relate it back into a normative position of how it impacts what should 
be done to ensure the fairness of sport. The question of competing values, fairness versus 
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privacy and autonomy, speak to the attempts by each side to point to something natural to 
language, something that is transcendent form the subjective way in which we describe it, 
something that is saturated with affect. Thus, the way these discourses justify the 
necessity of sex-verification is through a process of naturalization whereby they attempt 
to present the ideal female athlete as something that exists outside of linguistic 
subjectivity. In each instance, competing investments create the mutual exclusivity of the 
positions of the atomists and identifiers. I will explore the Atomist position and explain 
the ways in which these competing investments occur. 
Led by the IOC, atomists believe that there is a biologically determining factor for 
sex, and that that determining factor confers an unfair advantage to men over women in 
some sporting events. According to geneticist Eric Vilain, "The reality is that there is a 
pretty good candidate for such a substance [that confers a competitive advantage in elite 
athletes]: testosterone. We know that exogenous testosterone enhances performance and 
is therefore considered a doping substance, forbidden in all Olympic sports."46 It is 
important to note that those who subscribe to the atomist position, like Vilain, argue for 
some sort of "natural" process of doping that relies on the genetics of athletes – men are 
naturally better at sport than women. However, as I have shown in the case of genetic 
enhancement in chapter two, there is no such thing as a purely "natural" or "unnatural" 
enhancement, but rather all enhancements rest on a continuum, and it is the rhetorical 
maneuvering within discourse that artificially demarcates the boundaries between the 
two. Since the World Anti-Doping agency, along with the IAAF, IOC, all major 
American sport leagues, and other sport-governing bodies ban the use of injected 
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testosterone in male and female athletes as a performance enhancing drug, Vilain, as well 
as the IOC, believe that women having "naturally higher" amounts of testosterone confers 
an unfair advantage and that, as Vilain argues, "there is practically no overlap between 
normal male and female ranges of endogenous testosterone levels."47 Therefore, the 
atomists argue, if the levels of androgenic hormones, such as testosterone, reach "a male 
level" in female athletes, they should be forced to compete as males, or at least forbidden 
to compete as women, regardless of how they self-identify.48 This position is echoed by 
the IOC, which states in their report that high levels of androgenic hormones produce an 
unfair advantage in athletes, making the competition fundamentally unfair to women with 
"regular" or "female" levels of testosterone in their bodies. Thus, according to Vilain, 
testing for testosterone and enforcing boundaries between male and female levels would 
"allow women to compete with a shot at winning and … allow such a wide range of 
genetic and hormonal differences within the women’s group that we are in for the 
exciting treat of watching women compete passionately with all their unjust, innate 
athletic abilities that make sports so exhilarating."49 
However, not all atomists agree with Vilain and the IOC’s position. For example, 
Michelle Brett Sutherland et al. argue that simply testing for testosterone levels in female 
athletes is actually not enough. They state, "that shape and alignment of [the long] bones 
[in the arms and legs of] adults, which are largely dictated by the level of circulating 
testosterone around the time of puberty, gives athletes who were exposed to higher levels 
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of testosterone a distinct competitive advantage. Subsequent treatments to lower 
testosterone levels, such as those proposed by the IAAF and the IOC, will not alter 
athletes’ osteology and will therefore not result in a level playing field."50 Therefore, 
"This osteological difference has important implications for athletic performance. Simply 
put, the same tensile force from quadriceps contraction allows males to push down harder 
on the pedal or off the ground than females."51 This fundamentally modifies the binary 
atomist position of the IOC because, instead of segregating sports into male and female 
divisions, Sutherland et al. conclude that, "Rather than separating the competitors based 
on the traditional criteria used in athletics, such as the appearance of the external 
genitalia, sex hormone profile, or chromosomal karyotype, one could develop a system 
that categorizes athletes on osteology. Such a system could have more than two 
categories."52 Even though they advocate for abandoning the male/female distinction in 
sport, Sutherland et al. represent another strand of atomist thought: independent of the 
sex of athletes, there is still a biological determinism that allows for one athlete to excel 
of another due to his or her biological makeup, assuming that each competes at an elite 
level. As such, divisions ought to be established not on personal identification, but rather 
on biological makeup. 
The rationale for the continuation of Olympic sex-verification regimes is to "level 
the playing field" of female athletic competitions and ensure that women do not have to 
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compete against men, whom are supposed to have an intrinsic, biological advantage in 
competitions of speed and strength. According to J. C. Reeser, "Experience will 
eventually tell us whether they made the correct decision, and whether the modern female 
athletic playing field will remain level. Until such time when we can reflect on that 
experience with perfect hindsight, we must make the best decisions we can with the 
information available."53 For Reeser, that includes continued sex-verification tests under 
the new IOC regulations, to ensure fair competition. Likewise, Eric Vilain and Francisco 
J. Sanchez argue that: 
The best that the IOC can do is to create sound parameters to which 
athletes must adhere. The recent rule regarding females with 
hyperandrogenism is one such parameter. Although it has limits, the rule 
can be improved as we follow its application. The next big challenge for 
the IOC and other sports agencies will be to devise a way to precisely 
quantify the degree to which female athletes are resistant to androgen 
provocation, as that is what ultimately matters when it comes to asking the 
question of how much testosterone is too much testosterone.54 
While many atomists agree the testing regime established by the IOC is provisional and 
limited, what unites them is the dual assumption that there is a biological differentiation 
between male and female, that it has implications for the competitive landscape in sport, 
and that the playing field should be "level" to ensure female athletes can compete and 
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win. Hence the Chairman of the IOC’s Medical Commission, Arne Ljungqvist’s 
comment that "We are not determining the gender in an individual. What we are talking 
about is athletic eligibility."55 While the discourse has shifted from "men masquerading 
as women" to include a higher awareness for intersex athletes and DSDs, the general 
argument remains the same: to ensure "the fairness of sport." 
Signifying the Woman 
To explain the Atomists’ logic for the continuation of sex-verification practices 
for female athletes, it is important to understand the ways in which the category of 
"woman" is constructed as something wholly other than "man." I say wholly other 
because the relationship between the two is predicated upon a negation, namely, that 
"women" is that which is characterized by that which is not "man," or, more simply, man 
negates woman. This is evident in the discourse of "fair play," in that male athletes are 
seen as possessing capabilities that enable superior performance in sport. Men can jump 
higher, run faster, etc. Men are thus characterized in terms of negative difference from 
women, a woman is one who does not possess those capabilities for superior performance 
when paired against a man. Thus the notion of "gender testing" in Olympic sport is a 
misnomer since gender is understood as the social ways in which a subject enacts his or 
her role as male or female. A more accurate way of characterizing the issue, and one that 
I have tried to forward thus far in my terminology, is "sex verification," a term often 
conflated with "gender testing" in the literature, albeit with exceptions.56 Here, "sex" 
refers to the biological components of a subject that dictate his or her sex organs and 
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genetic makeup, thus biologically designating them as male, female, or intersex. It is this 
notion of female sex, and not female gender, that is conceptually negated in comparison 
to male sex and not male gender, and it is sex differentiation, or sexuation that I deal with 
in this chapter. 
Poststructuralist feminist thought has theorized this masculine negation of the 
feminine in terms of sex and note that it is the primary encounter with fundamental 
difference that structures the basis of western philosophy and, indeed, society itself.57 
Taken at a more abstract level, the act of negation, since Hegel, is understood in much of 
western philosophical thought as the foundational way in which the subject differentiates 
itself from the world and in turn, the way in which it understands itself as a totality, or as 
I will explain in the following section, as one. For Lacan, drawing on Hegel, this primary 
act of negation – the negation of a subject from that which it is not – and in turn the other 
series of negations that stem from it constitute a discourse.58 This fundamental relation to 
difference, the way in which the subject first encounters and negates the world around it, 
is characterized by Lacan as the logic of the male. Now, it is important to note that while 
Lacan designates two logics, two ways of encountering the world, as "male" and "female" 
in his theory of sexuation, he invokes the fundamental ways in which the subject 
encounters difference. Thus it is critical to understand that the male and female 
designations of the logics are not dependent on the actual sex of the subject who 
identifies with them. Lacan does not offer a biological account of the difference between 
the sexes, but rather one that is predicated on the subject’s encounter with difference. 
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Thus Lacan states that "Any speaking being whatsoever, as it is expressly formulated in 
Freudian theory, whether provided with the attributes of masculinity … or not, is allowed 
to inscribe itself [on either side of the sexuation dyad]."59 In relation to the sexuation of 
Olympic athletes, I will argue that the logic of sex verification stems from Lacan’s 
masculine side of the dyad, one that exists expressly through the negation of difference. 
For Lacan, masculine knowledge, again based on identification and not biology, is 
defined completely by its entrance into language. It completely accedes to the signifier. 
This is the essence of the Lacanian concept of castration is this entrance into language, 
since to do so, the subject must give up a part of itself in becoming caught up in the net of 
discourse. This is the essence of the barred S which, in a way similar to the barred 
signifier, must empty itself out of that which is asignifying, since, as Lacan points out, for 
the $, "There’s no such thing as a prediscursive reality ... [every] reality is founded and 
defined by a discourse."60 The basic formulation of the subject’s entrance into language, 
and the constitutive split that occurs is best defined by Lacan’s L Schema from his early 
work.61 There, Lacan posits the subject as split between two entities, the body, or 
physical assemblage of the self (Es(S)), and the imaginary image the subject has of itself, 
which is always partial (a or the Ego). In order to constitute itself, the subject then must 
posit two positions of otherness, the other which it can negate (a’) and the absolute other, 
Lacan’s "big Other," that which assumes a position of complete alterity to the subject.62 
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These four basic positional coordinates help explain the more complicated theory of 
sexuation forwarded by Lacan 17 years later. Focusing on the split subject, the 
designation between the Ego and the Es(S), there are two important implications 
forwarded by psychoanalytic thought: First, the subject is split between the Real and its 
imaginary conception of itself. There is no one-to-one relation between the subject’s 
physical assemblage, the Es(S), and its Ego. The Ego exists within the realm of discourse, 
hence Lacan’s famous formulation, "the signifier represents a subject to another 
signifier," meaning that subject is only a linguistic and imaginary representation in the 
eyes of another subject.63 Put another way, when Lacan states, "Men, women, and 
children are but signifiers," he means that subjects can only be signifiers for other 
subjects.64 This is the essence of castration, since if everything is represented by 
signifiers, if the subject is truly caught in discourse, then there will always be a remainder 
between its physical assemblage and its representation in language. There will always be 
a failed unicity between the real of the subject and its symbolic coordinates. Lacan 
designates this remainder to the signifier the phallus, which is "distinguished from [mere] 
signifying material."65 
This formulation implies that in order for the subject to fully be split, there must 
be an initial act of negation. There must be "one who is not" split. One who is whole, 
who has not completely acceded to language, one who is not a signifier for another 
signifier. Lacan formulates this using set theory as "there exists one who is not castrated." 
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Yet this position is a paradox because there is no subject that is not a signifier to a subject 
who can only perceive other subjects as signifiers. That is to say that since every subject 
is caught in discourse, every subject can only interpret other subjects through their 
imaginary and symbolic coordinates. There can be no subjects that exist completely 
outside of language (there can be no uncastrated subjects) because the very definition of 
subjectivity requires that a subject must be trapped in the world of concepts. To imagine 
this subject position is necessary for the subject to exist as split in language. The 
exception proves the rule, hence the other set formulation that follows from above: every 
subject is castrated. The subject posits that which cannot be, that to which it always must 
fall short, the subject who is not split, or, a zero-degree relationality between words and 
things, or the subject and itself (feigned unicity). This allows for the establishment of 
what Lacan calls "the Law," or a set of ordering principles in which the subject is able to 
define itself by what it is not. According to Ellie Ragland, "This creates a masculine or 
master discourse logic of the ‘at least one’ who says no to castration … and provides the 
model of an exception to the rule that gives rise to the concept of a social convention or 
‘norm’ of reality … most people believe in a superior being or principle … that 
transcends the law, in order to establish the law as a basis from which to ‘write itself’ in 
reference to something."66 
Coming closer to the western rhetorical cannon, Kenneth Burke provides an 
analog to this theory of the formation of the Law in his Rhetoric of Religion. For Burke, 
in a study of the overall schema of Western religious doctrine, there must be an 
establishment of what he calls "Order." This is similar to Lacan’s Law. Burke points out 
                                                
66 Ellie Ragland, The Logic of Sexuation: From Aristotle to Lacan (New York: State 
University of New York Press, 2004), 96. 
163  
that Order, "is grounded in the idea of a verbal command, which by its very nature 
contains possibilities of both obedience and disobedience … We reserve our commands 
… for language-using entities that can, to varying degrees, resist."67 Thus for Burke, just 
as with Lacan, the concept of a covenant, law, or order is established through the word. 
Burke continues: 
Here one can start with the creation of a natural order (though conceiving 
it as infused with a verbal principle); one can next proceed to an idea of 
innocence untroubled by thou-shat-nots; one can next introduce a thou-
shalt-not; one can next depict the thou-shalt-not as violated; one can next 
depict a new Covenant propounded on the basis of this violation, and with 
capital punishment; one can later introduce the principle of sacrifice … 
Then gradually thereafter, more and more clearly, comes the emergence of 
the turn from mere sacrifice to the idea of outright redemption by 
victimage.68 
Thus when a covenant or law is established, in order to be maintained, it must posit that 
which is the perfected, impossible, form of itself, and then symbolically sacrifice a 
transgressor to maintain the impossible "purity" of the order. This occurs because, as 
Burke points out there are two coordinates between which a covenant locates itself: the 
perfect, unattainable ideal, and the scapegoat which is sacrificed in order to maintain 
distance from the "fallenness" of reality and come closer to the, albeit impossible, 
unattainable ideal. The process continues indefinitely according to Burke, who argues, 
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"Thus when we read of one broken covenant after another, and see the sacrificial 
principle forever reaffirmed anew, narratively this succession may be interpreted as 
movement towards fulfillment, though from the standpoint of the tautological cycle they 
‘go on endlessly’ implicating one another."69 This is mirrored in psychoanalytic theory, 
where, as Yannis Stavrakakis argues, "Every utopian fantasy produces its reverse and 
calls for its elimination … If in almost all utopian visions, violence and antagonism are 
eliminated, if utopia is based on the expulsion and repression of violence … this is only 
because it owes its own creation to violence; it is sustained and fed by violence … it also 
resurfaces in the production of the figure of an enemy."70 In his study of the concept of 
"perfection" as it relates to human nature, Michael J. Hyde eloquently sums up the 
oxymoron of striving for perfected discourse, stating, "Perfection is a ‘god term,’ an 
ultimate standard meant to define states of completeness that can be used to direct us 
toward the good, the just, and the true. We thus tend to think of the completeness of 
perfection in terms as virtue. But … perfection can also drive us crazy and lead to 
troublesome (if not disastrous) consequences in our lives … Perfection can be both a 
benefit and a burden."71 Hence the idea that we can, in Burke’s terms, become "rotten 
with perfection." 
In the content of language usage and rhetoric, we can read this cycle through 
Lundberg’s formulation of failed and feigned unicity. Unicity as a concept, the direct 
one-to-one between relations and things, represents the perfection of language. However, 
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as such, it is ultimately impossible (failed unicity). The idea of a "degree zero" in 
language assumes the complete and perfect capture of an affect — its direct 
representation. But, as I have previously shown, affect is inherently asignifying, it is 
"ineffable," and thus we can only represent a lack of representation in its stead. Yet still, 
we present that representation of a lack of representation as transcendent, as a complete 
capture of the affect, the unicity is feigned and acted out through the compulsion to 
repeat, designating it as a site of investment. This entire process, as I have shown above, 
occurs through continual acts of negation. Artifice is hidden, leading to the double move 
of rhetoric: the presentation and concealment of contingency. The addition I will make to 
this formulation is that when acted out in discourse, this striving and failing to perfect 
language hinges upon the imposition of a scapegoat, a victim who we sacrifice as one 
way to maintain the feigned unicity of the signifier. 
The Woman Does Not Exist 
Lacan controversially states, "There’s no such thing as Woman, Woman with a 
capital W indicating the universal."72 What does he mean by this? For Lacan the category 
of "Woman," is that which escapes castration, the split in language, since she is not fully 
caught in the world of concepts. Thus, from the perspective of the masculine subject, 
from he or she who has ascended into language, the universal of "Woman," an entire 
subject category who is not castrated, cannot exist. Thus, Lacan writes the position as the 
Woman. Lacan posited that the universal of "Man," with a capital M, must be subject to 
the negative (the phallus) and thus must posit that which escapes the universal in order to 
establish the Law. The opposite of masculine logic does not abide by the same shackles 
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of negation. Instead, whereas the necessary is the grounding for the possible in masculine 
logic, feminine logic fuses the impossible with the contingent. The impossible, contrary 
to the logical equation that all (x) are castrated, Lacan posits the impossible feminine 
subject position as Elle Ragland classifies it, "there is no exception to not being identified 
with castration in the real…."73 This double negative leads to the conclusion that "there is 
no universal castration for women … insofar as the two negative on the top line yield a 
positive on the bottom line."74 Ragland thus concludes, "Women is not signifier as such 
in the unconscious, while man is signified there by a mark of difference from woman. 
And although women are not castrated in reality, they are castrated culturally by 
masculine signifiers that seek to interpret sexual difference."75 This "no universal 
category of Woman" according to Lacan, is, "a never-before-seen function in which the 
negation is placed on the quantifier, which should be read ’not-whole,’ it means that 
when any speaking being whatsoever situates itself under the banner ‘women,’ it is on the 
basis of the following — that it grounds itself as being not-whole in situating itself in the 
phallic function … There’s no such thing as Woman because, in her essence … she is 
not-whole."76 
This "not-whole" is demonstrated by the fact that the category of the Woman is 
not predicated upon negation. Whereas masculinity must posit its opposite in order to get 
a sense of itself, femininity does not succumb to the impulse of the negative, and as such, 
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from the eyes of the negative apparatus of the masculine, cannot exist as a universal 
category. The concept of the not-whole is derived from the fact that not every component 
of the Woman is captured in language, or is subject to castration. In terms that I have 
used before, this means that there is a necessary component of the subject position of 
women that escapes signification, that cannot be represented except by a negative 
hallucination, a representation of a lack of representation. Lacan’s Woman is thus the 
realm of the affective economy when posited through language. Any attempt to 
conceptualize the universal of Women, of pure alterity, must always become subject to 
negation, and thus part of it must escape that-which-signifies, must remain in part, 
ineffable. This is why Derrida argues that the encounter with the absolute-other is 
"Neither representation, nor limitation, no conceptual relation to the same."77 Instead: 
[There] is no way to conceptualize the encounter [with the absolute-other]: 
it is made possible by the other, the unforeseeable "resistant to all 
categories." Concepts suppose an anticipation, a horizon within which 
alterity is amortized as soon as it is announced precisely because it has let 
itself be foreseen. This infinitely-other cannot be bound by a concept, 
cannot be thought on the bases of a horizon; for a horizon is always a 
horizon of the same, the elementary unity within which eruptions and 
surprises are always welcomed by understanding and recognized.78 
Thus to conceptualize the Woman is immediately to place the category under erasure. 
Once one allows the category to enter into the realm of concepts – once we attempt to 
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define its essence –the Woman's alterity is immediately reduced along a horizon of the 
same — of language, of negation. This is a possible reading of the expansion of the 
concept of textuality, and a point where deconstruction and psychoanalysis overlap. This 
is not to say that everything is a text; rather, it is to acknowledge that there is something 
asignifyable beyond signification — the Woman — that which cannot be negated. This 
thing that cannot be negated can only be conceptualized through the net of signification, 
and thus only as a representation of an absence of representation. That which cannot be 
negated resides within the logically prior affective economy, and to attempt to 
conceptualize it without symbols is impossible. Yet it still exerts effects on the net, on the 
signifier, and we can point out those effects empirically through reading discourses like 
the IOC position on sex-verification. 
Tropological Regress 
To read texts from the perspective of masculine enjoyment is to be attentive to the 
ways they exist from the perspective of the negating prowess of being caught in 
discourse. It is to live next to a universal exception to signification that is simultaneously 
necessary and impossible. It is necessary in that there must be a one-that-is-not in order to 
establish a law, in this case the law of feigned unicity. It is impossible because to 
conceptualize it beyond the textual level is to bring it back to the textual level, it is failed 
unicity, the failure of the entity to be fully conceptualized because there is always 
something anterior to concepts. Thus there is a law of feigned unicity in order to cover up 
the logical necessity of a state of failed unicity. This failed unicity stems from the 
attempted conception of, in Hegelian and Derridian terms, absolute negativity, which is 
"A negativity that never takes place, that never presents itself, because in doing so it 
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would start [the work of negation] again."79 It is to imagine a paradox that absolute 
negation still requires an outside to itself, and thus at its very limit cannot negate that 
which is unnegatable. According to Derrida, "To go ‘to the end’ both of ‘absolute 
rending’ and of the negative … without reserve … [is] … convulsively to tear apart the 
negative side, that which makes it the reassuring other surface of the positive; and it is to 
exhibit within the negative, in an instant, that which can no longer be called negative."80 
This, I believe, is the same reading of a phenomenon as Lacan’s argument about the 
impossibility of the universal Woman. This is the paradox at the logical limit of 
textuality. What happens to the net of signification as it encounters the absolutely 
negative? Derrida argues: 
Since it is a certain sliding that is in question, as we have seen, what must 
be found, nor less than the word, is the point, the place in the pattern at 
which a word drawn from language will start by virtue of having been 
placed there and by virtue of having received such an impulsion, to slide 
and make the entire discourse slide. A certain strategic twist must be 
imprinted upon language; and this strategic twist, with a violent and 
sliding, furtive, movement must inflect the world corpus in order to relate 
its syntax and its lexicon to major silence … An absolutely unique 
relation: of a language to a sovereign silence which tolerates no relations, 
tolerates no symmetry with that which tilts itself and slides in order to be 
related to it. A relation, however, which must rigorously, scientifically, 
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place into a common syntax both the subordinated significations and the 
operation which is nonrelation, which has no signification and freely 
keeps itself outside syntax.81 
Here, the Woman is the relation that tolerates no relation. No existing female athlete can 
perfectly embody the ideal Female Athlete. Concepts, Derrida points out, slide in 
response to the relation of no relation, representing only an absence of representation. 
This sliding prompts an indirectness of the concept in relation to no relation since it 
cannot relate to the concept outside of concepts, something escapes signification. This is 
the failed unicity of the signifier. Since the relationship between the concept and the 
relation of no relation is indirect, it is simultaneously presented and effaced as a trope. 
The double movement of the rhetoric act is thus necessary to both overcome the failure of 
unicity and maintain the integrity of the signifier in its relation to the signified. Hence 
Derrida’s insistence in both Of Grammatology and "White Mythology” of the primacy of 
metaphor as "a conceptual network within which philosophy is also constituted. Each 
thread in the net forms a turn of speech…"82 
Since each signifier that encounters the relation of no relation can only represent 
it as an absence of representation, its logical limit, the point in which it interacts with the 
affective economy. This is the formation of Lacan’s metonym, the contingent relation 
between signified and signifier. Having described this position in relation to the concept 
of affect in the previous chapter, I will now show how it is enacted in discourse, or, how 
we can trace its empirical effects. Each metonym enters into a relationship with other 
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metonyms, forming metaphors based upon invested usage. Those metaphors have a series 
of metonyms under their purview, each attempting to represent a lack of representation, 
east taking the position of $. This is especially prescient in an instance of a concept with a 
high level of definitionality, since it cannot, yet must be defined. In other words, the 
attempted zero-degree relation between trope and affect is both necessary and impossible. 
In the case of the IOC’s policy on sex-verification, it stands out as exceptional because, 
unlike debates over the concept of "dignity" or biotechnological enhancement, this case 
demands a resolution. Thus we can see, enacted into policy, the implications of when 
language confronts its own limit. 
In this instance, the limit of language is the essence of "Female", with an F, the 
universal category, the perfected conceptual essence of "the Woman." But it the Woman 
does not exist, it is that which escapes castration (language) and thus cannot be 
conceptualized by all castrated beings. Yet it is necessary because the discourse presents 
itself as referring back, with other signifiers, to the relation of no relation. Furthermore it 
hides this artifice by presenting its linkages as transcendent, as relating to the signified at 
a zero-degree of difference. Hence to say "the Woman does not exist" is to say that the 
Woman only exists rhetorically. I term a specific kind of this rhetorical movement as 
"tropological regress." It occurs when there is an endless procession of tropes defining 
tropes, each presenting themselves as a "final link" in the chain of signifiers, the ones that 
ground the word to the Real in a zero-degree relation. But of course, this presentation can 
never last permanently because the unicity is feigned, the trope’s artifice is rhetorically, 
temporarily presented. Thus the entire chain reorients itself around another signifier, 
turning it into a metaphor with only its own metonymic connections and no "primordial 
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signifier" below it. The act is rhetorical because, according to Ernesto Grassi, metaphor is 
the bases for all rational speech. All rational speech, for Grassi, "is immediately a 
‘showing’ – and for this reason ‘figurative’ or ‘imaginative’ … It is metaphorical. i.e., it 
shows something which has a sense, and this means that to the figure, to which is shown, 
the speech transfers [metapherein], a signification … [Speech] cannot have a rational by 
only a rhetorical character … ‘rhetoric’ assumes a fundamentally new significance; 
‘rhetoric’ … [is] the speech which is the basis for rational thought.83 This reversal of the 
hierarchy of rhetoric and philosophy leads to the implication that language’s unicity is a 
failed unicity.  
In the case of the IOC this is possible to point out through the various, provisional 
policies they have enacted throughout the era of gender verification. It can be traced back 
to the inability of language to completely symbolize the signified in any non-rhetorical 
manner. The signifier that escapes castration, the S, does not exist, yet is posited as 
existing because it is necessary, and cannot be conceptualized fully by a castrated 
signifier, $. The initial proposition given by Atomist discourse stipulates that there is a 
biological essence to the signifier of "Female," or, it posits something that exists outside 
of concepts as an essence that authorizes the use of the concepts in the first place. It 
draws upon an assumed one-to-one connection between the signifier "Female" and an 
imagined entity within the affective economy: the affect. But the connection of "Female" 
to "biological essence that confers a competitive advantage," from one signifier to 
another signifier that elides itself, an $, is indirect with regard to the affective economy 
and presents itself as direct with regard to the tropological one. The first example of this 
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was the Barr test, attempting to locate the Woman in chromosomes. This was presented, 
at the time of its implementation, as reliant upon a description of "things as they actually 
were." In other words, as being able to identify the Woman outside of concepts. It is 
necessary that there is a biological component to the Woman that exists outside of 
language, that in order for it to develop as Law, it had to posit that which is not castrated 
by language – that which is outside of the signifier. But the Woman does not exist. The 
Barr test could not account for the existence of XXY women as well as others with 
various chromosomal DSDs. Thus it was found to be indirect, and thus ceased to exist as 
the structuring metaphor for how we understand, biologically, what makes the Woman. 
Thus the test for the SRY gene became the new standard. The genetic presence of the Y 
chromosome would be enough to verify the limit of the feminine. It replaced the 
discourse of chromosomes to that of genes and genetics and in so doing took control of 
various metonyms of the concept of genetics, structuring a new discourse. The change to 
searching for "androgenic hormones" made the discourse more precise but not more 
direct in relation to the affective economy, meaning unicity can be easily feigned, yet still 
exists in a state of failure. The cycle will probably continue, indefinitely, as new 
metonyms take the place of metaphors and anchor, albeit temporarily, the entire 
discourse. 
Thus when the IOC report argues that "Androgenic hormones have performance 
enhancing effects, particularly on strength, power and speed, which may provide a 
competitive advantage in sports," it relies on the stabilizing reference to the natural, that 
of "androgenic hormones," which has purview over the metonyms of strength, power, 
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and speed.84 Unicity is feigned by linking together the test with a discourse of scientific 
knowledge when there is an "Expert Panel" established to oversee the proceedings.85 The 
expert panel has empirically failed to do its mission: provide validity for the tests, 
however in all three iterations from the Barr test to androgenic hormones have failed to 
develop a system that is either false positive proof or false negative proof.86 As for 
strength, power, and speed, they are all linked to a supposedly stable (verifiable) 
discursive metaphor in the criteria of the androgenic hormone. The "masculine" qualities 
of strength, power, and speed are measured against the thrice-removed conception of the 
biologically "Female" and found to be superior to the constructed subject position of the 
Woman. The emphasis here is on the constructed nature of the subject position; since the 
Woman does not exist qua representation, the discursive system puts the imagined 
absolute negation in its place. That the conception of the Woman can come from biology, 
androgenic hormones in particular, is the subject position established by the discourse in 
order to present that subject position as transcendent. The discursive economy of 
Olympic sex-verification predicated on the test for androgenic hormones is thus founded 
on rhetoric: the double rhetorical act of invention – the linking together of contingent 
connections between signifiers and signified – and the concealment of artifice occurs in 
the debates over the Woman in the discourse. 
The case of Olympic sex-verification is exceptional in that we can see its effects 
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as they are enacted in policy. However, this does not mean that the policies enacted by 
the IOC suture the discourse once and for all. Rather, it, just as with the debates over 
“dignity,” biotechnological enhancement, stem cell research, and genetic patenting, 
comports to the life of the sign. That life, I have argued, stems from the relationship 
between the signifying and affective economies, specifically how the latter affects the 
former by the mooring and unmooring of affects to signifiers. The life of this discursive 
economy is apparent in the continually varying testing regimes established by the IOC 
over the course of the 20th and 21st Centuries, and there is no indication that the debates 
over sex-verification's prudence and procedures will cease any time soon. To say “the 
Female Athlete does not exist” is to gesture towards the open-ended nature of the debate. 
While the concept itself has a high level of definitionality much like “dignity,” it is, 
perhaps more than any other case study in this volume, envisioned to be tangibly 
embodied in human subjects. While “dignity” is at best an abstract concept and 
biotechnological enhancement does not yet exist in the capacities outlined in the debate 
over its implementation, the Female Athlete has and continues to be necessary and yet 
impossible. Its construction is necessary for the IOC if it continues along a path of sex-
verification, and yet impossible to occupy for female Olympians. The result is the 
inevitable production of more scapegoats as the entire discourse seeks to purify itself, 
continues to be “rotten with perfection.” 
To call the process by which the discourse operates “rhetorical” is not to say that 
the science on which it is founded is rhetorical. Rather, it is to say that the appeal to 
scientific discourse in the attempt to justify the legitimacy of the exclusion of athletes 
with DSDs from Olympic sports on the grounds that they imperil the “fairness” of the 
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games is a rhetorical act. The validity of the science has elsewhere been challenged, but 
those arguments are a far cry from those who sought to find the “rhetoric of science.”87 
The insights garnered by this exploration of Olympic sex-verification is not that the 
science of androgenic hormones is fraught with rhetoric, but rather to say that the 
discourse over how the science of androgenic hormones are used in practice is where 
rhetoric resides. To justify the (necessary and continual) exclusion of female athletes on 
the grounds that they are “not feminine enough” to compete fairly against other women 
must be a rhetorical act since it, using the discourse of science as a justification, attempts 
to halt the life of the sign by assuming a level of precision in relation to the gap between 
the signifier and signified. It has been my contention that this gap is constitutive of the 
subject and the signifier, the dual $, in that it requires the establishment of an impossible 
ideal in order to negate itself into existence. The impacts of that stipulation are tangible to 
the women who have “failed” tests in the past. As long as the regime of IOC sex-
verification exists, it will single out women who appear to be “too masculine” to compete 
fairly. Perhaps by understanding the rhetorical nature of this exclusion, of the failed 
unicity in all of the IOC's feigned attempts to justify drawing a biological line between 
men and women, we can move toward an understanding of the way the discourse (and 
others like it that draw upon scientific justifications to outline the boundaries of a 
conceptual ideal) operates on the embodied subjects under its purview. This 
understanding, I believe, relies on the twofold disclosure of the contingency of the 
linkages between the concepts of sex and athletics and, ultimately, on the realization that 
the Female Athlete does not exist. 
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Chapter 4: On Affirmation, Negation, and Modality: Debates over Human Cloning 
and the Rhetorical Engagement with Novelty 
 
Recently, rhetorical theorists interested in both composition and rhetorical 
criticism have attempted to reconceptualize the relationship between rhetorical invention 
and novelty. Stephen R. Yarbrough outlines the essential question posed by this line of 
inquiry, relevant since the Sophists, as, "can rhetors only recognize and use novelty once 
it has appeared, or can they deliberately create novelty because they want or need it?"1 In 
its recent strand, theorists have posed this question in terms of affirmation and negation, 
or, can rhetors only react to novelty (through negation) or create it (through affirmation)? 
Both affirmation and negation represent a mode of engaging an event of novelty, but they 
do so in drastically different ways. Traditionally associated with the dialectic, negation is 
conceived of as the overcoming, sublation, or Hegelian Aufhebung, of novelty in relation 
to an existing structure or economy. John Muckelbauer argues that negation serves as the 
default method of engagement with "the new," and produces a "difference and novelty 
[that only emerges] by somehow overcoming or negating particular others … change is 
always and everywhere the effect of overcoming and negation."2 The question of 
refiguring the concept of difference is of interest to rhetoricians because it sits at the 
intersection between existing linguistic economies and events of novelty (be it a new 
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subject position, technology, mode of political engagement, etc.) and speaks to the ways 
in which language engages with the new. Thus any rhetorical scholar interested in the 
relationship between the canon of invention and novelty has a stake in the ways in which 
that event is differentiated from existing structures of intelligibility. From a political, 
ethical, or rhetorical perspective, conceiving of a mode of differentiation that does not 
stem from negation offers an enticing way to understand and encourage an engagement 
with difference in ways that foster difference in and of itself instead of perpetually 
reducing the new into the replication of the old.  
The main goal of this article to is explore the ways in which rhetorical invention 
is a simultaneous engagement with novelty, one that both affirms and negates an event. 
At stake in this intervention is to understand how novel technologies are both rendered 
intelligible by existing methods of interpretation and how we can create new concepts 
that are attentive to their specificity.  To demonstrate this, I will explore the ways that a 
particular existing linguistic economy, that of current debates over the development of 
human cloning technologies, engages with an event of novelty: the near-future, yet-to-
exist capacity of scientists to clone a human embryo. The way the current discourse plays 
out in practice, I argue, is that the ways in which the highly stratified debate affirms and 
negates the potential technology moves beyond simply advocating or decrying its 
development. Rather, the two sides of the current discussion on human cloning engage 
with difference in fundamentally different ways. This argument stems from the 
fundamental tension outlined by Yarbrough above: detractors of the technologies seek to 
utilize existing tropes in public discourse such as science fiction and religious arguments 
about the nature of the family and the sanctity of life to spark the public imaginary 
180  
against developing human cloning, while proponents of the technologies seek to invent 
novel concepts, focusing less on what they say over their motive power to persuade 
publics. This duality in the ways in which they engage with the development of cloning 
technologies, understood for my purposes as an event, speaks not only to the contrasting 
rhetorical strategies employed by each side, but also indicates something about the 
fundamental nature of rhetorical invention itself.  
Thus the fundamental contention of this piece: the aporia between affirming and 
negating difference is the very same aporia of rhetoric as outlined by Paul de Man: the 
undecidable tension between the study and use of tropes and the study and use of 
persuasion. Ultimately, I argue, understanding these tensions not as a choice between 
affirming or negating difference, but rather as an undecidable aporia – a "both, and" 
rather than an "either, or." allows us to make proscriptive claims about the necessity of 
pragmatism in the cloning debate in an attempt to move beyond the stalemate inherent to 
the field. The chapter proceeds in six sections. In the first, I outline the particular event I 
will be dealing with: the proposed development of human cloning technology, arguing 
for its status as an event since it represents something that forces contemporary bioethics 
to reconsider fundamental assumptions it has made about the nature of humanity, the role 
of the family, and the boundaries of human life. Second, I outline a brief ontology of the 
event and its relationship to a given linguistic economy, establishing the reading practice 
for the rest of the piece. Third, I demonstrate the conceptual similarities between de 
Man’s argument for the undecidability of rhetoric and Deleuze’s concepts (taken from his 
readings of Nietzsche) of affirmation and negation. I explain the relationship between the 
figural pole of rhetoric, or the study of trope, and the conception of negative difference, 
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while persuasion and affirmation exist in a similar, related context. I will explore the 
ways in which each side of the cloning debate encapsulate this distinction in their 
respective differences with the engagement of the novelty of cloning technology. In order 
to understand the relationship between affirmation and negation and their differences 
from each other, I explore the question of rhetoric and modality in the next section. Here 
I explore the basic taxonomy of the debate and demonstrate why it necessarily leads to a 
judgmental impasse unless we understand the stylistic differences at play. Finally, again 
drawing upon the work of Nietzsche and de Man, I argue that any engagement with the 
event of novelty must ultimately be both affirmative and negative since the distinction 
between the two is ultimately undecidable. Ultimately, I aim to demonstrate that in the 
case of the cloning debate, understanding the simultaneity of both affirmation and 
negation is essential to adopting a pragmatism that is necessary to break out of the 
argumentative stalemate that characterizes much of the debate. 
The Event: Human Cloning 
While there are still substantial scientific and technological barriers to cloning 
human embryos, and so far, all reports to the contrary have been discredited as hoaxes, 
few potential scientific advancements spark the imagination and challenge so many 
foundational assumptions about the role of reproduction, the boundaries of human life, 
the ethics of scientific research, and its role in bettering society as much as the debate 
over human cloning. In a 2002 report commissioned by then president George W. Bush, 
the President’s Council on Bioethics (PCB) eloquently states, "The new and distinct 
challenges that confront us through cloning call upon us to consider the character of [the 
tacit agreement between society and science], and to determine whether, and in what 
way, it might need to be amended and supplemented, especially in the face of the rapidly 
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arriving new biomedical technologies that touch so directly upon our humanity."3 
Since Dolly’s "inception," in the United States alone, there have been three 
executive-ordered white papers issued on the topic (two under Bill Clinton’s National 
Bioethics Advisory Board and one under Bush’s PCB), an executive order by Bush 
banning all federal funding for research on human embryos, another executive order 
overturning Bush’s doctrine by President Obama, two bills passed by the House of 
Representatives (the Weldon-Stupak bill, passed in 2001 and again in 2003), a series of 
proposed legislation bouncing around in Senate committees and sub-committees, and 
legislation considered or passed in twenty-two states, all aimed at either clarifying what 
aspects of human cloning should be legal or banning the practice in its entirety.4 All of 
this stemming from a debate over a technology that has yet to be developed and exists 
only in theory. Thus, the issue of human cloning serves as an exemplar of an event – 
something that exists as something that is "yet to come," wholly outside of the actual, yet 
it surely exerts effects on it. By examining the ways in which the proposed technologies 
enter into the public imaginary through various linguistic economies, we can gain insight 
into how those economies engage with novelty. Furthermore, there are a plethora of 
examples in American and British bioethical discourses that either whole-heartedly 
negate or affirm the potentiality of the event of human cloning, allowing us to explore 
exactly what happens to a linguistic economy as it struggles with novelty.  
Terminology: Human Cloning in Actuality 
While invoking images of "human farms" and the production of thousands of 
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exact replicas of the same person, the actuality of the proposed processes of human 
cloning is far more mundane, yet no less ethically complicated. But before we can 
explore the way in which it is derided or championed, a few notes on terminology are in 
order. First, human cloning is defined, quite broadly, as the production of a human 
embryo outside of sexual reproduction. It is not the direct duplication of an adult 
organism, but rather, as the PCB explains, cloning "is a form of asexual reproduction … 
the production of a new individual not by the chance union of egg and sperm but by some 
form of replication of the genetic makeup of a single existing or previously existing 
individual."5 All cloning, including human cloning, synthetically produces an embryo. 
What makes cloning different from In-vitro Fertilization is that, while both take place 
outside of the body, IVF fuses male and female germ cells to produce a viable embryo 
and thus is a form of sexual reproduction. Cloning on the other hand, does not require 
those germ cells, and is thus a form of asexual reproduction. The technique used to clone 
Dolly, and subsequently any other embryo, is called somatic cell nuclear transfer 
(SCNT). Joan Haran et al. describe the process: 
Somatic cell nuclear transfer or replacement requires the removal of the 
‘nucleus’ containing the genetic material – the nuclear DNA – of a donor 
egg and its replacement with the nucleus of a differentiated cell. Through 
chemical and/or electrical stimulation, the egg is activated, and an embryo 
is thus created outside of sexual reproduction.6 
The created embryo, then, is genetically identical to the organism that supplied the 
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differentiated cell, all taking place without the need for sexual fertilization. 
SCNT facilitates two types of (potential) human cloning, and the distinction 
between them, while often missed by the popular imagination of the process, is central to 
the debate over the ethics of the practice. The distinction relies on what happens to the 
reconstructed embryo after it undergoes SCNT. The first kind of cloning, the one that 
most people think of when they hear "human cloning," is called in the literature 
"reproductive cloning." Haran et al. explain that "reproductive cloning [involves] the 
placement of the resulting (reconstructed) embryo into a women’s womb for gestation."7 
According to the PCB, "the goal [of reproductive cloning] is the production of a (cloned) 
child."8 The second kind of cloning is called "therapeutic cloning," and is the production 
of human embryos, along with their stem cells, that can be used for "the development of 
treatments for diseases (suffered not by the clone, but by others)."9 Therapeutic cloning, 
then, would not allow the embryo to gestate, or develop into a child, but rather freezes the 
developmental process at the embryonic stage in order to, most likely, extract embryonic 
stem cells from the clone for biomedical research and stem cell treatments. 
This, of course, is but a cursory explanation of the complicated scientific 
processes involved in human cloning, but should serve our purposes here to frame the 
context of the debate over its implementation. Even with the brief outline of the science 
involved in the process above, the immense ethical challenges wrought by the potential 
development of these technologies is apparent. The role of science in society, the 
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beginnings of human life, and our understanding of ethical scientific practices all come 
into question in the face of the potential for cloning human embryos, and these questions 
are reflected in the passionate and stratified debate taking place over whether or not to 
continue to research uses and practices of cloning human beings. Thus, the debate serves 
as an exemplar of the ways in which events of novelty (in this case a near-future 
technology) negated and affirmed in a particular linguistic economy – in this case, the 
field of American and British bioethics. To explore how this event is negated and 
affirmed, and how each process is a result of linguistic labor and artifice when explaining 
in a discursive economy, it is necessary to explain the relationship between rhetoric, 
affirmation, and negation in more theoretical detail. 
The Ontology of the Event and its Relationship to Linguistic Economies 
To understand the relationship of affirmation and negation to the event of novelty 
it is critical to explore the ontology of the event itself. Deleuze begins with a definition of 
the event as something that exists externally from the "state of affairs," or the set of 
existing entities in a given situation. The event, rather, is an effect on those entities, and, 
"These effects are not bodies, but, properly speaking, ‘incorporeal’ entities. They are not 
physical qualities and properties, but rather logical or dialectical attributes. They are not 
things or facts, but events. We cannot say they exist, but rather that they subsist or inhere 
… they are not substantives or adjectives but verbs. They are neither agents nor patients, 
but results of actions and passions."10 The state of affairs is exposed to an effect, rendered 
by an event, which is wholly different in terms of kind from the already existing 
actualizations inherent in the state of affairs itself. Hence the event of novelty is one that 
reveals an entirely new set of possible connections between the event itself and the state 
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of affairs – connections that have previously been unthinkable prior to the exposure of the 
state of affairs to the event. This previous unthinkability carries with it a cost: the 
possibility of new ways of connecting between the event and the state of affairs remain 
unintelligible until there are ways of expressing them. This act of expression – the site of 
encounter between the state of affairs and the event – is expressed through "language," 
here understood as the vehicle for rendering the event intelligible. Paul Patton explains 
that, "events require interpretation and it is impossible to disentangle their meaning if not 
their very nature as events of a certain kind from the theories which inform their 
description … events are the epiphenomena of corporeal causal interactions: they do not 
affect bodies and states of affairs but they do affect other events, such as the responses 
and actions of agents. Pure events are both the expressed of statements and the ‘sense’ of 
what happens."11 This is why Deleuze remarks, "Events make language possible. But 
making possible does not mean causing to begin."12 In other words, the event spurs the 
creation of linguistic concepts, rendering possible the act of rhetorical invention, and the 
act of rhetorical invention is expressed by and expresses the event. 
Thus to "speak" of an event, to render it intelligible, to make sense of it, one must 
perform a double action: the simultaneous negation of the event’s novelty in order to 
bridge the gap between it and the state of affairs, and the invention of the novel concept, 
an act that affirms the event’s difference from the situation qua difference. The former 
operation relies of synthesis and identity to bring in existing modes of sense–making to 
bear on the event’s interpretation, while the latter, according to Deleuze, puts "objects 
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[in] simultaneous affirmation only insofar as their difference is itself affirmed and is itself 
affirmative."13 This affirmative mode of engaging novelty means that the disjunctive 
relationship between the possible methods of relation between the event and the state of 
affairs (either this … or that) is not reliant upon the "exclusion of predicates from one 
thing in virtue of the identity of its concept (the negative, limitative, or exclusive use of 
disjunction)."14 Rather, it eschews the negating notion of identity in concepts for the 
inventive mode of play – "each ‘thing’ opens itself up to the infinity of predicates through 
which it passes, as it loses its center, that is, its identity as concept or itself."15 The 
inventive process is thus an affirmation concerned with the motive power of words rather 
than rote representation, or to engage in the play of the pure effectivity of language, while 
the tropological process, by rendering the encounter with the event intelligible by way of 
forcing it into an existing tropological structure, is by nature, a negation. To truly 
"affirm" the relationship with the event, then, it is critical to locate the relationship 
between the two in an affirmative sense of disjunction, which I will now outline. 
The relationship between the affirmative and negative poles of the engagement 
with novelty, I argue, exists in disjunctive relationship that is indicative of Deleuze’s 
"affirmative synthetic disjunction," a procedure that, "consists of the erection of a 
paradoxical instance, an aleatory point with two uneven faces, which traverses the 
divergent series as divergent and causes them to resonate through their distance and in 
their distance. Thus, the ideational center of convergence is by nature perpetually 
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decentered, it serves only to affirm divergence."16 Therefore to affirm the possibility of 
affirmative engagement with the event, one must cast off the properties of identity 
inherent in the affirmative and negative poles of that engagement. Paradoxically, this 
means that there can be no excluded predicates in the possibility of affirmation or 
negation since to do so would be to negate the possibility of affirmation, rendering the 
entire operation null and void. Rather, the event is simultaneously affirmed and negated, 
each movement placed in an affirmative synthetic disjunction with the other, in other 
words, in a relationship of undecidability. To affirm affirmation is not to negate negation, 
but to affirm the possibility of the paradoxical simultaneity of the two operations. 
In reference to rhetoric and its relationship to the engagement with the event, it is 
important to note that the state of affairs, or existing structure, refers to the specific 
linguistic economies utilized by a public both to describe and communicate within a 
given context or conjuncture. In other words, it is the shared symbols utilized by a 
grouping of subjects to render their existence in the state of affairs intelligible. There is 
an emphasis placed on the relationship between the linguistic economy and the event 
such that the event must be "named," or rendered intelligible by an intervention into the 
event that allows for the process of sense–making to occur. While there are other ways to 
engage with the event, independent from the linguistic economy and the words used to 
foster the intervention, those methods of interaction or not rhetorical per se, and thus do 
not fall under the purview of this analysis. However, what remains is subject to the 
paradox of simultaneity outlined above. A way to lay out the parameters of this paradox 
is as follows: it is impossible to intervene, or name, an event of pure novelty because, as 
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Badiou points out, no vocabulary in the state of affairs (what he terms "the situation"), 
"can furnish what we require, because the effect of the homonymy would immediately 
efface everything unpresentable contained in the event …"17 However the event must still 
be rendered intelligible for the subjects that encounter it in order for it to be recognized as 
such. There must be a name rendered on the event in some capacity in order to establish a 
relationship, in the economy of existing tropes, between the event and the state of affairs. 
Thus it is important to note that the relationship between the existing linguistic economy 
in the state of affairs and the event of novelty is such that the economy engages with the 
name it gives to the event and not the event itself. The name of the event serves as the 
fulcrum on which the relationship between the linguistic economy and the event pivots – 
and it is this relationship that facilitates, in Badiou’s words, the "undecidability" in 
determining if an entity exists as an event or part of the situation.18 The name of the 
event, in effect, splits the difference between the two – serving as a bridge between the 
event of novelty and the linguistic economy. Deleuze refers to this as the "incorporeal" 
nature of the event, its capacity to affect bodies in the state of affairs, and this capacity is 
enacted through the name given to the event by the subjects utilizing the economy of 
tropes that interact with the event. The result, I argue, is that Badiou’s undecidability is 
the same, in the context of the relationship between the event and the tropological 
economy, as Deleuze’s paradoxical simultaneity of affirmative disjunction. 
The Dual Aporias of Rhetoric and Differentiation 
To stipulate: the binary between affirming and negating an event of novelty takes 
on a position of radical undecidability – an aporia – conceptualized as an oscillation 
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between an affirmative and negative pole. It is here that Paul de Man’s reading of 
Nietzsche can shed some insight into this relationship. For de Man, the aporia between 
two undecidable poles is constitutive of the structure of rhetoric, for "if [Nietzsche’s] 
critique of metaphysics is structured as an aporia between performative and constative 
language, this is the same as saying that it is structured as rhetoric."19 My argument here 
is that these two sets of poles are really one in the same. Since rhetoric is primarily 
concerned with, in both its classical and poststructuralist forms, both the confrontation 
with, and demonstration of contingency, it represents the fundamental site where an 
economy (language) engages with an event of novelty. This duality of confrontation and 
demonstration of contingency has been described in many ways over the rhetorical 
tradition, from Aristotle’s argument that rhetoric is both the use (confrontation) and 
concealment (demonstration) of artifice, to de Man’s undecidability between the poles of 
persuasion and form. Furthermore, for de Man, it is the very gap between the two poles 
that constitutes rhetoric itself: 
Considered as persuasion, rhetoric is performative but when considered as 
a system of tropes, it deconstructs its own performance. Rhetoric is a text 
in that it allows for two incompatible, mutually self–destructive points of 
view, and therefore puts an insurmountable obstacle in the way of any 
reading or understanding. The aporia between performative and constative 
language is merely a version of the aporia between trope and persuasion 
that both generates and paralyzes rhetoric and thus gives it the appearance 
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of a history.20 
This aporia between persuasion and trope mirrors the aporia between affirmation and 
negation not just in form, but also in content. Each is concerned with the engagement of a 
novel event: for the structure of rhetoric, just as the problem of affirmation and negation, 
it is a constant, undecidable tension in the brute confrontation between novelty and 
economy. On one side lies the drive to incorporate the event into the structures of 
intelligibility that render it knowable – this is the side of negation and trope, specifically 
the way in which the event engages with the formal elements of language, causing both 
the economy and the event to contort and conform to each other. On the other side of the 
aporia is the confrontation with novelty that does not seek to render itself knowable to an 
existing structure – instead focusing on a demonstration of novelty over a representation 
of it, one that presents the novel event as a repetition with a difference. This affirmation 
of difference is characterized by Deleuze as "produced by the positivity of problems 
understood as differential positings; multiple affirmation is produced by problematic 
multiplicity. It is in the essence of affirmation to be in itself multiple and to affirm 
difference. [The negative] testifies to the existence of another power, that of effective and 
persistent problem."21 The affirmative pole of the evental encounter is contained within 
the persuasive pole of the rhetorical aporia since the persuasive act is concerned more 
with the motive force of words, and hence the moment of creativity, or rhetorical 
invention. 
Thus, the aporia of rhetoric is the aporia of affirmation and negation. The very 
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structure of rhetoric is itself an undecidable tension between the affirmative and negative 
tendencies of the encounter with novelty – one that pits persuasion (affirmation) and 
trope (negation) as two simultaneous occurrences that mutually destruct each other. There 
is no trope without persuasion, no negation without affirmation and vice–versa. Stepping 
past the binary between affirmation and negation is critical to theorizing an encounter 
with a novel event – moving beyond the simple dualism of "negation is problematic" and 
"affirmation is less problematic" is critical to understanding how the subject encounters 
novelty within a given structure (signification). While it is possible to conceptualize 
novel events outside of signification, it is impossible to understand how they produce 
meaning and effects independent of the heuristics that subjects use to interpret those 
meanings and effects. In other words, signification is the fulcrum in which demonstration 
and representation pivot – hence any encounter with novelty that produces effective 
meaning must be rhetorical. I will now explore in more detail the relationship between 
negation and trope, on the one hand, and persuasion and affirmation on the other. 
Negation: An Economy of Trope 
The first of de Man’s two poles of rhetoric concerns the study of the tropes and 
figures inherent in the use of language. In the context of the relationship between a 
linguistic structure and its encounter with an event of novelty, this pole constitutes the 
site of negation. Because the very nature of trope demands that there is a gap between 
itself and the thing it represents. Thus, in order for the trope to fully represent the 
signifier, it must alter it to fit within the trope's parameters, which are given in advance. 
For Muckelbauer, this is the side of the dialectic, one that is predicated on the 
reproduction of the method of the dialectic itself. He states that, "if dialectics offers a 
diagram for [the encounter with novelty, or] change … this change is fundamentally 
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repetitive: all negation, all the time. The one thing that does not change is the movement 
of change itself. And the difference that emerges through this movement is subject to this 
same repetition, this repetition of the same … that which we refer to as ‘the different’ or 
‘the new’ is merely a product of the monotonous, complex repetition of dialectical 
change."22 For Deleuze’s Nietzsche, this is the moment of ressentiment. Deleuze argues, 
"It is reactive forces that express themselves in opposition, the will to nothingness that 
expresses itself in the labor of the negative. The dialectic is the natural ideology of 
ressentiment and bad conscience. It is thought in the perspective of nihilism and from the 
standpoint of reactive forces."23 For both authors, this occurs because the dialectical 
synthesis of the new represents a "measuring up" of the new to the old based upon the 
values of the old, the existing structure. For Nietzsche, this is the crux of the problem 
with negative differentiation, of reactive forces acting upon the site of novelty: 
The slave revolt in morals begins when ressentiment itself becomes 
creative and ordains values: the ressentiment of creatures to whom the real 
reaction, that of the deed, is denied and who find compensation in an 
imaginary revenge. While all noble morality grows from a triumphant 
affirmation of itself, slave morality from the outset says no to an ‘outside’, 
to an ‘other’, to a ‘non–self’: and this no is its creative act. The reversal of 
the evaluating gaze – this necessary orientation outwards rather than 
inwards to the self – belongs characteristically to ressentiment. In order to 
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exist at all, slave morality from the outset always needs an opposing, outer 
world; in physiological terms, it needs external stimuli in order to act – its 
action is fundamentally reaction.24 
Hence Muckelbauer’s and Deleuze’s critique of the negative: it is at once a moment of 
intrinsic reaction – a movement that reduces difference to the same, or at the very least 
inculcates the new in terms of its difference to the existing structure to which it is 
measured against. 
Douglas Thomas situates this moment of negation in the context of rhetoric, 
stating that, "[Negation] is an economy that privileges usage over value and the 
metaphysical over the rhetorical. This economy of negation effects a certain return in the 
process of exchange … it returns with a different value, a value stripped of its ‘sensuous 
force,’ stripped of its rhetorical style."25 He continues, "In this economy, usage, as the 
common, sterilized, and naturalized form of language, negates value, and value returns as 
a negation of itself, which is to say it returns as the Truth. The Truth, then, while 
inherently moveable, is only Truth when it appears to cease moving, when it ruptures the 
economy and appears to make the economy that produced it impossible."26 For 
Nietzsche, then, what is called "Truth" is "a moveable host of metaphors, metonymies, 
and anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human relations which have been poetically 
and rhetorically intensified, transferred, and embellished, and which, after long usage 
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seem to a people to be fixed, canonical, and binding."27 Thus the economy of negation is 
predicated upon stripping novelty out of the new by situating the event of novelty well 
within the existing tropological economy of the structure that encounters it. By hiding its 
tropological nature, and in turn its own artifice, the movement of negation, by measuring 
the new in terms of the old, effectively removes the novelty from the event – placing it 
squarely within the coordinates of what is already known, rendering it intelligible. 
In order for this intelligibility to take place, the event of novelty, when placed in 
language, must adhere to existing tropes that have been themselves rendered intelligible 
through the wearing–down of constant usage. According to Thomas, "An economy of 
negation requires participation, in a way that other economies of exchange may not 
require. In order for Truth to return, it must return in a conscious, reflexive way; it must 
return as a function of memory and promise. This is the mechanism that Nietzsche 
identifies that hides the basic fact that Truth is convention. Truth, in order to be treated as 
something more than convention, needs to be enforced."28 Invention, and with it the 
motive power of novelty in language, must be placed in contradistinction and indeed 
eventually succumb to the conventions of constant usage. This is how novelty is stripped 
from the new. This, consequently, is also the pole of rhetoric that focuses on the study of 
those very tropes that negate novelty. This is the relationship between the study of trope 
and negation: When understood as an exploration of tropological economies within a 
given discourse or textual formation, rhetoric becomes the sustained examination of the 
ways in which novel events are subsumed into existing structures of linguistic 
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intelligibility. Nietzsche’s negative economy requires a certain memory or repetition in 
order to make claims to Truth, and so too does the study of trope.  
Negating the Prospect of Human Cloning: Brave New World 
Opponents of human cloning can be understood as negating the technology-as-
event in two ways: First, perhaps obviously, they negate it by arguing against its 
implementation. The fact that each side of the debate can be seen as either negating the 
event (by saying "no") or affirming it ("yes") is actually ancillary to the larger point I 
wish to make. Instead, I argue, these sides also represent fundamentally different methods 
of engaging with difference, where difference is understood as the difference between a 
linguistic economy and the event of proposed cloning technologies. Thus the "no" and 
"yes" spoken by each side of the debate serve two purposes: the rather facile 
championing or detracting of the technology and the methods of conceptualizing that 
technology in relation to the status quo. While those who oppose its implementation 
argue for the continuation of the status quo through the rejection of scientific 
advancement and those who favor it argue for its unbridled continuation, the linguistic 
(rhetorical) methods they deploy ultimately frame the way in which they engage with 
events of novelty. Thus the second way opponents of cloning negate the event: by 
referring to well-versed tropes that subsume the novelty of cloning technologies to 
already-known narratives of science fiction and religious doctrine. The novelty of the 
event is minimized by using fictional cautionary tales to highlight the potential dangers of 
its implementation in scientific practice. It is now what opponents of cloning say that is 
of interest to us here in terms of the above aporia of affirmation and negation, but rather it 
is how they express those beliefs in public discourse. 
The latest presidential report issued on human cloning, published in 2002 by 
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George W. Bush’s PCB, speaks directly to, and in many instances is exemplary of, the 
way in which most cloning detractors frame their arguments: 
Technological novelties are often imagined and discussed in literature, 
especially in science fiction, well before they are likely or even possible in 
practice. This has certainly been the case with human cloning, whose 
place in the popular imagination precedes the earliest successful animal 
cloning experiments. Perhaps the most famous early modern account of 
human cloning is Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World (1932), where 
natural human procreation has become a thing of the past, and where 
babies are produced in identical batches through "Bokanovsky’s Process." 
… [Some] believe the book remains a prescient warning of where 
biological self-manipulation could take us – which is to say, to a world 
where family is obsolete, life is engineered to order in the laboratory, and 
human beings have reduced themselves to well-satisfied human 
animals."29 
Brave New World, along with the perpetuation of the Frankenstein myth bolster the 
claims made by the detractors of human cloning. The novelty of the technology is 
subsumed into that-which-has-come-before, those existing tropes of science fiction that 
seek to fold the narratives of Huxley’s vision into the discourse on the developments of 
cloning technology. Leon Kass, the former head of the PCB and ardent critic of cloning 
technology, argues that "The stakes are very high indeed. I exaggerate, but in the 
direction of truth, when I insist that we are faced with having to decide nothing less than 
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whether human procreation is going to remain human, whether children are going to be 
made rather than begotten, whether it is a good thing, humanly speaking, to say yes in 
principle to the road that leads (at best) to the dehumanized rationality of Brave New 
World."30 Elsewhere, he writes, "Not by accident does Huxley’s Brave New World begin 
with the overturning of sexual reproduction and its replacement by cloning … For to say 
‘yes’ to asexual reproduction and baby manufacture is to say ‘no’ to all natural human 
relations, it is to say ‘no’ also to the deepest meaning of coupling, namely, human erotic 
longing."31 And finally, "The superhighway to Brave New World lies open before this 
society … The prospect of human cloning, so repulsive to contemplate, is the occasion 
for deciding whether we shall be slaves of unregulated innovation, and ultimately its 
artifacts, or whether we shall remain free human beings who guide our powers toward the 
enhancement of human dignity."32 
There are two recurring rhetorical tropes of note in the above passages from Kass. 
First, the reference to Brave New World. Not only does the negation of novelty occur by 
feeding the possible developments of cloning technology into Huxley’s narrative, but it 
renders the event of the development of cloning technology as intelligible in an 
effectively rhetorical manner. Kass’ arguments are enthymematic in that they allow for 
the reader, who ostensibly is familiar with the novel, to map the narrative, already 
established in the linguistic economy, to the event of novelty. According to Haran et al., 
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in an extensive study of the representation of human cloning in a wide array of media, 
"The future of reproductive cloning has fairly consistently been associated with fictional 
dystopias …" 33 Much of the way this narrative is told in many popular films such as The 
6th Day and The Island that deal with the issue of human reproductive cloning, they 
argue, is by "[conjuring] a ‘near’ future and they make references to contemporary issues 
pertaining to cloning. [They] are aesthetically realist films which visually evoke a 
present/future world. They also revolve around actual dates, events or consumer goods 
that contemporary audiences can identify as familiar elements of their own world."34 
Thus, the dystopic vision created by science fiction in regards to human cloning tends to 
incorporate familiar tropes (especially Dolly the sheep as leading to a slippery slope of 
human reproductive commodification) that reduce the novelty of the event to something 
intelligible and frightening. The phenomenon of the relationship between science fiction 
and public understandings of scientific technology have been investigated in terms of 
"terministic screens" and "myth," and my argument here is that the vocabulary already 
developed by rhetoricians in explaining the relationship between science fiction and 
public discourse is particularly useful when viewed in a lens of negating the novelty of 
the event.35 Invoking Huxley’s vision, or films like The 6th Day are rhetorically powerful 
moves by the opponents of human cloning since there is an already established dystopian 
narrative that can easily be modified to negate any novelty in the event of human cloning; 
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we have, the argument goes, already predicted the outcome and thus can reduce the 
novelty of the future event to the replication of what has come before. In other words, 
discourses against the implementation of human cloning as scientific practice rely on 
linking, as Ron Von Burg classifies it, "discursive commonplaces that nonscientific 
audiences employ to articulate their understandings of genetic science."36 Here I have 
provided an understanding of how those commonplaces are established, and, what 
accounts for their commonality is the negation of novelty by expressing what-it-to-come 
with what-has-come-before. 
The second type of trope used by Kass and other opponents of reproductive 
cloning is the repackaging of religious arguments used against other forms of biomedical 
research. Terms like "begotten," "dignity," and "given nature" are all used to highlight 
"naturalness" of human sexual reproduction, while terms like "sanctity of life," "potential 
life," and "respect" are used to refer to human embryos. These terms are often deployed 
by the religious right over many biomedical issues and are well-known to those who are 
familiar with the debates over stem cell research, abortion, and even marriage equality. 
The recycling of these tropes, while forming a perhaps consistent ethical position, still 
carry with them a substantial amount of enthymematic baggage such that they apply what 
is already known within a given linguistic economy to an event of novelty and resonate 
with a religiously invested public. The PCB, internally divided over whether or not 
cloning for biomedical research (therapeutic cloning) is ethical and should be pursued, 
issued arguments for and against this type of human cloning in its report. In the 
arguments against the practice, the PCB (its dissenting opinion presumably led by Kass) 
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argues the following: 
The cell synthesized by somatic cell nuclear transfer, no less than a 
fertilized egg, is a human organism in its germinal stage. It is not just a 
"clump of cells" but an integrated, self-developing whole, capable … of 
the continued organic development characteristic of human beings. To be 
sure the embryo does not yet have, except in potential, the full range of 
characteristics that distinguish the human species from others, but one 
need not have those characteristics in evidence in order to belong to the 
species … All of us who oppose going forward with cloning-for-
biomedical-research believe that it is incoherent and self-contradictory … 
to claim that human embryos deserve "special respect" and to endorse 
nonetheless research that requires the creation, use, and destruction of 
these organisms, especially when done routinely and on a large scale.37 
This component of the PCB concludes that, "If we add to this description a commitment 
to equal treatment – the moral principle that every human life deserves equal respect – we 
begin to see how difficult it must be to suggest that a human embryo … could simply be 
used for the good of others and then destroyed."38 Note the terminology here: the 
reconstructed embryo is referred to, always, as the "human embryo," it is not "a clump of 
cells," and it deserves "respect." This language, along with the central metaphors of 
"respect," "potential" and "equality" are the very same used to justify, often, the 
outlawing of stem cell research and abortion. By using the well-worn tropes already 
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existent in the linguistic economy, Kass and the contingent of the PCB against 
therapeutic cloning negate the novelty of the specificity of the technology and render it 
intelligible by implicitly comparing it to existing technological formations, such as 
embryonic stem cell research. When this contingent of the PCB argues, "If from one 
perspective the fact that the embryo seems to amount to little may invite a weakening of 
our respect, from another perspective its seeming insignificance should awaken in us a 
sense of shared humanity. This was once our own condition," they are attempting negate 
the novelty of the event by referencing it to what which has come before – namely all of 
us were once embryos, regardless of how we were geminated.39 
An Economy of Affirmation: Persuasion 
So how can we conceive of a mode of engagement with novelty that is neither the 
same as, nor different from, the concept of negation? As Judith Norman points out, 
"Nietzsche’s challenge will be to chart a new route for philosophy to take, a sense of 
positivity and affirmation that is not fundamentally nihilistic, which is to say does not 
have essential reference to negativity and opposition."40 For Muckelbauer, the answer lies 
in the thinking of Deleuze, who thinks of, "this affirmative repetition as being composed 
of "singular rhythms." These singular rhythms indicate an unidentifiable and 
unrecognizable movement of dialectical negation … everything hinges on how one 
repeats (rather than if one repeats) … in any particular encounter [with novelty], 
everything depends on one’s orientation within repetition: an orientation toward negation 
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itself or an orientation toward the singular rhythms within negation."41 The reason being, 
and a reason that I agree with, that every encounter with novelty is essentially rhetorical. 
Here we are dealing with the moment when new content is created in language as it is 
confronted with novelty – in other words the moment the signifying field confronts its 
own limit. This process is described by Derrida as a "strategic twist" that is imparted 
upon language when it is confronted with its own silence – the silence of the unknowable, 
the purely novel. It is here that this "strategic twist, with a violent and sliding, furtive, 
movement must inflect the old corpus in order to relate its syntax and its lexicon to major 
silence."42 Hence the rhetorical nature of the signifying field when confronted with its 
own limit. This is the moment of rhetorical invention, one in which new content is 
created. Muckelbauer describes this moment as an act of invention, as the moment that 
"orients itself towards [a] future [and] cannot be thought of as the essential tension 
between tradition and invention. Because it functions through a distributed, unidentified 
intensity, this invention does not constitute a point … at which something begins. Instead, 
this affirmative invention immanently enables the very movement of beginning."43 
According to Thomas, at this stage, when language is confronted with novelty, "words 
are most expressive" since "they are produced as a reflection of an artistic consciousness 
that needs them to express something new or different."44 Thus, for Muckelbauer, this 
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reading of rhetorical invention is the site of a potential "singular rhythm" that allows for 
an affirmative engagement with the event of novelty. 
This act of invention is tied with de Man’s notion of persuasion because the act 
of, in Kenneth Burke’s terms, "inducing cooperation," is not inherently concerned with 
negative appropriation of novelty. Muckelbauer explains this point most clearly in his 
take on persuasion: For Muckelbauer, the act of persuasion is contrasted to the act of 
communication. Whereas an act of communication "attempts to transmit its proposition 
through understanding [and] endeavors to reproduce, as accurately as possible, the 
proposition in the mind of its audience," an act of persuasion on the other hand, "is not 
primarily a signifying operation and hence its mode of repetition is quite different. Rather 
than attempting to identically reproduce the proposition as a meaning in the mind of an 
audience, persuasive rhetoric attempts to make the proposition compelling, to give it a 
certain force … persuasion’s relationship to the proposition it supplements is … its 
ability to evoke particular responses in specific audiences…"45 He concludes that 
"persuasion is fundamentally an asignifying operation, interested in provoking the 
proposition’s effects rather than facilitate its understanding."46 Thus the method of 
repetition is rather different from communicating. Whereas the focus on the tropological 
economy of a proposition explores the way in which it communicates its message 
artistically, the pole of persuasion focuses on how the message compels an audience to 
action. The signifying material, and hence the mode of repetition, is undecidable – it is 
the way in which the proposition is presented to exact a method of action. Hence, the 
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persuasive pole of rhetoric, and its asignifying nature, is, at its heart, an act of 
affirmation, or a repetition that does not require the submission of the novel event to the 
structure, but rather utilizes it to produce a result in an audience.  
Furthermore, the persuasive pole of rhetoric engages in the play of affirmative 
difference by virtue of its inventive nature. Since, we are dealing with language at the 
limit of itself when pressed against the event of novelty, the method of differentiation 
between language and the event itself is fostered by a gap – one that could suck the 
novelty of the event back into the tropological economy of negation, or perhaps foster an 
inventive component that affirms the difference between the event and economy. 
Muckelbauer classifies this possibility as a "repetition–of–difference" instead of a 
"repetition–of–the–same." He argues, "the variation that is encouraged in [repetition–of–
the–same] is one that results from the fact that this reproductive imitation is practiced in 
conjunction with an external multiplicity … As a result of its emphasis on ideal 
reproduction, then, any variation that occurs within the imitative act itself is conceived of 
as a failure … While [repetition–of–difference] offers a fundamentally different 
conception of how repetition works."47 He continues, "Not only does it accept the fact 
that variation is necessarily an internal principle of imitative repetition, it even champions 
this necessity."48 Douglass echoes this sentiment, arguing that in an affirmative economy 
of difference, "words that are unique, forceful, and the clear product of artistic creation 
are the most important in the rhetorical economy of affirmation. Rather than usage and 
value converging as Truth, usage and value diverge and return as illusion, error, and 
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deception."49 Instead of predicating the value of language on its usefulness for boiler–
plate repetition, "there is no need to remember the rules, laws, or conventions … Instead, 
there is a premium on forgetting usage and replacing it with value."50 Hence the site of 
the interaction between the novel event and the linguistic economy, again is rhetorical in 
nature, but instead of negatively capturing and overcoming the event’s novelty in order to 
render it intelligible, an emphasis is placed on world play, as the linguistic structure 
dances around the evental site. Indeed for Muckelbauer, this conception of rhetoric, "is 
more precisely directed at troubling the traditional hierarchy between doxa and episteme 
and reintroducing difference into the terrain of thought. In the case of contemporary 
rhetorical efforts, it does so by rendering true propositions just as contingent and 
contextual as their practical counterparts."51 
Affirming Cloning: Meme Wars 
Leon Kass argues, "Repugnance is the emotional expression of deep wisdom, 
beyond reason’s power to fully articulate it … The repugnance at human cloning belongs 
in that category. We are repelled by the prospect of cloning human beings not because of 
the strangeness or novelty of the undertaking, but because we intuit and feel, immediately 
and without argument, the violation of things that we rightfully hold dear."52 Taken 
together, the dystopic tropes of science fiction along with the inherent "repugnance" we 
feel at the potential of human (reproductive) cloning constitutes what certain bioethicists 
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call "the yuck factor." While opponents of the implementation of cloning technology, like 
Kass, argue that there is a certain "wisdom" to that repugnance, proponents of human 
cloning face the task of overcoming the initial "gut response," fostered by existing tropes 
that negate the novelty of the event, to its development and implementation. Thus, it is 
my argument that proponents of human cloning not only argue in conceptual 
contradistinction to people like Kass, but also engage with the event of novelty in a 
fundamentally different way, and their discourses operate at the other pole of de Man’s 
rhetoric: persuasion. Instead of focusing on existing tropes that render the event 
intelligible based upon what has come before, these discourses seek to invent new 
concepts, embracing the novelty of the event, and imagine a future not filtered through 
the past, but radically (affirmatively) different from the present. 
In his Transhumanist Manifesto, Simon Young lays out the task for those who 
seek to advance society by embracing what he calls the "biotechnological revolution:" 
This book represents the opening battles in a Meme War. A meme is an 
idea or habit regarded as a unit of cognitive information, as a gene is a unit 
of biological information … Some say that memes act of their own accord. 
I shall argue that memes are power tools. Meme Wars are battles of ideas 
played out within a culture to influence the direction it will take. Whoever 
controls the spread of attitudes and habits in a society, controls the society. 
He who holds the power is he who controls the meme.53 
Young call seems to echo Muckelbauer’s assertion that an engagement with novelty that 
is rhetorically (and affirmatively) persuasive does not necessarily rely on the what of 
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what is being said, but rather the how it effects the public who engages with it. Young is 
essentially calling for proponents of the biotechnological revolution, cloning included, to 
invent new memes, or tropes, that fundamentally reorient the way in which an existing 
discursive economy engages with the event of novelty, or in this case, yet-to-develop 
technologies. The focus is not on what those tropes are in terms of how the relate back to 
the existing economy, but rather how they can modify the existing social imagination 
about human cloning. In other words, instead of relating the event back to the economy, 
these memes seek to relate the economy forward to the event. The focus is on the 
rhetorical, persuasive effectivity of the memes, on the way they channel the effects of the 
event onto the linguistic economy in order to accomplish something like a paradigm shift 
in the public imagination – to go from "yuck" to "wow." 
Thus proponents of human cloning, or more precisely, some aspects of it, 
constantly engage in the rhetorical act of inventing new concepts to capture, in their 
minds, the ethical specificity of the new technologies. Specifically, there is an ongoing 
debate over what to call the entity created by SCNT. Opponents of the practice of all 
SCNT, such as members of the PCB and others seek to define the entity created as a 
"human embryo," thus allowing them to negate the difference between a fertilized cell 
produced through sexual reproduction and one that is asexually cloned and therefore 
apply broadly the same discourse of "pro-life" used in the abortion and stem cell debates 
to argue against the practice. Conversely, proponents of certain cloning technologies seek 
to develop newer, more precise or different vocabularies for the objects and processes 
inherent to the technological developments that allow them to step out of the "pro-
choice/pro-life" dichotomy. For example, Bert Vogelstein et al. argue that we should 
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draw a careful distinction between SCNT for producing children and SCNT for 
producing embryos for stem cell research. They argue, "More careful set of terminology 
would help the public and lawmakers sort out the substantial differences between nuclear 
transplantation and human reproductive cloning," advocating for the abandonment of the 
term "cloning" altogether for the production of an embryo for its stem cells.54 Thus there 
is a desire to separate the ends of cloning from the means of SCNT with cloning-to-
reproduce-children on the one hand and SCNT-to-produce-stem-cells on the other. 
British bioethicist John Harris also outlines this position, arguing that "so-called 
therapeutic cloning is ethical, permissible and indeed mandatory. While there are few 
pressing moral reasons to pursue human reproductive cloning there are overwhelmingly 
powerful reasons to pursue therapeutic cloning, stem cell research and other research 
which therapeutic cloning will augment and probably make much more effective. The 
reasons for pursuing this research are so strong that it would be unethical not to pursue 
this research."55 The distinction between "therapeutic cloning" (or whatever we choose to 
call it) and "reproductive cloning" is critical for advocates of the former who argue that 
the potential benefits of stem cell research are too great to be abandoned if the two 
strands of cloning are conflated and banned. While the distinction between these two 
types of cloning have been challenged, a common goal among advocates for therapeutic 
cloning has been to rhetorically separate the two in the public imagination.56 The reason 
seems simple: therapeutic cloning has a much lower "yuck" factor, rendering its 
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implementation more palatable to a public who is influenced by science fiction narratives 
of the "dangers" of human reproductive cloning. 
In order to advance the acceptability of therapeutic cloning, bioethicists and 
scientists have also advocated for the rhetorical invention of novel concepts to account 
for the specificity of the event of the technology. For example, in order to sidestep the 
objections of those who argue for our "debt" to human embryos, several have argued for 
naming the product of SCNT a "clump of cells," "activated cells," or "pre-embryo" 
instead of a human embryo.57 This act of invention follows along the lines of 
Muckelbauer’s argument about the nature of persuasion; specifically, the use of this 
terminology actively obfuscates the imaginary of the public, rendering the products of 
SCNT less tangible and more obscure than the concept of a human embryo, expressing 
the motive power of the words used over their conferring of intelligibility in order to 
elicit a response that is more permissible in terms of proceeding with stem cell research. 
The battle over both the distinction between therapeutic and reproductive cloning and the 
terms used to describe the product of SCNT represent sites of rhetorical invention – the 
moment where the given tropes of a discursive economy are shrugged off in favor of new 
terms to describe the event of novelty. The focus here is on the power of words to shift or 
alter the nature of the public imaginary of the debate, to affirm the novelty of the event of 
cloning technology instead of sedimenting that imaginary in terms of what has come 
before. 
Rhetorical Modalities: Schematizing Affirmation and Negation 
So how can we schematize the relation of affirmative and negative difference in 
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terms of the types of rhetoric utilized in each instance? If, as I have claimed, the 
distinction between trope and persuasion bifurcates along the same lines as affirming and 
negating difference, then we need to conceive of a way that each exists within a 
discourse, while still falling under the masthead of rhetoric. To explain this, I will turn to 
the work of Gerard Genette and his theory of the modality of rhetoric. For Genette, there 
exist two fundamental semiotic planes of signification: the first is the relationship 
between the signifier and the signified: understood as the formula for the linguistic 
representation of the natural world. Drawing upon the work of Saussure, Genette isolates 
the simple relationship between signifier and signified as semiological level of meaning. 
In other words, the relationship between the signifier and the signified is not rhetorical 
per se, but rather constitutes the way words represent and meet the burden of their linkage 
to objects in the natural world. The second plane, more important for our purposes here, 
groups the signifier and signified relationship together as its own signifier, related then to 
s signified representing the mode of relation utilized by the linking of the two on the first 
plane. The signifier/signified relation, linked together in this plane form a secondary 
signifier, forming the modal signified, the relationship between the two in the syntactic 
choice of the rhetor, to form a plane of signification that constitutes the realm of rhetoric. 
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Signifier 1 
(Sail) 
Signified 2 
(Ship) 
 
Signification 1 
(Figure) 
Signifier 2 
Signified 2 
(Poetry) 
Signification 2 
(Rhetoric) 
 
 
This 2nd order level of signification, or what Genette calls super-signification, "manifests 
the writer’s choice of a particular literary attitude, and therefore indicates a particular 
modality of literature; the writer chooses neither his language nor his style, but he is 
responsible for the methods of writing that indicate whether he is a novelist or a poet, a 
classicist or a naturalist, bourgeois or populist, etc."58 Take, for example as Genette does, 
the simple metonymic relation between the word sail and the concept of ship. For 
Genette, "the semiological system in which the word ‘sail’ may be used to designate a 
ship is a figure; the secondary semiological figure in which a figure, such as the use of 
the word ‘sail’ to designate a ship, may be used to signify poetry, is rhetoric."59 
Within Genette’s framework of signification we can infer another example of the 
characteristic of the figure. Not only does the production of a figure within a text signal a 
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particular modality, it also enters into a relationship with other figures. In other words, 
the modality that it signifies is representative of how a figure interacts with other figures 
within an economy of tropes. Thus within the first order of signification in Genette’s 
schema, we can infer the 2nd order of tropological interaction. Genette gets us half of the 
way there: his indication of the first level of tropes (Signifier 1 "sail" and Signified 1 
"ship") represents the direct level of substitution between a given trope and the object it 
attempts to signify. Lacan provides insight into this first level in two ways: First, he 
demonstrates that this initial level of tropological interaction is necessary in that there can 
be no "primordial signifier," or a signifier that represents a direct one-to-one 
correspondence with the object it signifies. "The point we keep coming back to," he 
writes, "is that every signifier is, as such, a signifier that signifies nothing."60 As a result, 
every signifier is necessarily a trope in that it requires a substation of a word for an 
object. This, for Lacan, is the realm of metonymy. Thus, Lacan’s understanding of the 
necessity of metonymy refigures Genette’s understanding of the figure such that it is not 
its mere existence that signifies poetry, rather it is the relationship between this first level 
of tropology (the existence of metonymic connections) and other metonymies (2nd order 
tropology) that determines a specific modality. Another note about this first order of 
tropology: the metonymic relationship between signifiers (1) and signifieds (1) at this 
level is always catachretic. Catachresis in this sense does not mean simply that every 
trope is a dead metaphor. Rather it means that the metonymic connection is unstable and 
ultimately incomplete but at the same time necessary. This understanding of the concept 
derives from Paul Ricoeur’s examination of figure-tropes and catachresis-tropes. 
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Catachresis-tropes, in Ricoeur’s view, represent the necessary tropological functioning of 
language, (similar to Lacan’s metonymy). Ricouer explains the catachresis-trope as 
"every trope whose use is forced and necessitated, every trope that results in a pure 
extension of meaning, is a case of catachresis."61 Thus if every sign has, at its center, a 
play of signifiers, it is, in effect catachretic. The contingent, arbitrary linkages between 
signifiers and signifieds, forming metonymic connections then enter into relations with 
each other, forming the 2nd order of tropological interactions, indicating the modality of 
the tropological economy. This, for Lacan is the realm of metaphor. Metaphor represents 
a specific trope that regulates a series of other tropes around a specific investment. Sites 
of particular importance to a given public delineate investment. Metaphor serves as a sort 
of signaling apparatus that marks out specific connections between a series of signifiers 
and signifieds as "more important" than others, and thus designates those connects as 
sites of investment. But of course, metaphors can enter into relationships with each other, 
meaning that tropes enter into an infinite regress of realtionality in both directions: 
signifiers to signifieds combine to become catachretic metonymies, which themselves 
relate to each other through metaphor. Thus, Lacan’s metaphor by itself is insufficient to 
describe the relationship between tropes in this 2nd order. 
A more accurate way to define this relationship is through the trope of metalepsis. 
Victoria Kahn defines the trope citing Quintillian, arguing that "Quintillian writes that 
metalepsis provides a transition from one trope to another. ‘It is the nature of metalepsis 
to form a kind of intermediate step between the term transferred and the thing to which it 
is transferred, having no meaning in itself, but merely providing a transition’ (8.6.38). 
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Thus, metalepsis is both the figure of a figure and a figure that is elided."62 Therefore, 
2nd order tropology is no longer the realm of meaning, since the relationship between 
tropes has no meaning in and of itself, but rather it signifies a particular modality - it is 
the way in which tropes are configured that determines the modal register of the text. 
Ricoeur argues that it is at this level that creativity in language flourishes. Tropes are no 
longer operating in the register of the necessary, but now become creative in that they 
regulate and reconfigure the relationship amongst themselves. He calls these tropes 
"figure-tropes": 
But besides being needed in view of the deficiency of vocabulary, the 
figure trope is occasioned by another cause, that is, pleasure. "The chosen, 
the stylistic tropes, the figure-tropes, are also, brought about by the delight 
and pleasure that, as if by a sort of instinct, we first anticipate and then 
experience them" (160). So this pleasing quality acts as an incentive to 
invention, as opposed to just being necessary.63 
To explore this level of tropology, then, we must explore not just individual tropes but an 
entire discourse. As Ricoeur explains, "Therefore, we must shift our focus from the word 
to discourse, because only the conditions proper to discourse can distinguish between the 
figure-trope and the catachresis-trope…"64 Thus, we can infer the following schema: 
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Order Level Type Trope Signifies 
1st Order Word Specific Trope Catachresis Meaning 
2nd Order Discourse Figure / 
Economy 
Metalepsis 
(Figure-Trope) 
 
Modality 
 
 
In order to understand the role rhetoric plays in the interplay of tropes in a text it is 
critical to examine both orders of tropological exchange: the first order designates the 
meaning of any individual metonymic connection, and the second designates the specific 
modality of the text. 
Modality and Engaging with the Event 
I have already sketched out a possible reading of the cloning debate in this realm 
of super-signification. Recall that I argued that it is not what each side says in terms of 
answering the "yes/no" question for the debate, but rather how each side presents their 
respective arguments. The how question is necessarily one of modality: the relation 
between the tropes themselves in a particular economy of discourse. However, each side 
operates on a different modal register at the level of super-signification, indicating what 
while each side is no-less rhetorical than the other, they engage with the event in 
fundamentally different ways. We now have a vocabulary for explaining, at a schematic 
level, the way in which that difference makes a difference: the modality of the competing 
economies of discourse. This modal difference can be explained via two competing 
gestures made by each side, one to the catachretic level of discourse, and one to the 
metaleptic level. 
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Negation and the Catachresis-Trope 
Recall that for Ricoeur, catachresis-tropes result in the pure extension of meaning. 
This means that the relationship between the resulting trope and the signifieds it relates to 
operates under a framework of utility that aims to extend the sensible to the speakable – 
signifiers to signifieds. This is what Ricoeur means when he talks about this level of 
discourse as operating on the plane of meaning; coupled with the argument that every 
trope must be catachretic in that there can be no primordial signifier, we arrive at the 
conclusion that every act of the extension of meaning requires labor: namely the 
presentation of the artificial and contingent relations between tropes as stable and 
ossified. The formation catachresis-trope through-and-through an act of rhetorical 
invention coupled with the elision of artifice, forming the double act of rhetoric outlined 
in the previous chapters. When understood in the context of a discursive economy and its 
relation to an event, we see the formation of one type of rhetorical invention: the gesture 
to catachresis. We have been previously calling this type of invention the negation of the 
event. The emphasis here, as we have previously explored, is on meaning rather than the 
effectivity of discourse. This is accomplished through the use of tropes to relate the event 
back to the discursive economy, a form of relation that I have just characterized as a 
gesture from super-signification to a 1st order of tropology. In other words, this gesture is 
understood as the move from figure, in Ricoeur terms, to tropes. Here Ricoeur, in his 
reading of Genette and Fountanier, corroborates de Man’s understanding of the pole of 
trope in the rhetorical tradition. The distinction between tropes and figures is critical for 
his project, indeed he argues, "The use of figure must remain, even if it becomes habitual; 
a deviation that is imposed by the language, catachresis, the forced extension of meaning 
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in words, is excluded from the field of figures (213–19)."65 While I will address the 
notion of figure in a moment, it is critical to note that the free, effective use of the figure-
trope differs in kind from the catachresis-trope in that the former retains to the effectivity 
of discourse, while the later aims to extend meaning. Both can fall under the purview of 
rhetorical invention, but in different ways, the catachresis-trope, as I have shown, 
gestures back away from the realm of super-signification to individual linkages between 
signifiers and signifieds in existing usage; it is the negation of the event in that it seeks to 
establish and make meaning out of the novelty imposed on the discursive economy by the 
event. At the level of super-signification, this can be seen as an elision of the metaleptical 
nature of figures in favor of the 1st order interaction of tropes. 
This is apparent in the discourse over cloning through the gesture back to well-
worn tropes of Brave New World to make meaning out of the event of the development 
of cloning technologies. Likewise the comparison between existing technological 
formations and the new, proposed instantiations of cloning technology operate in the 
same way – the goal is to extend meaning from the discursive structure to the event, at 
the expense of the novelty of the event itself. These rhetorical moves gesture at that 
which has come before in order to explain the new. This gesture backwards is understood 
as a moment of artifice that seeks to halt the play of discourse, through the pure extension 
of meaning, away from the interaction of tropes between themselves. Instead, what is 
privileged, is not the 2nd order level of super-signification, but rather the 1st order of 
linking signifieds (the conceptual notion of cloning technologies) with already-existing 
signifiers in metonymic connections. The result is a modality of negation, or the gesture 
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back to existing metonyms to explain novelty. 
Affirmation and the Figure-Trope 
Having explained the modality with which tropological economies of negation 
enter engage with the event, it is now necessary to explore how figural economies engage 
with difference in an affirmative way. Ricoeur’s reading of Genette and Fontainer 
provides insight into this modal register in a way that squares with de Man and 
Muckelbauer’s arguments for persuasion and the effectivity of rhetoric, respectively. For 
all three, emphasis is placed on the motive power of discourse over the pure extension of 
meaning. Here Ricoeur makes a critical distinction between the trope and the figure, 
where the former rests on the extension of meaning through catachresis while the later 
emphasizes the play and force of language. In order to explore the motive power of 
figures, Ricoeur draws upon the idea that one must explore not individual tropes but 
rather entire discourses, as well as effects they exert on subjects who ascribe to their use. 
In other words, the emphasis is placed not on the word, but rather the discursive economy 
when exploring its interaction with the event. Ricoeur argues that, "To choose figure – 
which is neither word nor statement – as the basic unit [of analysis] is to take an 
intermediate course between that of Aristotle, who still took in the whole of the field of 
rhetoric … and that of Dumarsais, who reduced rhetoric to grammar, the function of the 
latter being ‘to make one understand the true signification of words in what sense they 
are used in discourse’ (cited by Genette 8) … The figure is coextensive with discourse in 
general … Thus, figure can apply equally to word to sentence, or to the traits of discourse 
that express the workings of feelings and passion."66 To explore a discursive economy 
qua economy, as I have previously argued, is not only critical to understanding the 
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relations of tropes to other tropes (metaleptical figures) but also, we can now argue, to 
understand affirmative engagements with an event. Whereas for Ricoeur, catachresis 
"refers to a situation in which a sign, already assigned to a first idea, is assigned also to a 
new idea, this latter idea having no sign at all or no other proper sign within the 
language," the concept of the figure is the site of what is more commonly understood of 
as rhetorical invention.67 In other words, he argues: 
This invention forces us to distinguish between the occasional causes of 
tropes (necessity and also pleasure), and the properly generative causes: 
imagination, spirit, passion. To give colour, to astonish and surprise 
through new and unexpected combinations, to breathe force and energy 
into discourse – so many impulses express themselves only in figure-
tropes, which must be called ‘writer’s tropes’ since they are the ‘special 
creation of poets’ (165).68 
While I have argued that negation is a form of invention, it differs wholly from the kind 
found in affirmation. Specifically, affirmative invention, derived from Ricoeur and 
Fontainer’s "figure-tropes" is predicated exclusively on the motive force of language. 
This is the realm of persuasion for de Man and affirmation for Nietzsche. Creativity takes 
primacy over repeatability, force over meaning. 
So how does this indicate a shift in modality? For Ricoeur, it becomes question of 
the level of analysis and interaction between figures. He argues, "Therefore, we must 
shift our focus from the word to discourse, because only the conditions proper to 
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discourse can distinguish between the figure-trope and the catachresis-trope, and within 
the figure-trope, between constrained and free usage."69 In other words, to understand the 
nature of the motive force of words, of persuasion or affirmation, one must examine the 
linguistic economy at the level of economy in order to explore not how signifiers interact 
with signifieds, but how figures interact with other figures – this is the realm not of 
metonymy, but metalepsis. Specifically, the modal register of the economy gestures 
forward toward the level of super-signification. When new concepts are created through 
rhetorical invention, it is not through their repeated uses (becoming dead, catachretic 
metaphors) but rather through their ability to evoke the passions of the audience through 
their affective character. Investment in the context of affirmation is fundamentally 
refigured: it is no longer the act of repeated usage to secure metonymic linkages between 
signifiers and signifieds, but rather it is the labor of making connections between figures 
themselves. Investment in an affirmative sense requires not just the habituated usage of 
metonyms, but the formation of new metaphors (in the Lacanian sense of the term) that 
move beyond simple meaning and account instead for the motive force of the language to 
formulate public opinion. If the presumption of the linguistic economy is always to stay 
with the status quo, to resist the novel and refiguring power of the event through the 
tyranny of meaning, then the task of investment, affective investment in the affirmative 
sense is predicated upon overcoming that presumption not through literal meaning, but 
through what Ricoeur’s Fontanier calls "spiritual meaning," or, "‘the diverted or 
figurative meaning of a group of words … that which the literal meaning causes to be 
born in the spirit by means of the circumstances of the discourse, by tone of voice, or by 
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means of expressed connections with unarticulated relationships’ (58–9)."70 This, in other 
words, is the affective power of the new, of the event. Since the emphasis is on the 
motive force of language to create, to move, instead of the pure extension of meaning, the 
economy-as-figure model of affirmation comports with Muckelbauer’s formulation of the 
asignifying force of persuasion. 
Thus we can understand the difference between an affirmative and negative 
interaction with the event as a difference of rhetorical modality. The literal relations 
between metonyms at the level of the trope differs fundamentally from the metaleptical 
relations between metaphors at the figural level. Whereas the negative form of 
engagement with the event is predicated upon a gesture away from super-signification 
toward the ossified relations between signifiers and signifieds, affirmative engagement 
with novelty gestures toward super-signification, toward the creation of new concepts as 
the existing discursive economy contorts to the event. This affirmative level of super-
signification demands a modal view from the level of economy, where the entire 
discourse is fundamentally refigured by the event. Thus, when we conceive of rhetorical 
invention in the mode of affirmation, we must explore, economically, the way in which 
the discourse shifts in relation to its engagement with difference. 
This is demonstrated by the gesture toward new concepts in the cloning debate, 
not only linking tropes through signifiers and signifieds, but also figures through their 
relation to each other. While the level of super-signification is present in both the 
affirmative and negative sides of the debate, the affirmative side highlights the modal 
interaction between figures. Creativity, force, and effectivity are present not at the level 
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of the individual text, but at the level of the discursive economy – the relations between 
figures require a discourse-based view of the debate, one that modally differs from its 
negative counterpart. "Clumps of cells," "therapeutic cloning," and the renaming of the 
practice to SCNT all require a refiguration of the discourse surrounding the cloning 
debate – one that does not just focus on the substitution of concepts for other concepts, 
but rather also includes the reconfiguration of the way the discourse affects the subjects 
who adhere to the economy. 
The malleability of the concepts used to describe the practice of human cloning 
for those who engage affirmatively with the event is indicative of the hollowing out of 
the signifier through negative hallucination. In other words, the unmooring of the affects 
that dictate the investment in the debate around well-worn tropes such as Brave New 
World demonstrate that they can be refigured around newly invented figures such as 
naming the practice Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer. Investment, ideally for proponents of 
the technology, would be channeled to new ways of caring about and understanding 
human cloning in a way that circumvents the "yuck factor." The entire goal of the 
rhetorical invention in this case is to capture an affect through the production of figures 
that fundamentally alters how we care about the technology itself. Only by formulating a 
new way of speaking about the technology, by refiguring the discourse at the economic 
level through the metaleptical interactions of figures with each other, can proponents of 
human cloning overcome the bias of the status quo against its implementation. Ultimately 
the rhetorical strategy deployed by those who affirmatively engage with the event of 
human cloning must channel affects in new ways, signifying them not only through 
metonymic connections of absent representations, but also through the formulation of 
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new metaphorical figures that comport the affective economies in new and creative ways. 
Thus, the interaction with the event highlighted by proponents of these technologies 
differ not only in position from those who negate human cloning, but also in the modal 
register in which they present their arguments. This, then, is yet another way we can 
conceive of the difference between affirmation and negation: a difference in modality that 
gestures toward differing planes of signification. 
Transvaluation and Undecidability 
Having explored the differing methods of engaging with novelty in the debate 
over cloning technologies, we can reach a diagnosis: with each side clinging to an all-or-
nothing approach, arguments have largely stagnated in public discourse. While I have 
argued up to this point that the two sides of the debate represent a fundamental 
divergence in their engagement with difference, I have not yet explored how they relate 
to each other in an aporia. Recall that for de Man, and indeed as the central proposition of 
this article, that affirmation and negation represent two sides of the aporia of rhetoric. 
The relationship between the two, according to de Man, is one of undecidability. He 
argues: 
[In] Nietzsche, the critique of metaphysics can be described as the 
deconstruction of the illusion that the language of truth (episteme) could 
be replaced by a language of persuasion (doxa). What seems to lead to an 
established priority of "setzen" over "erkennen," of language as action 
over language as truth, never quite reaches its mark. It under– or 
overshoots it and, in so doing, it reveals that the target which one long 
since assumed to have been eliminated has merely been displaced. The 
episteme has hardly been restored intact to its former glory, but it has not 
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been definitively eliminated either. The differentiation between 
performative and constative language (which Nietzsche anticipates) is 
undecadible; the deconstruction leading from the one model to the other is 
irreversible but always remains suspended, regardless of how often it is 
repeated.71 
Thus taking the debate as a whole, we can see in form, if not content, a potential way 
beyond the stalemate. Instead of viewing affirmation and negation as an either/or 
proposition, it is my contention that we understand the dual methods of engaging 
difference in a "both, and" relationship. The very nature of the undecidable, 
paradoxically, demands no forced choice, or, suspends the possibility of suspension in the 
debate. In order to understand this relationship, I argue that the insights provided by 
theorists of affirmative difference demonstrate to us that affirming the aporia between 
affirmation and negation requires two movements: one Nietzschean, and one de Manian. 
"Where does [one] seek that new morning, that still undiscovered delicate blush 
with which another day – ah, a whole series, a whole world of new days! – sets in?" asks 
Nietzsche in Ecce Homo.72 "In a revaluation of all values, in freeing himself from all 
moral values, in saying ‘yes’ to an placing trust in everything that has hitherto been 
forbidden, despised, condemned … Morality is not attacked, it just no longer comes into 
consideration."73 This, of course, is one of Nietzsche’s primary goals – the revaluation of 
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all values. Deleuze succinctly phrases the project as, "A new way of evaluating: not a 
change of values, not an abstract transposition nor a dialectical reversal, but a change and 
reversal in the element from which the value of values derives, a ‘transvaluation’. All 
Nietzsche’s critical intentions come together in the perspective of this positive task."74 
Included in these critical intentions is the relationship between affirmation and negation. 
Thus we reach another step in re–theorizing the relationship between these modes of 
engagement. To take seriously the project of affirmative engagement with novelty one 
must come to terms with the idea that, according to Deleuze, "New values derive from 
affirmation: values which were unknown up to the present … creation takes the place of 
knowledge itself …"75 Thus we cannot make a normative claim about the nature of 
affirmation since to do so would be to short–circuit the possibility of transvaluation – to 
attack morality instead of letting is no longer come into consideration. Nietzsche warns 
us about taking such an approach: to simply affirm everything is to take the position of 
the ass, simply saying "yea" to every proposition uncritically. Deleuze’s reading of 
Nietzsche here is also insightful: 
[The] yes which does not know how to say no (the yes of the ass) is a 
caricature of affirmation. This is precisely because it says yes to 
everything which is no, because it puts up with nihilism it continues to 
serve the power of denying – which is like a demon whose every burden it 
carries. The Dionysian yes, on the contrary, knows how to say no: it is 
pure affirmation, it has conquered nihilism and divested negation of all 
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autonomous power. But it has done this because it has placed the negative 
at the service of the powers of affirming. To affirm is to create, not to 
bear, put up with or accept.76 
This is why Deleuze claims, "The negative becomes the thunderbolt and lighting of the 
power of affirming."77 And again, "There is no affirmation that is not preceded by an 
immense negation: ’One of the essential conditions of affirmation is negation and 
destruction.’"78 Thus to think through the concept of affirmation in a way that is not to 
already cede the ground to negation is to transvalue the relationship between the two – 
affirmation is not "the good," and negation is not its foil – to posit it as such is to take on 
the weight of the values of the negative, to bear the burden of its dialectical force. It is to 
take the position of the "higher man" in Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche, and the higher 
man "does not know that to affirm is not to bear, carry, or harness oneself to that which 
exists, but on the contrary to unburden, unharness, and set free that which lives. It is not 
to burden life with the weight of higher … values, but to create new values that would be 
those of life, values that make life light or affirmative."79 Affirmation and negation thus 
exist in a relationality to one another that is unilaterally distinct and transvalued. There is 
not a moral imperative to choose one over the other, but rather the affirmative nature of 
the former provides its own internal schema for a new mode of valuation. From a 
rhetorical perspective, negation does not represent a "bad" rhetorical strategy, but rather 
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is simply one possible avenue that renders an event of novelty intelligible, while 
affirmation, in turn, exists in concert with the negative as the realm of invention and play. 
This brings us to our second moment. 
Recall that for de Man, rhetoric permits two incompatible, mutually–destructive 
viewpoints: that of the study of trope and persuasion, or, the constative and performative 
elements of language. My contention throughout this piece has been that the aporia 
between trope and persuasion is the precise aporia between affirmation and negation. 
Both dualisms are permitted at the site of novelty, both are incompatible with each other 
and both exist in a state of radial undecidability with their respective dyad. It is not as 
simple as extolling the slogan "affirm affirmation!"; in fact, I believe the entire concept 
of performing that task should be altogether jettisoned. Instead, we might be best served 
by understanding that there is not a forced choice between either dualism. When it comes 
to a linguistic economy’s encounter with novelty, it is necessary to understand that both 
affirmation and negation occur simultaneously and independent of each other – there is a 
moment of invention, of play and the creation of new concepts just as there is a moment 
when the novelty of the event is rendered intelligible within the confines of the existing 
tropological economy. In fact, there can be no negation without affirmation, just as there 
can be no study of trope without an understanding of the motive power of words. In his 
exploration of the undecidability between trope and persuasion, de Man formulates a 
summary of the discipline as follows: 
Within the pedagogical model of the trivium, the place of rhetoric, as well 
as its dignity, has always been ambivalent: on the one hand, in Plato for 
example and again at crucial moments in the history of philosophy 
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(Nietzsche being one of them), rhetoric becomes the ground for the 
furthest–reaching dialectical speculations conceivable to the mind; on the 
other hand, as it appears in textbooks that have undergone little change 
from Quintillian to the present, it is the humble and not–quite–respectable 
handmaiden of the fraudulent grammar used in oratory; Nietzsche himself 
begins his course by pointing out this discrepancy and documenting it with 
examples taken from Plato and elsewhere. Between the two functions, the 
distance is so wide as to be nearly unbridgeable. Yet the two modes 
manage to exist side by side where one would least expect it.80 
I would like to offer that the project of thinking through the relation between affirmation 
and negation follows along the same path; while affirmation may be the more enticing 
way to conceive of the engagement with novelty – portraying negation as its not–so–
respectable cousin – it is paramount that the rhetorical scholar examine the ways in which 
each is at work at the site of the new. Without negation there can be no intelligibility and 
without affirmation there is no "livedness" to the word. We as critics will continue to be 
stuck in the middle until we realize that there is no other mode of existing in language. 
Conclusion: Affirming Pragmatism 
So how do these three movements play out in practice? In the case of the debate 
over human cloning, it requires radically refiguring the understanding of the parameters 
of the discussion. Having explored both sides of the issue, it seems all too easy to make 
the rhetorician’s gesture to explain that "both sides use rhetoric (albeit in different forms 
as they engage with the novelty of the event) to forward their position," with the 
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subsequent claim that there needs to be greater public involvement in the understanding 
of the technologies in order to provide a better understanding of the parameters of the 
debate at hand. Thus the seductive attempt to point out the rhetorical nature of the 
disclosure of scientific information to the public, or even, locate rhetoric in the 
production of scientific advancement itself.81 But this seems to explode all parameters for 
rhetoric itself, rendering the concept so promiscuous that it ceases to have much 
conceptual value. Likewise, we cannot simply embrace pure affirmation in the case of the 
cloning debate: opponents of the technology do raise valid concerns, and if we are to 
simply accept the unbridled advancement of science without consequence there would be 
no need for bioethics in the first place. But the bioethical endeavor is a noble one, and 
sometimes tempering the scientific imagination with the societal one is a worthwhile 
proposition. So where do we strike the balance? Rightfully, rhetoricians do not get to 
decide; however, analyzing the discourse on cloning in terms of affirmative and negative 
difference does yield insight into a way beyond the simple "yes/no" paradigm. 
If we take de Man’s reading of Nietzsche seriously, and understand the ultimate 
undecidablilty between the affirmative and negative poles of differentiation, we can 
garner some insight into the role the study of public moral argument in today’s society. 
To explore the three movements outlined above: First, unilateral distinction. Deleuze’s 
concept provides insight into the way that the current debate over human cloning has 
taken shape. If we understand the proponents’ position in favor of both reproductive and 
therapeutic cloning as unilaterally distinct from their counterparts, we can see why the 
debate has stagnated. Simply put, the position of those who seek to adopt even the most 
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modest forms of NCST and therapeutic cloning, those who wish to use it for stem cell 
research and genetic medicine, is folded into the same camp as the more radical 
transhumanist position of advocating all cloning in the eyes of those who seek to "pre-
abandon" the process altogether. PCB member Charles Krauthammer sums up this 
position forcefully in his personal statement at the end of the PCB report, stating, 
"Research cloning is an open door to reproductive cloning. Banning the production of 
cloned babies while permitting the production of cloned embryos makes no sense. If you 
have factories all around the country producing embryos for research and commerce, it is 
inevitable that someone will implant one in a woman (or perhaps in some artificial 
medium in the farther future) and produce a human clone."82 While the advocates of 
therapeutic cloning, including members of the PCB, argue for a ban on reproductive 
cloning, the position is expressed as unilaterally distinct from those who make the 
slippery slope argument. Those against cloning reject the pragmatism of proponents of 
therapeutic cloning by negating the position and folding it into the more radical call for 
reproductive cloning. Krauthammer is not alone; many who take on the conservative 
position against all forms of cloning make the slippery slope argument.83 This conceptual 
reduction, understood as the process of the attempted negation of a unilaterally distinct 
affirmation, is responsible for driving the conversation towards an intractable stalemate 
because the opportunity for pragmatic solutions to complex problems, with all their novel 
specificity, is ultimately negated in favor of the perpetual replication of the status quo. 
This is not to say, however, that we ought to embrace cloning technology simply 
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because it is new. To do so would be to take the Nietzschean position of the ass, to say 
"yea" to everything. Rather, it is to understand the nature of the disagreement between the 
two sides of the debate. Thus the second movement in the above schema of affirmation 
and negation: transvaluation. Cloning technology is understood as an event of novelty 
because it carries with it challenges to our understanding of human sexuality so profound 
that detractors classify it as "repugnant" and proponents hail it as an essential next step in 
human evolution.84 Gregory E. Pence summarizes the stakes: 
Human cloning separates sex from reproduction, and hence, symbolizes – 
in fact and concept – this break. As such, it resonates in our culture in 
more emotional ways than simply as a new way of making babies or as a 
new way of helping infertile couples. It appears that the separation of sex 
from reproduction strikes some deep fears in the human breast, making 
theological pundits predict that we are fast approaching reproductive 
Armageddon.85 
The impact the technology has on the foundational assumptions of humanity is, in part, to 
blame for why we cannot seem to talk about it in ways that differ from the hyperbolic. 
Thus, to understand how the pragmatic approach to therapeutic cloning can resonate with 
publics who adhere to a given discursive economy, it is critical that it is not evaluated by 
the overarching framework of all-good or all-bad. Totalizing normative claims are the 
realm of negation – the dialectic loves to reduce contingency by expanding universality. 
When faced with the choice of "all or nothing" when it comes to human cloning 
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technologies, the precautionary principle will inevitably win out. Ultimately, the choice is 
rigged because to look at an event through the existing system of valuation even if the 
conclusion is to overturn that system of values is to reinstate the normative framework of 
the status quo. To affirm the event of human cloning, in a way that is attentive to the 
potentiality of the technology itself is not simply to say "yes" or "no" to the totality of the 
endeavor, but rather to refuse the overarching claims to universalization by both sides – 
this is how the negative becomes the "thunderbolt" for affirmation: to render judgment in 
a way that adheres to the event requires the pragmatic realization of radical contingency. 
The system of values existing in the discursive economy that encounters the event cannot 
by definition utilize those values to interpret the event in an affirmative way. Being 
neither the ass nor the cynic, what is required in the cloning debate is a measured 
pragmatism that is both prudent and open to the radical possibilities offered by the 
technology. 
Thus we arrive at the final movement: undecidability. Ultimately, to render 
judgment on the desirability of events of novelty like human cloning technologies 
requires the suspension of the possibility of suspension. In other words, the possibility of 
judgment, true judgment, requires the recognition of the undecidability between affirming 
and negating the novelty of the event. Refusing to adhere to the overarching universals on 
both sides of the debate opens a space for the contingent pragmatics that allow us to 
evaluate the debate on its own potential. The debate over cloning is stagnant because in 
their attempts to force an all-or-nothing approach to the technologies, proponents and 
detractors have left us in the position of being unable to choose either. In the simplest of 
terms, cloning technologies must both be engaged from a standpoint of affirmation in 
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order to remain open to their potential and negation in order to be rendered intelligible. 
The study of each position, both for the arguments made and the modality they have of 
engaging with novelty allows us not just to weigh the costs and benefits of the 
technology, but to remain open to the possibility of judgment – facilitated by the 
undecidable tension between affirming and negating the event and the refusal to suspend 
the debate based on the seductive claim to the universal. Ultimately, to truly affirm 
difference in this instance requires ongoing discussion that can open the possibility of a 
pragmatism sorely missing from current discourse on the topic. 
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Conclusion: How to Argue About Values: Empty and Full Deliberation in the 
Biotechnology Debate 
 
 The four case studies I have explored so far share one key aspect: they attempt to 
determine the ethical implications of biotechnologies that have yet to exist. While today 
we see rapid advancements in the fields of genetics, nanomedicine, synthetic biology, and 
other biotechnological disciplines, we do not yet possess the capacity to substantially 
augment, manipulate, or clone human embryos and adults. Still, every report I have 
examined concludes that, if left alone, research in these areas will inevitably give us the 
power to alter our biology in ways that have heretofore been unfathomable. Furthermore, 
the main contention uniting all of the cases I have examined has been that the rate of 
scientific advancement is currently occurring at an exponential rate, meaning that new 
uses for biotechnology may develop faster than our capacity to understand the moral 
implications that come with them.  
 As I hope to have shown, the state of public moral argument between competing 
stakeholders renders it difficult to facilitate the type of deliberative practices everyone 
seems to agree is necessary. Not only is this one of the very few places in which every 
side seems to concur, but the point is particularly salient. If we are entering a time in 
which the increasingly rapid technological advancements we have seen in areas such as 
communication technologies in the 20th Century are now starting to occur in biomedicine 
and genetics, it is important that members of democratic systems in which those 
developments are taking place take interest in forming judgments about their desirability. 
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Since the effects of implementing some of the proposed biotechnological developments 
that are now theoretically possible will dramatically alter those to whom they are applied, 
it is becoming increasingly necessary that publics only understand what those alterations 
are, but also make determinations as to their desirability. Biotechnology is thus truly an 
issue of public importance in that its development and implementation has the capacity to 
fundamentally reorient the inter-human relationships between those who undergo 
biotechnological treatment and those who do not. Thus, even if one does not partake in 
biotechnological alteration, everyone will be affected by the biotechnological revolution. 
It is therefore critical that the very large number of stakeholders in the debate both realize 
that they are stakeholders and participate in the discussion instead of leaving the decision 
of the desirability of biotechnological advancement in the hands of those who research 
and develop its applications.  
 The current state of bioethical debates in the United States, and the call for 
increased public deliberation that follows, implicates the entire discipline of bioethics as 
it grapples with questions about future biotechnologies. Recall Angus Dawson’s 
argument that bioethics "has no future: at least not in its present form … We need to face 
up to the fact that as a discipline it is has become stale and tedious. It is time to ask some 
fundamental questions about what bioethics is and where it is going."1 The fact that 
contemporary bioethics' perceived nadir coincides with the increasingly rapid 
development of new biotechnologies creates a rather uncomfortable moment for the field: 
faced with both increased relevance (the executive committees formed by the last two 
presidential administrations have produced reports at the rate of one, sometimes two a 
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year) and an increased awareness of the difficulties facing the field, bioethicists are 
producing many pages of work on the ethics biotechnology while simultaneously 
publishing more and more defenses of the field. Everyone seems to agree that the coming 
biotechnological revolution requires that we need bioethics to say something about it, but 
at the same time many argue that existing bioethical discourses seem to be broken. 
As a corrective, bioethics journals, panels, and commissions in the United States 
and internationally increasingly call for increased public awareness, participation, and 
deliberation on how various regulatory agencies ought to cope with rapid 
biotechnological advancement. While increased public participation in nearly any civic or 
political realm is viewed almost unanimously as a good thing, it is my contention that if 
bioethicists want to foster public deliberation on biotechnological advancements, they 
must be attentive to what has spurred critiques of their field. If we stipulate that increased 
public involvement in the biotechnology debate is beneficial not just for the United 
States, but, as some bioethicists argue, for the species as a whole, then calls for that 
deliberation from participants in a debate that contains several structural problems may 
simply yield fruit from the poisonous tree. 
Thus, to facilitate a more constructive form of public deliberation, I argue that we 
need to be aware of the rhetorical dimensions of the debate. Specifically, we ought to pay 
attention to what bioethicists claim are the rhetorical dimensions (what many characterize 
as the "mere" rhetoric deployed by proponents and detractors of biotechnological 
development) and what a more critically inflected view of the concept tells us about the 
debate. Likewise, I believe that understanding what the assumptions inherent in the calls 
for deliberation can tell us about how many bioethicists conceptualize communication 
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more broadly can allow us to explain why the field has come under fire. My contention is 
that the debate over bioethics demonstrates not just an example of what can be called 
"deep" or "intractable" disagreement, but showcases the limits of calls for rational 
deliberation and adherence to the sender-receiver model of communication by virtue of its 
very structure. 
As a potential alternative, I will turn to Jacques Lacan's concept of empty and full 
speech coupled with a Hermagorian understanding of the krinomenon as the starting point 
for deliberation. Theorized most fully in his early writings and seminars, Lacan's 
thoughts on speech influence much of his later work. While the terms "empty" and "full" 
eventually fall out of the Lacanian vernacular, the concepts themselves are still 
informative in examining his later remarks on speech, the goal of analysis, and language 
itself. My hope is to show how we might foster a kind of "fuller" deliberation on 
biotechnology by examining the current state of the discourse and theorizing an 
alternative conception of how we ought to view the stakes of the debate. Thus the 
argument can be seen in two broad strokes: a sort of deconstruction of the existing debate 
in both how it is conceptualized by those in the field and how it imagines ideal public 
deliberation, and a potential reconstruction of how we might encourage the debate to 
allow for more robust public deliberation. 
The chapter proceeds in three sections. First, I explore one final report from the 
PCB. Titled Reproduction and Responsibility, the report was the last published by the 
council. Picking up where the report on human cloning left off, this report asses the moral 
worth of various proposed reproductive biotechnologies beyond cloning human embryos. 
Reproduction and Responsibility is unique in the cannon of PCB reports in that it deals 
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almost exclusively with potential regulatory measures to restrict yet-to-be-developed 
technologies the report finds to have dubious ethical standing. Serving as a bridge 
between the end of the PCB project and the establishment of the Presidential Commission 
on the Study of Bioethical Issues (PCSBI) by the then-incoming Obama Administration, 
the final PCB report seeks to outline a framework for fostering increased public 
deliberation on future biotechnological development. The inaugural PCSBI report 
continues this project by dealing exclusively with theorizing how public deliberation is 
critical to assessing what it characterizes as “future technologies.” Uniting the two reports 
is a call for a type of rational public deliberation that eschews any “mere” rhetorical 
flourishes that detract from the “heart of the matter.” This is hardly unique to the two 
executive agencies, and as I will show, the quest to dampen the prevalence of ornamental 
rhetoric in the biotechnology debate is one of the key recommendations for fostering 
robust, rational debate. However, I argue here that these attempts to “rationalize” public 
deliberation are both impossible and highly problematic for any deliberation on the topic. 
In so doing, I diagnose the main point of contention in the debate from this assumption 
and explore why a Lacanian-inflected view of rhetoric can help us understand how the 
debate has reached a stalemate that paralyzes public participation. 
If the first section represents a deconstructing of the debate, in the last two I 
attempt to reconstruct an alternative. First, I explore the concepts of "full" and "empty" 
speech in Lacanian theory, looking both to his primary texts and how communication 
scholars and other humanists have characterized the concepts. I emphasize how Lacan's 
conceptions of types of speech can benefit rhetorical critics by complicating a sender-
receiver model of communication and focusing on how they can help us understand the 
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fundamental structure not only of the biotechnology debate, but to some extent 
signification itself. I conclude with a gesture toward what I believe a more "full" 
deliberation on the topic might look like. There I explain how the biotechnology debate 
serves as a microcosm for demonstrating the very limits of signification, and how coming 
to terms with the limit of the symbols we use can help us foster deliberations about values 
that may not stagnate in incommensurable impasses. 
Reproduction and Responsibility and New Directions: Rational Public Debate? 
In 2004, the President's Council on Bioethics published a report titled 
Reproduction and Responsibility: The Regulation of New Biotechnologies. Out of the ten 
reports commissioned over the life of the Council, Reproduction and Responsibility 
stands out as the only one that explicitly deals not only with the desirability of new 
biotechnological developments, but also addresses potential mechanisms and policy 
options relating to their regulation. While nearly all of the reports by the PCB, especially 
the ones addressed in this dissertation thus far, call for restrictions to be placed on certain 
biotechnological developments and their potential uses, Reproduction and Responsibility 
stands alone in the PCB catalog for its sustained treatment of potential and specific 
actions that could be undertaken by governmental and non-governmental bodies 
regarding the regulation of biotechnological development. Thus, it provides insight into 
the ways in which larger, existential questions about the nature of the "human" intersect 
with specific policy proposals in bioethical debates over biotechnology. 
The report builds upon the work done by the Council in their 2002 treatment of 
human cloning, serving as a counterpoint to the theoretical and ethical issues raised in 
that volume by "[describing] and critically [assessing] the various oversight and 
regulatory measures that now govern biotechnologies and practices at the intersection of 
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assisted reproduction, human genetics, and human embryo research.”2 In keeping with 
the larger goal of understanding the ethical implications of biomedical advances, 
Reproduction and Responsibility aims to "[explore] how, if at all, the existing regulatory 
mechanisms in the United States address the various ethical and social issues that arise 
from advances in biomedical science and technology.”3 As such, the report is structured 
into two main sections: a "diagnostic survey" of that current regulatory framework and a 
"discussion of policy options and recommendations" based on that survey.4 Of interest to 
me here is the second section of the report; while the diagnostic survey has become 
subject to changes in regulations and oversight demanded by changing political 
conditions and technological developments, the layout of policy options and 
recommendations forwarded by the PCB highlights an important aspect of public debates 
over biomedical advances: the advancement of arguments regarding policy options that 
attempt to deal with the potential development of near- and far-future technologies. 
By extending the work done by the report on human cloning, Reproduction and 
Responsibility focuses on "the growing capacity to influence and control the beginnings 
of human life, especially as exercised ex vivo (outside the body), in the clinic and the 
laboratory ... The well-established practices of assisted reproduction are today being 
augmented by techniques of genetic screening and selection of embryos; someday, 
gametes or embryos may be modifiable by directed genetic manipulation ... we are 
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concerned with the unique interactions among these elements and the new possibilities 
these interactions create for controlling and perhaps someday altering the character of 
human procreation and human life.”5 The report highlights an aspect of bioethical public 
moral argument that separates it from many other forms of public deliberation: As well as 
focusing on how the implementation of regulatory mechanisms should alter current 
conditions regarding practices, technologies and policies, bioethical public moral 
argument also includes deliberation about regulating the future development of those 
practices, technologies and practices. In other words, public arguments over 
biotechnologies like the PCB report must forecast the desirability of regulations not only 
for the current state of biomedicine, but also must anticipate potential developments in 
the field and make arguments about the desirability of those potential developments. 
What further distinguishes reports like the PCB's Reproduction and Responsibility 
is the timbre of the call for increased public deliberation. Seeing as it belongs to a subset 
of public argument concerned with legislating the desirability of future technologies not 
just on their potential economic impacts or concerns of national or public safety, but also 
on the potential ethical and moral implications that these technologies call into question, 
the report sits at a unique intersection of public moral argument and deliberative 
policymaking: not only must it anticipate future technological developments, but it must 
establish clear, definitive ways to legislate certain moral norms that govern the 
development of those technologies. Indeed, when examining these potential technologies, 
particularly when a human embryo is altered ex vivo, or outside of the uterus, the Council 
points out: 
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one must readily agree that [these technologies] raise new ethical 
questions bearing on the character of human reproduction, well beyond 
anything involved in in vitro fertilization for procreative purposes to help 
an infertile couple have a child of their own ... [The] ethics of embryonic 
stem cell research ... concerns only one of the pertinent issues. Other 
possibilities touch on the respect owed to women and human pregnancy, 
the respect owed to children born with the aid of assisted reproductive 
technologies, and the boundary between human and animal life in the 
context of reproduction.6 
The fear of the PCB, then, is that these technologies may lead to, "a diminished regard for 
the 'naturalness' and awe-inspiring power of the procreative process. Treating as 'normal' 
all the novel things we are learning to do with embryonic human live ex vivo might also 
desensitize us to still greater departures from the human way of procreating, putting us at 
risk of weakening, in thought as well as in deed, our regard for the meaning and worth of 
human procreation.”7 Thus the task outlined by the PCB in the report twins the 
anticipation of the development of future technologies with an attempt to gauge the 
desirability of those future technologies based upon an understanding of the moral and 
ethical understanding of the "human" they challenge, enhance, or threaten. Thus is the 
nature of public moral argument over biotechnological advancements. 
Because part of the nature of bioethics is to provide a solid, foundational 
understanding of the ethical use and deployment of biotechnologies, public argument and 
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deliberation over those technologies must necessarily take on an ethical valence. When 
coupled with having to anticipate the develop of near- and far-future biotechnologies, this 
process becomes more complicated because policymakers must not only imagine a world 
in which these technologies exist, but then must weigh that potential world against the 
ethics of this one to determine the ultimate desirability of new biotechnological 
developments. Not only is this report concerned with the process of developing new 
biotechnologies (and the potential harms associated with their research and testing), but it 
is also interested in imagining a possible world where these technologies were to be fully 
implemented, and how, in that world, our current day understandings of what it means to 
be human would be altered, enhanced, or degraded.  
The report adheres to the deployment of the future perfect tense characteristic of 
deliberative rhetoric in the contest of public moral argument. Since the report not only 
seeks to determine the potential economic impacts of ARTs but also the potential moral 
and ethical concerns inherent to their development and use, it situates itself in a position 
of imagining what current regulatory frameworks are necessary in order to create the 
conditions of possibility for the responsible development of future ARTs. After spending 
roughly 200 pages outlining the potential uses and abuses of both existing and potential 
ARTs, the report shifts its focus to outlining potential policy recommendations for the 
regulations of these technologies – existing or not. The report opens its 
"Recommendations" section with the following: 
While much remains unknown about the present state of technologies 
affecting human reproduction, we can no longer claim to lack a sense of 
the circumstances surrounding their use. We have a good grasp of the 
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various concerns that might arise in these areas, and we have a sense of 
what sorts of benefits and difficulties will emerge as assisted reproductive 
technologies (ART) becomes more integrated with new genomic 
knowledge and technologies.8 
This passage is of note because it adheres to the basic conceptual framework of the rest of 
the section. Specifically, it demarcates a difference between existing ARTs and those that 
will emerge as a result of scientific advancement over time. The distinction is important 
because it demonstrates, as indicated in the above passage, that much of the "benefits and 
difficulties will emerge" from the development and refinement of ARTs. This means that 
those potential costs and benefits do not yet exist in the status quo, yet, given the current 
trajectory of development in genomic medicine, they will inevitably develop along with 
new or enhanced ARTs. In other words, the conditions of possibility now exist in the 
status quo that will lead to the moral and ethical dilemmas demanded by the maturation 
of near- and far-future ARTs. Thus the PCB lays out as its goal of the report an 
understanding of what will have been the conditions that allow for the development of 
new ARTs in the status quo, and what, if any, regulatory measures should be taken to 
alter the conditions of possibility for their development. 
The Executive Summary of the report outlines this logic through the articulation 
of two goals: "first, to strengthen existing legislation and regulatory mechanisms in order 
to gather more complete and useful information; and, second, to erect certain legislative 
safeguards against a small number of boundary-crossing practices, at least until there can 
be further deliberation and debate about both the human goods at stake and the best way 
                                                
8 Ibid., 184. 
246  
to protect them.”9 The first goal, data compilation, is at least partially started by the first 
section of the report. This process, albeit incomplete in the eyes of the PCB itself, is 
necessary to determine the nature of the development of ARTs in the status quo. As the 
report argues, "Having put together this picture of the status quo, we cannot now 
recommend that nothing further needs to be done without, in effect, deciding that the 
status quo is in all respects better than any realistic alternative.”10 Put into the context 
from above, the logic of the first goal of the report is to determine "what will have been" 
the conditions of possibility for the development of new ARTs by examining the status 
quo. The second goal of the report, then, doubles the future tense in an act that properly 
designates the text as a rhetorical act. By expressing the contingent nature of the 
regulatory framework in the status quo (done by advocating its alteration) the reports 
engages in a conceptual act of fiat by imagining other possible "what will have beens" 
and then choosing the most desirable one. 
One of the ways the PCB recommends altering the status quo is through a 
legislative measure designed to prohibit "rogue" practices they deem as ethically dubious. 
According to the report, "In the course of our review, discussion, and findings, we have 
encountered and highlighted several particular practices and techniques (some already in 
use, others likely to be tried in the foreseeable future) touching human procreation that 
raise new and distinctive challenges.”11 Thus, the report argues, "Especially because 
technological innovations are coming quickly and because there are today no other public 
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institutions charged with setting appropriate limits, we believe Congress should consider 
some limited targeted measures – bundled together perhaps as a 'Reproduction and 
Responsibility Act' – that might erect boundaries against certain particularly questionable 
practices. These measures, proposed as a moratoria, would remain operative at least until 
policymakers and the public can discuss the possible impact and human significance of 
these new possibilities and deliberate about how they should be governed or regulated.”12 
The goal of the moratoria, then, is "to establish boundaries and guidelines for future 
practice, and barriers against those irresponsible practitioners who, indifferent to the 
standards of the profession and the community, might not only endanger patients and the 
public, but also unfairly cast a pall over the entire field.”13 The report outlines only a few 
examples of the types of biotechnological practices that should be outlawed, but it is 
uncharacteristically clear about why those technologies should be banned. "One bright 
line should be drawn at the creation of animal-human hybrid embryos, produced ex vivo 
by fertilization of human egg by animal ... sperm," the report argues, because "[they] do 
not wish to have to judge the humanity or moral worth of such an ambiguous hybrid 
entity ... we do not want a possibly human being to have other than human progenitors."14 
Following from this, they argue for the prohibition of "the insertion of ex vivo human 
embryos into the bodies of animals: an ex vivo human embryo entering a uterus belongs 
only in a human uterus."15 
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Ultimately, these prohibitions, along with the general arguments in favor if 
regulation issued by the report deal exclusively with technology that has yet to be 
developed. Animal/human hybrids, or chimeras, are not immanent in the status quo. 
Rather, the report imagines possible uses for biotechnological advancements based upon 
hypothesizing their development. Leon Kass, in his personal statement at the end of the 
report, sums up the impetus for imagining these future technologies in deliberating over 
the benefits of establishing a regulatory framework in the present. He argues: 
in this rapidly developing world of biotechnology, where the human 
import of the changes we are undergoing is hard to discover and where 
social institutions lag far behind in their ability to cope with the new 
challenges that innovations may bring, a case can be made for the 
importance of trying to devise suitable regulatory institutions and 
activities that could help protect society's basic values, even as we 
continue to treasure the benefits that biotechnology will continue to bring 
us ... Laissez-faire, while reflecting the honored American principles of 
freedom and choice, offers no guidance other than the market. Regulation 
would seem to offer a superior alternative, even if it is far from clear what 
form it should take or how it might be effected.16 
Thus, according to Kass, as well as the other authors of the PCB, the development of new 
regulatory frameworks for biotechnology are not predicated upon the desire to restrict 
current technologies, but rather what those technologies might develop into. 
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 As this was the last report by the PCB, its successor, the Presidential Commission 
for the Study of Bioethical Issues (PCSBI), created in 2008 by President Barack Obama, 
continued the trend of calling for increased public deliberation over near-future 
biotechnologies. Titled New Directions: The Ethics of Synthetic Biology and Emerging 
Technologies, the report sought to outline what role, if any, the federal government ought 
to take in regulating the development of controversial biotechnologies. The conclusion of 
the report calls for increased public deliberation and input in determining governmental 
regulatory policies. Thus: 
Biotechnology has the potential to affect everyone, and opportunities for 
the public to participate in discussion and deliberation about emerging 
technologies such as synthetic biology are critical. The principle of 
democratic deliberation highlights the importance of robust public 
participation in both the development and implementation of specific 
policies as well as in a broader, ongoing national conversation about 
science, technology, society, and values.17 
The PCB and PCSBI are hardly alone in this belief. A wide array of bioethicists, from all 
points on the political spectrum – detractors an proponents of new biotechnologies alike – 
advocate for increased public deliberation about the desirability of the coming 
"biotechnological revolution." Many of these recommendations stem from the belief that, 
as Renee Kyle and Susan Dodds summarize, "In industrialized liberal democracies ... 
policymakers are held accountable for seeking a level of public acceptance and 
‘ownership’ of decisions relating to ethically contentious technologies. [Political] 
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representation and bureaucratic decision-making are often considered inadequate in fully 
articulating or resolving concerns about novel technologies."18 Ultimately, the remedy to 
this question of accountability rests in, "Discursive public deliberation [that] involves 
more than simply the presentation of individual views or opinions; rather, it is the 
presentation and defense of arguments as a public means of working towards a defensible 
solution to public issues."19 
In fact, the vast majority of reports about biotechnological development 
commissioned by various governmental agencies in the last decade from the United 
States, European Union, and Australia contain some type of call for public deliberation in 
their recommendations sections. Thus, scholars of public moral argument have turned 
their attention to the ways in which debates over biotechnologies can foster this ideal of 
democratic deliberation. Since the only thing nearly all stakeholders in these 
controversies can agree on is the need for enhanced deliberation, it would serve scholars 
of these public discourses well to explore the ways in which those deliberations can be 
fostered through the ways in which we argue about the benefits and risks 
biotechnological developments. According to Nancy M. P. King and Michael J. Hyde, 
"Scholars of public moral argument make their living by studying the symbolic capacities 
of human beings, especially as these capacities show themselves in situations that call for 
the production of discourse as a means to coming to terms with the matters at hand."20 
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19 Ibid., 85. 
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Within this context, there is an underlying assumption that, "Science and society have 
built an exceedingly and increasingly complex community around biomedical 
technology. Scholars, scientists, policymakers, and the public all therefore need to be able 
to talk together in this community."21 Uniting this call for community is the belief that 
there must be a capacity of publics to interface with the scientific, scholarly, and 
policymaking community in order to achieve a clearer framework about what ought to be 
done given the new challenges that arise out of biotechnological advancements. In other 
words, societies, especially democratic ones, need to be able to argue about values. Since 
there will inevitably be competing claims about the way we believe the moral contours of 
the society should be shaped (and increasingly, the role and status of the "human" in 
those societies as new biotechnologies continue to develop), there needs to be a way to 
address these competing claims through public discourse while still maintaining our 
democratic ideal. Hence, scholars of public argument believe that the need for developing 
an understanding of public moral argument is becoming increasingly prescient. 
Avoiding “Mere” Rhetoric? 
According to Bernice Bovenkerk, the forced confrontation with larger ethical 
issues that stem from the biotechnology debate has led to a situation in which: 
[It is] becoming ever more clear that in this debate [that] we cannot easily 
separate facts and values. Normative presuppositions are involved in 
scientific research, from the stage of problem definition to the choice of 
methodology, to the interpretation of test results. In the case of 
biotechnology this is especially true because we are not only dealing with 
risks (known unknowns), but also with unknown unknowns, which takes 
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us to a whole new level of uncertainty. It appears that the more radical our 
uncertainty, the more room opens up for normative divergence. We are, 
therefore, not dealing with a scientific problem that can be solved by 
scientists and neither with a normative problem that can be dealt with in 
society; the two are interwoven.22 
In order to address this conflation of normative values with the facts of scientific 
developments, Bovenkerk, like many other bioethicists, calls for increased public 
deliberation. She argues that while, "It may be true that the moral and metaphysical 
nature of the disagreement over GM makes it an intractable disagreement by its very 
nature, but this does not necessarily have to translate into an intractable policy problem if 
the parties to the debate can agree to disagree or reach a compromise or an incompletely 
theorized agreement."23 The key to reaching these potential agreements rests in the act of 
deliberation, because, "Deliberation [helps participants] to understand exactly what 
values or worldviews they disagree about ... One way to reach agreement in the face of 
pluralism is to find values that are shared by the different sides to a disagreement, and 
work from these."24 Thus, according to Bovenkerk, as well as many other bioethicists 
who extoll the virtues of public involvement in the biotechnology debate, deliberation is 
necessary to address the core issues at stake, fostering the possibility for some type of 
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agreement by stripping away the intractable metaphysical differences between 
stakeholders in order to address the factual elements of the issues at hand.25 
To scholars of communication, the idea that public deliberation allows for the 
capacity to strip away ideological presuppositions in order to rationally talk about the 
facts at the core of an issue bears a striking resemblance to a Habbermasian view of ideal 
discourse in the public sphere, coupled with a Rawlsian demand for rational public 
reason. Indeed, there have been increasing calls to foster a type of public deliberation that 
avoids "unsubstantiated words and empty rhetoric."26 Representatives from both extremes 
of the biotechnology debate, from the most stringent luddites to the staunchest 
transhumanists, call for a "richer" conversation, one devoid of rhetorical flourish. For 
example, Leon Kass laments that in the current bioethical landscape, "Though originally 
intended to improve our deeds, the reigning practice of bioethics, if truth be told, has, at 
best, improved our speech."27 Instead, Kass argues, bioethicists need to encourage a 
move from speech to action, since, "Full human dignity requires a mind uncontaminated 
by ideologies and prejudice, turned loose from the shadows of the cave, free not only to 
solve factitious problems of its own devising, but free to think deeply about the meaning 
of human existence and, especially in a world overshadowed by technology, to think 
about the nature and purpose and goodness of science and technology."28 Similarly, 
James Hughes, an ardent transhumanist, claims, "The bio-Luddites and human-racists are 
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already in place ... They have filled the media with alarmist rhetoric about Frankenstein, 
The Boys from Brazil, and Brave New World."29 
Yet, if debates over moral issues regarding particular biotechnologies such as the 
abortion and stem-cell debates are any indication, "stripping" away all of the rhetoric in 
public discourse may not only be an idealist pipe-dream, it may in fact be impossible. But 
impossibility in this sense can be constructive. If, debates over biotechnology inherently 
lead to definitional contestations about the nature of the "human," looking at the ways in 
which stakeholders in the debate stipulate their understanding of humanity can provide 
insight in to the ways the debate not only affects public discourse, but also may serve as a 
starting point for imagining a type of deliberation that differs from the rationalist model 
currently proposed by all sides. To do so, I believe that instead of deriding "mere" 
rhetoric as an impedance to deliberation, we ought to utilize the concept as a starting 
point to theorizing alternative forms of public engagement. 
No “Mere” Rhetoric 
 As I hope to have demonstrated in the previous chapters, this characterization of 
rhetoric as merely obfuscating the possibility for rational discussion is highly inaccurate. 
The very foundation of the discourse in biotechnological debates is rhetorical such that 
each side consistently begins from incommensurable definitions of the “human” that stem 
from attempts to signify that which cannot be signified. If the above analysis is accurate, 
any attempt to provide for public deliberation in the biotechnology debate that requires 
rational discussion over facts is properly impossible since those facts cannot be separated 
from values and "mere" rhetoric. Given the fear that biotechnology will develop faster 
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than our ability to understand its implications, it seems that we are doomed to let 
unfettered scientific advancement dictate our future while we perpetually bicker over 
what to do about it. Yet, my goal here is not to deconstruct the debate to a point of 
deliberative paralysis. Rather it is to understand the debate itself on different grounds – 
grounds that do not attempt to arbitrarily synthesize incommensurable positions, but 
rather account for the formal necessity of that incommensurability and imagine the 
conditions of possibility for public deliberation stemming from that account. 
 To do so, I will return to Lacan. The psychoanalytic project, mirroring rhetoric, is 
not just a thing done – the act of analysis – but an understanding of what enables the 
analyst to analyze. It is a sort of second-order insight into the functioning of the psyche, 
or more importantly for Lacan, an insight into the functioning of signifying processes. 
Psychoanalysis, then, is much like rhetorical criticism in the sense that there is no "great 
reveal" after it is complete. Because rhetoric is not ornamental, because there is no degree 
zero in language, rhetorical criticism cannot step past or expose the "mere rhetoric" of a 
debate over biotechnologies in the hope of finding a more pure explanation of the issues 
at hand. The insight of Lacanian analysis then, is a shift in emphasis from the content of a 
discourse to its formal properties. From individual texts, we turn to economies of 
discourse, and in analyzing those economies, we ought to look towards their formal 
properties, the rhetoric, instead of focusing solely on their content. 
Looking the formal properties of a discourse must begin, according to Lacan, with the 
ways in which that discourse organizes particular investments to render itself meaningful 
for subjects who participate in that discourse. He calls these sites of investment “master 
signifiers.” According to Mark Bracher, "a master signifier is any signifier that a subject 
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has invested his or her identity in – any signifier that the subject has identified with (or 
against) and that thus constitutes a powerful positive or negative value. Master signifiers 
are thus the factors that give the articulated system of signifiers ... that is, knowledge, 
belief, language – purchase on a subject; they are what make a message meaningful, what 
make it have an impact rather than being like a foreign language that one can't 
understand."30 In the context of public debates, especially those about values, participants 
in the same discursive economy who represent differing viewpoints can identify with 
different master signifiers. This is because, according to Lacan, "All signifiers are in 
some sense equivalent, if we just play on the difference of each from all the others, 
though not being other signifiers. But it's for the same reason that each is able to come to 
the position of master signifier, precisely because its potential function is to represent the 
subject for another signifier ... However, the subject it represents is not univocal. It is 
represented, undoubtedly, but also it is not represented. At this level something remains 
hidden in relation to this very same signifier."31 This again means that there can be no 
"objective" language that exists outside of the play of signifiers, outside of the formal 
rhetorical nature of the sign. Any attempt at a univocal discourse, a closed system of 
zero-degree relationality between signifiers and signifieds demands a concealment of 
artifice – and with it, the necessary use of artifice in the first place. The Lacanian insight 
here is that claims to objectivity, be it in public moral argument or any other field of 
discourse, requires a master signifier to authorize its truth claims. 
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Be it the master signifier of the “givenness" of life, the "godliness" of the human, 
or the "Will to Evolve," all sides of the debate over biotechnological advancements rely 
on the imposition of various master signifiers to stitch together and hide the fragility of 
their discourse. In each instance, the master signifier is imagined as something 
primordial, something that exists outside of the symbolic, something inherent in the 
ontological makeup of the "human" that authorizes subsequent symbolic linkages. Master 
signifiers appear to halt the sliding of the signifying chain. To stop the play of the 
symbolic, master signifiers must gesture to something outside of signification, something 
that the discourse can attach to in order to remove the dynamism of the signifier. This, 
then, is at its most basic, the function of rhetoric in any discursive economy – the 
artificial establishment of a master signifier and the effacement of that initial artificial act 
by a gesture towards that which exceeds signification. This initial move is then repeated 
again and again throughout any discourse that adheres to a particular master signifier. 
So why must we continually efface artifice in these discourse? For Lacan, this is the most 
basic definition of desire. Because language exists in a state of failed unicity, because 
there is no degree zero – especially when arguing about categories of essence and value – 
signifiers are destined to overshoot or undershoot the signifieds they attempt to capture. 
As such, there is always a remainder in the relation between the signifier and the 
signified, and as Jerry Aline Flieger explains, "Lacan’s concise formula designates this 
excess or remainder as désir, where ‘Desire equals the excess of demand over need.'"32 
Thus, participants in a discursive economy that demands semantic precision are "never 
adequate to [their] desire, and that this inadequacy produces the entire battery of 
                                                
32  Jerry Aline Flieger, “Is There a Doctor in the House? Psychoanalysis and the 
Discourse of the Posthuman,” Paragraph 33, no. 3 (2010): 354–375, 367-368. 
258  
signifiers at play in the ongoing search for meaning."33 Paradoxically then, the more a 
subject attempts to bring signifiers to bear on a given signified, the more he or she 
becomes split between those signifiers. More splits means more remainders producing 
more desire. As this happens, the discourse moves further away from the cause of desire, 
leading to an increased anxiety that demands repressing this initial lack – leading finally 
to the instantiation of master signifiers as a corrective. In the context of the biotechnology 
debate we can see this anxiety play out in the continued failure to define the “human.” 
The result is a proliferation of texts that center on forging a definition under the refuse of 
two incommensurable master signifiers: the “Will to Evolve” and “Givenness.” 
Simply put, the more we attempt to define what it means to be human, the more 
we must act as if we actually can authoritatively reach a conclusion of what that 
definition actually is. Furthermore, once we become invested, we must deny the 
impossibility of the attempt in the first place. The subject desires unicity although it must 
efface the artifice used to achieve it, even from itself. 
Two Types of Deliberation 
Deliberation Vide 
The above process, and coincidentally what characterizes the current 
biotechnology debate, is facilitated by what Lacan calls "empty speech" (parole vide). 
Empty speech occurs when the subject fails to account for the fundamental bifurcation 
between the signifier and the object it attempts to signify. It is speech where the subject 
relies on a series of master signifiers to impose a system of unity over a discursive 
economy, a unity that elides the failure of signification to achieve a one-to-one 
correspondence with its target. In the context I have been exploring here, empty speech 
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occurs when a discursive economy effaces its own artifice, condemning the discourse to 
continued repetition of its initial gambit – that it can signify that which exists beyond 
signification. New meaning is not created so much as it is deferred. In empty speech, 
according to Lacan, the subject "will simply find his desire ever more divided, 
pulverized, in the circumscribable metonymy of speech."34 Consequently, "the subject 
seems to speak in vain about someone who ... will never join him in the assumption of his 
desire."35 
In the context of debates over future biotechnologies, stakeholders on every side 
engage in such empty speech. Both detractors and proponents of biotechnological 
advancements continually attempt to signify that which is beyond their reach, relying on 
master signifiers that simultaneously let them down due to their inevitable failure, yet 
hold the discourse suspended within an internally consistent, sealed circle. This accounts 
for the lack of clash in the debate since it dooms competing, empty discourses to circle 
around one another with incommensurable presuppositions. If one does not subscribe to 
the initial stipulation that the human is defined by “givenness,” or the "will to evolve," 
one has difficulty adhering to the arguments for the dangers or benefits of future 
biotechnologies that necessarily follow. Simply: as long as both sides of the debate are 
continually alienated by their desire to signify that which is beyond the signifying 
process, then calls for rational public deliberation necessarily follows in the emptiness of 
the discourse. Empty speech does not create meaning, instead it simply repeats the same 
(failed) attempt over and over. When no meaning is created in two simultaneous 
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continual repetitions that are mutually exclusive with each other, the discourse stagnates 
– leaving the public stuck in the middle with no capacity for rational deliberation. 
So then what is the alternative? For Lacan, it is none other than the goal of 
analysis to confront the emptiness of speech. Thus, in his conceptualization of analysis 
we may find a way to reorient the debate. As Michaela Driver explains, "Analysis is not 
about healing or about helping individuals to develop integrated, harmonious egos but 
about creating a different discourse."36 This discourse, then, differs from empty speech in 
that it does not begin with an effaced reliance on master signifiers. Rather, the goal of the 
analyst, as Bracher explains, is to represent "to the patient the effect of what has been left 
out of discourse ... the cause of the patient's desire (205). It is being confronted with this 
rejected element that produces the depth and intensity of self-division or alienation 
necessary for patients to want to separate themselves some of the alienating master 
signifiers ... and produce new master signifiers/identifications that as less exclusive, 
restrictive, and conflictual."37 The subject's desire is no longer the remainder in the gap 
between the signifier and its target that is constantly deferred through endless repetition. 
Rather, it is the motive force that compels the subject to confront those gaps, to 
understand what the underlying assumptions of the discourse he or she deploys are, and 
how they are elided by master signifiers. Here is it important to note that for Lacan, the 
result of analytic discourse is to produce master signifiers. These signifiers however 
differ from the previous master signifiers in that they are produced by the subject instead 
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of imposed on the subject from without. Indeed, as Lacan speculates, "it is fairly curious 
that what [the subject] produces is nothing other than the master's discourse ... which 
comes to occupy the place of production. And ... perhaps it's from the analyst's discourse 
that there can emerge another style of master signifier."38 The question then becomes, 
what is the nature of this new style of master signifier? Do we simply end up back where 
we started, or can we garner any insight from Lacan's theory that can help us to move 
beyond the empty speech of the biotechnology debate?    
To begin to answer these questions I will look to what Lacan points to as the goal 
of analysis: namely to facilitate what he calls “full speech” (parole pleine). For Lacan, 
"Full speech is that which aims at, which forms, the truth such as it becomes established 
in the recognition of one person by another. Full speech is speech which performs. One 
of the subjects finds himself, afterwards, other than he was before." Further, "Each time a 
man speaks to another in an authentic and full manner, there is, in the true sense, 
transference, symbolic transference – something takes place which changes the nature of 
the two beings present."39 This alteration, or transformation, of the subjects engaged in 
full speech stems from confronting the essential impossibility of communication; in other 
words, the lack of a degree-zero in signification, the inevitable gesture towards that 
which is beyond speech. If the effacement of artifice that culminates in the feigned 
unicity of the signifier and signified in empty speech results in the constant deferral of the 
desire to signify that which is beyond signification, full speech confronts this desire head 
on. 
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Deliberation Plein 
 According to Flieger, "The discourse of the posthumanist thus far has been 
limited by an avoidance of the encounter with human being itself as Otherness."40 
Likewise, this conclusion can be equally applied to the discourse of the project of 
conservative bioethics. The inability to cope with the desire produced by the gap of 
meaning left over by signifiers failing to link solidly to the concept of humanness 
produces anxiety. Lacan states that what differentiates anxiety from fear are their 
differing relationships to an object. Fear has as its object a concept we can signify (a bear 
or spider, for example). Anxiety however, has as its object something wholly different, 
something beyond conception, something Real. Lacan explains that the function of 
anxiety, "belongs to the realm of the real's irreducibility ... Therefore, the real, an 
irreducible pattern by which this real presents itself in experience, is what anxiety 
signals."41 In a succinct explanation of the concept, Barbara Biesecker outlines the real 
as, "that which, thanks to the symbolic incision, has existence but not substance, an 
existence discernible only by virtue of a careful accounting of its (de)structuring 
effects."42 That is to say that the Real is not only that which is beyond signification, but 
that which both enables and is produced by the constitutive lack inherent to the 
signifying process. Desire resides within that gap, and how we confront that desire is the 
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fulcrum on which the distinction between empty and full speech pivots. Importantly, 
then, is Biesecker's observation: 
[What characterizes empty] speech is not merely that it sustains or even 
promotes our wrongheaded over-investment in appearances or so-called 
reality; even more, by redoubling our belief in signification's noumenal 
beyond, speech that is stuffed with meaning simultaneously delivers us 
over to the grand illusion of the signified, the spatial and temporal 
coordinates of the Symbolic, and likewise, then, to finitude's grip.43 
The problem with both the transhumanist and the bioconservative is that they are awash 
in meaning. They produce too much of it in their subsequent attempts to fully grasp the 
nuances of the real, of the "human," by investing so heavily in their effacement of 
artifice. 
The alternative is to come to terms with the irreducible gap between what we 
want to signify and what is actually signified. It is full speech. Biesecker argues, "Full 
speech performs something more, something quite other, since it refuses the closure of 
representation that induces the referential illusion or the mistaken belief that something 
obtains in itself on the other side of the empire of signs."44 Indeed, "Triggering that 
awareness of the limit of the Symbolic is, I submit, the charge of full speech and the 
accomplishment of an admittedly rare but evental rhetoric."45 Most forcefully, Biesecker 
notes that, "Full speech and evental rhetoric are discursive interventions that function as 
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ground zero for fashioning our way out of mistaking the given for 'the all' and thereby by 
delivering ourselves over in advance to it endless repetitive cycle - finitude's final and 
triumphant score."46 
How does full speech trigger an awareness of the limits of the Symbolic? My 
gamble here is that to understand the stakes of this question is to begin to theorize a type 
of deliberation, a fuller deliberation, that the debate over biotechnology deserves, but is 
as of yet strikingly absent. Since the existing debate relies on a twofold deployment-then-
concealment of artifice, simply demonstrating the formal functioning of signification in 
the debate is not enough. Pointing out that the debate is saturated with moments of "you 
are unsuccessfully trying to articulate your position" does not tell us anything helpful 
about reorienting public deliberation on the topic in and of itself. However, if we explore 
the tacit assumptions that demand this disavowed use of artifice, we can begin to 
formulate an alternative. Recall the banal assumption that an audience is less likely to be 
persuaded if it knows it is being persuaded. Already in this characterization another 
assumption is being made: namely that the basic discursive configuration in the debate 
rests on the existence of a simple rhetorical dyad: the rhetor and the audience. 
Lacan levels a comprehensive critique of the communicative dyad in his earliest 
seminars and writings on Freud. Here, the concepts often bandied about by Lacanians 
such as the "Big Other" and the "objet petit a" are formulated squarely in a treatment of 
speech. The problem with the sender/receiver dyad, according to Lacan, and eloquently 
summarized by Lundberg, is that, "A dyadic conception of communication localizes 
rhetorical agency around subjects exchanging messages in speech, as opposed to seeing 
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both the subject and its message as effects of the whole economy of discourse. [The 
dyadic conception comes at] the expense of attending to the symbolic conditions that 
make exchange possible in the first place."47 To wit: when we focus on the messages 
hurled by a rhetor and their reception by an audience, we leave unexplored the very 
precondition of symbolic exchange through signifiers. This of course resonates quite well 
with the basic psychoanalytic commandment of "when we do something, we are 
unconsciously doing something else." In this case, when we skim the surface of 
communication via talking solely about senders and receivers, we belie interrogating the 
unconscious domain that resides below our initial assumptions. Speech and 
communication, for Lacan, does not exist in a dyad, but rather already prefigures at least 
three components: a sender, a receiver, and the conditions that make communication 
possible in the first place. 
The problem with empty speech, and indeed the calls for deliberation in the 
biotechnology debate, rests in the fundamental conflation of the last two coordinates. "If 
we could just better clarify our message to the public," bioethicists argue, "we could 
allow them to deliberate rationally." They lament that they cannot express their messages 
clearly enough, that each side is deploys too much rhetorical flourish, that we need to get 
to the bottom of the stakes of the debate and eschew all of our ideological 
presuppositions. In short: we need to be heard more clearly. This obsession with 
conveying meaning is what empties speech; it assumes that the failure to communicate 
rests on the speaker and the audience, not on the very preconditions that render speech 
(im)possible in the first place. For Lacan, this is the fundamental conflation between what 
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he calls the "big Other" (capital O) with the other (other in French is autre, hence the 
petit a). In other words, when we speak, we are addressing the Other, the preconditions 
for symbolic exchange, who we mistakenly identify as residing in the other subjects we 
are addressing. In so doing, we assume that communication is possible, that signifiers 
neatly represent the totality of what we think they signify, and specifically that the 
"human" can be neatly summarized as that which is given or that which wills itself to 
evolve. But the Other frustrates the subject for Lacan – the Other's (mis)hearing of what 
the subject tries to communicate demands that the subject tries and tries again, 
continually frustrated in his or her desire to be understood. 
To convey this process is nothing short of the goal of analysis. Here it is essential 
to note that the Lacanian analyst is not out to impose his or her own meaning on the 
subject's frustration. Contrary to the characterization of pop-psychoanalytic, the Lacanian 
analyst ought not to claim, "Yes, I know you are frustrated that you cannot get a job, but 
really you have penis envy." Likewise, the rhetorical critic who takes to heart Lacanian 
insights ought not to attempt to strip away the "mere" rhetoric in an object in order to get 
to "what it is really conveying." Colette Soler succinctly explains that Lacan's 
formulation, “introduces, between subject and interpreter, the Other - not as listener, but 
rather as symbolic context, that is, as the locus of a discourse ... Lacan stresses the fact 
that, as listeners, we always have to ask ourselves what position the subject occupies with 
respect to the symbolic order that envelops him."48 Thus, if we return to the question of 
fostering a more full deliberation in the biotechnology debate, we ought not to demand 
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that we strip away all the ideological presuppositions of each side in order to foster a 
wholly rational debate that "really" gets to the heart of the issue.  
Full Deliberation and the Biotechnology Debate 
 Recall that for Flieger, the biotechnology debate is characterized by a failure for 
stakeholders to encounter "human being itself as Otherness." Perhaps unintentionally, the 
capitalization of "Otherness" is instructive here. While perhaps not unique, the 
biotechnology debate lays bare the impossibility of communication through our inability 
to definitively articulate the essence of the "human." Specifically, the very preconditions 
of communication, the existence of the Symbolic that channels all discourse on the 
matter, demands that defining the "human" can only be met by failure. But failure is 
productive. This is not to say that we ought throw our hands up, declare public 
deliberation on biotechnology to be a failure and rest on our laurels by employing the 
turn of phrase that “failure is productive.” Rather, it is to foster a particular type of 
failure, one that can be productive for those involved since not all failure is created 
equally. Michael J. Hyde, in his Arnold Lecture on the biotechnology debate sums this up 
eloquently, stating, "Any talk of human perfectibility presupposes the existence of this 
process that is what it is (a completeness) only by its being open-ended and thus 
incomplete, forever calling itself into question and challenging us with the task of 
maintaining or remaking our meaningful existence."49 Elsewhere, he characterizes this as 
a "reconstruction," importantly, a reconstruction that is itself always a process.50 Thus, in 
order to facilitate a reconstructing of the biotechnology debate, Hyde demands we 
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employ an, "Open-mindedness [that] is a necessary condition for appreciating the 
otherness of infinity and the question of perfection that it raises."51 
It is my contention that the open-mindedness of which Hyde speaks can be 
accomplished by fostering a type of deliberation that is predicated on full speech, a more 
full deliberation about biotechnology. While it may be (productively) impossible to fully 
articulate what this type of deliberation might look like – doing so might come perilously 
close to simply imposing definitive meaning on a task that by its very nature is empty 
because of its obsession with imposing meaning – we may be able to offer some broad 
preconditions by which to triangulate an alternative. 
First, it seems to be absolutely essential that we move away from calls for 
"rational" public discourse over biotechnologies. Attempting to strip away any “mere” 
rhetoric from the debate in order to "get to the facts" simply moves us from one master 
signifier to another. In so doing, we repeat various incommensurable definitions of the 
"human" that move us further and further away from confronting the fundamental lack of 
the Symbolic. Try as we might, we can never finally affix a singular meaning to the 
"human" without gesturing toward that which cannot be signified, and as we gesture 
beyond our signifying capacity, we invite the conditions for intractable disagreement. 
Instead of debating over what whatever unsayable beyond may be, we ought to confront 
its necessity head on, knowing that distinguishing facts from values in the biotechnology 
debate is ultimately a fool’s errand. Instead facts and values are forever twinned as 
constitutive components that performatively express the unbridgeable gap between the 
signifiers we use and the real we wish them to signify. In short, we ought to strive for a 
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deliberation that accounts for our desire to signify the "human," not one that attempts to 
hide from it under the cover of rationality, facts, and empty master signifiers. 
Paradoxically, the more we try to strip discourse to the bone, the more signifying flotsam 
we toss between ourselves and the critical questions raised by biotechnological 
advancement. 
Linked to this first contention is a correlate that requires us to move past the 
communicative dyad. The reason current attempts to foster public deliberation over 
biotechnology are continually frustrated does not stem from bioethicists’ inability to 
present a clear enough message to the public. We should be painfully aware that attempts 
to disavow the initial use of artifice that link signifiers to a concept requires even more 
artifice. Thus, striving to reduce the noise to signal ratio between a sender and receiver is 
unhelpful because current calls for deliberation do not grasp the nature of the signal path. 
If the current debate is characterized by an unconscious (in Lacan's terms) conflation of 
the audience (other) with the conditions of possibility for discourse to take place (Other), 
the role of the rhetorical critic-as-analyst would be to create the conditions that allow for 
the apprehension on the part of the participants that this is not simply a failure to 
communicate, but rather that this is a communication of that failure. In other words, we 
need to interpose the Symbolic Order between the sender and the receiver.52 
This interposition serves as the framework for Lacan’s understanding of the 
ethical aim in his psychoanalytic project. His seminar on ethics, Seminar VII, provides us 
with the clearest analog for imagining what “full deliberation” might look like. Lacan 
explains that any ethics consists of a sort of dual judgment: the judgment of individual 
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actions and the judgment of how we judge those individual actions in the service of the 
good.53 This second judgment thus reflects what I have referred to as a sort of entelechy, 
an imagining of the perfected form of the ethical system in which each individual act can 
be referenced back to a rubric that is unfalteringly “good.” If there is a main point I have 
argued so far, it is that the contemporary biotechnology debate is focused squarely on this 
Last Judgment, an imagining of the essential components of the “human” to serve as a 
guideline for which to interpret the desirability of biotechnological enhancement. 
However, if bioethicists’ preoccupation with their particular forms of the Last Judgment 
leads us to empty deliberation, how might we imagine a different framework?  
Let us refer back to the concept of desire and its central role in speech. If desire is 
understood as the demand to signify object in a zero-degree deviation, we understand that 
it must fail.54 Importantly, “The channel in which desire is located is not simply that of 
the modulation of the signifying chain, but that which flows beneath it as well; that is, 
properly speaking, what we are as well as what we are not, out being and our non-being  
that which is signified in an act passes from one signifier of the chain to another beneath 
all the significations.”55 As I hope to have shown, the realm beneath all signifiers is the 
logically prior realm of affect. The continual mooring and unmooring of affects to 
signifiers is the warp and woof where desire lies, continually under- or overshooting its 
mark. As such, desire is, by definition, unknowable  in its place, we can only signify a 
representation of a lack of representation. What fills this lack? For Lacan, it is the quest 
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for knowledge, for rendering the unknowable known. He characterizes this a science of 
desire, since, “Science, which occupies the place of desire, can only be a science of desire 
in the form of an enormous question mark; and this is doubtless not without a structural 
cause. In other words, science is animated by some mysterious desire, but it doesn’t 
know, an more than anything in the unconscious itself, what that desire means.”56 
Therefore, in order to coax full deliberation out of the biotechnology debate, I propose we 
imagine the endeavor of bioethics not simply as a field concerned with the ethics of 
science, but instead as itself a science of desire  specifically, a science of the desire to 
define the unknowableness that is the “human.”  
To reformulate the discipline in this way means to reorient it in the ways I have 
outlined above. The result, I hope is to provide the opportunity for full deliberation by 
forwarding not just arguments for or against biotechnology, but striving for knowledge of 
the desire that animates them. To give an example of how this might look, I’ll turn to 
Lacan’s exploration of the concept of “eating the book,” taken from Revelation. For 
Lacan,  “[This] is the most extreme of metonymies. [In eating the book] it isn’t the book 
that fills our stomach. When I ate the book, I didn’t thereby become any more book than 
the book became flesh. The book became me so to speak. But in order for this operation 
to take place … [I have to pay a price, and] that’s the object, the good, that one pays for 
the satisfaction of one’s desire.”57 The analogy speaks to the passage where an angel 
commands, “Take [the book] and eat it. It will turn your stomach sour, but in your mouth 
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it will taste sweet as honey.”58 In order to become the Word, the subject takes on the laws 
by which it is governed  the good given up (precipitating the Fall) is required for the 
fulfillment of desire. That good, the state before the Fall, is then, in the thing the 
Christian tradition seek to recuperate. In other words, fulfilling one’s desire requires 
sacrifice. We see this on both sides of the biotechnology debate: for the bioconservative, 
fulfilling the desire to remain human means accepting the biological limitations and 
suffering intrinsic to it. For the transhumanist, the desire for immortality requires that we 
abandon techno-skepticism and indeed our purely organic biological makeup. 
But Lacan reads this action differently. For him, eating the book is a sublimation 
of hunger. It is sublimation that, drawing on Freud, he characterizes as a change in aim 
and not object.59 In other words, instead of eating the book in order to understand its 
meaning, along with the Fall that necessarily follows, he refigures the process: eating the 
book means to explore why we desire meaning and what we are willing to give up in 
order to attain it. Thus, Lacan a science of desire seeks to eat the book, the book of 
Western science. Lacan concludes, “The important thing is not knowing whether man is 
good or bad in the beginning; the important thing is what will transpire once the book has 
been eaten.”60 If bioethics seeks to be a science of desire, it too must eat the book. 
In practical terms, bioethics needs to change its aim. Instead of attempting to 
explain more clearly to the public one position on the essential qualities of the “human” 
or another in order to facilitate Final Judgment on the desirability of biotechnology, the 
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goal ought be to abandon the prerequisite topoi of the debate and focus instead on the 
krinomenon: What does the debate itself tell us about our desire (and our inevitable 
inability) to define ourselves? Fostering public deliberation without rushing towards 
equally arbitrary definitions of essence outside of language requires that we accept that 
while we desire to understand the “human,” it remains ultimately unknowable. With that 
acceptance comes the possibility for instead deliberating what we ought give up in our 
quest. The importance of the biotechnology debate may not be solely comprised of its 
content, which in and of itself is already quite significant. It may rest in the fact that it 
forces us to confront not just what makes us "human," but also our inherent inability to 
communicate, much less deliberate, our answer. Simon Young's Transhumanist 
Manifesto calls for transhumanists to engage in a "meme war." He argues, "Some say that 
memes act of their own accord. I shall argue that memes are power tools. Meme Wars as 
the battles of ideas played out within a culture to influence the direction it will take. 
Whoever controls the spread of attitudes and habits in a society, controls that society. He 
who holds the power is he who controls the meme."61 Eloquent, but perhaps inaccurate in 
that it posits we must assume we can control how the Other interprets our message. In 
order to foster full deliberation over what makes us who we are, we need to explore the 
ways in which debating over our very humanity forces us to confront the limits of the 
Symbolic and indeed confront our desire to avoid them. This in turn may allow us to 
come to terms with what is "Other" in ourselves. Perhaps the very structure of the 
discourse of debates over our biotechnological future renders final reconstruction 
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impossible, but in its very impossibility we may be able to articulate something more 
fully about how we define ourselves in accepting its failure. 
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